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EVER VIGILANT: CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCES 
 
William Carlton Mayborn 
 




Abstract:  This dissertation presents a structured and focused comparison of how 
Chinese leaders and academics have perceived the security cooperation of states on 
China’s periphery.  This study examines three cases: the U.S.S.R.-Vietnam Alliance 
(1978-1989); the U.S.-Japan Alliance (1990-2016) and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance 
(1990-2016).  They exemplify adversarial alliances in that they represent security 
cooperation that threatened or potentially threaten Chinese vital interests.  
Similarly, they all represent adversarial alliances of an asymmetric power 
relationship between a larger and smaller state.  I gathered this data from Chinese 
journal articles and books related to the three cases, interviewed Chinese academics 
and think tank analysts, and compared the Chinese perceptions with non-Chinese 
primary and secondary sources.  The research explores how well four concepts 
describe alliance behavior in the evidence.  The first three concepts relate to how 
China views the alliances’ intentions, capabilities, and cohesion.  The fourth concept 
relates to China’s self-perception as a rising state relative to the adversarial 
alliances.  Knowledge of Chinese past and present perceptions of adversarial 
alliances should assist academics and policy makers in understanding the 
implications of security cooperation of states that are in close proximity to the 
Chinese mainland. 
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1.0  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 KEY QUESTIONS AND RELEVANCE 
In broad terms, how do China’s leaders and policy makers perceive security 
cooperation between states on China’s periphery?  How do they evaluate an 
adversarial alliance’s cohesion or capabilities?  Moreover, do alliance activities on 
China’s periphery cause Chinese analysts to over-read or perceive conspiratorial 
motives?  Consequently, do these varying perceptions of adversarial alliances have 
any bearing on the formation of Chinese foreign policy outcomes?  These four 
questions build upon a number of significant International Relations debates 
concerning the ability to discern intentions, the role of capabilities, perceptions and 
misperceptions, and rising states.   
Beyond the debates above, it is important to understand how China’s leaders 
have perceived past and present adversarial alliances.  First, little has been written 
on how target state leaders perceive adversarial alliances.  The CIA has delved into 
the topic, as evidenced by a thought provoking study of how the Warsaw Pact 
officers viewed NATO in the early 1980s.1  Besides Thomas Christensen’s book, 
                                                        
1 “Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO Strengths and Weaknesses,” CIA, Intelligence Information 
Report (HR 70-14), 19 August 1982, Document No. 5166d4f999326091c6a60963, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/5166d4f999326091c6a60963 (Accessed 12 March 2015); 
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Worse Than a Monolith, and his article, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the 
Security Dilemma in East Asia,” little attention has been paid specifically to China’s 
perceptions of foreign alliances.2  In a different vein of scholarship, works by 
Timothy Crawford and Yasuhiro Izumikawa have focused on how target states have 
attempted to prevent or divide adversarial adversaries.3  In contrast to Zhang 
Biwu’s recent book, Chinese Perceptions of the U.S., I will focus on three great power 
alliances that threatened or currently threaten Chinese security interests.4   
Second, from a practical angle it is important to trace how China’s leaders 
and policy makers have interpreted important or transformative alliance events 
such as revised guidelines and military capability enhancements.  For example, from 
China’s viewpoint, are the adversarial alliances actions heightening the security 
dilemma?  Alternatively, how do they perceive the cohesion and capabilities of 
adversarial alliances?  Likewise, in the context of the rise of China, it is important to 
examine how the growth of China’s comprehensive national power has changed the 
way China’s leaders perceive the adversarial alliances.  For instance, is there 
evidence that Chinese leaders have become increasingly dissatisfied with 
adversarial alliances on its periphery?   
                                                        
2 Thomas Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy 
in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); and Thomas Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), 
pp. 49-80. 
3 Timothy W. Crawford, “How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security, Vol. 35, 
No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 155-189; and Timothy W. Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the 
Deviant Case of Spain, 1940-41,” Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 155-189; and 
Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “To Coerce or Reward?  Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics,” 
Security Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 498-531. 
4 Zhang Biwu, Chinese Perceptions of the U.S.: An Exploration of China’s Foreign Policy Motivations 
(New York: Lexington Books, 2012). 
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Third, it is important to understand how China’s leaders view adversarial 
alliances in the context of peripheral issues such as North Korea, Taiwan, and 
maritime territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines.     
This dissertation investigates how Chinese perceptions of adversarial 
alliances exhibit variation in reading the alliance’s intentions, capabilities, and 
cohesion.  Additionally, this dissertation will investigate how China’s rise in both 
economic and military power has changed its perception of the US-Japan Alliance 
and the US-ROK Alliance.  
1.2 RESEARCH CONCEPTS 
This research seeks to examine four significant alliance perception concepts, 
so I will begin with defining key terms and concepts.  To define the term alliance, I 
will use Glenn Snyder’s definition, “Alliances are formal associations of states for the 
use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside 
their own membership (Italics removed).”5  From the vantage point of the third-
party state or target state, its position is outside the membership of the alliance.  
Thus, an adversarial alliance is one that is targeted against one’s own military 
capabilities or one’s own existing alliances.6  I use the term adversarial to draw the 
distinction from alliances that China had formal membership during the Cold War: 
                                                        
5 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4. 
6 Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith.  The term “adversarial alliance” is commonly used in business 
parlance to mean cooperation between two or more competing companies to accomplish a shared 
purpose; for example, Dell and Hewlett-Packard working together on laptop motherboard research 
and development to produce for their respective product lines. 
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the Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Sino-North Korean Alliance.  Additionally, at 
present China’s relations with Pakistan and Russia are often termed “quasi-
alliances.”  Therefore, I am not studying Chinese perceptions of its past or present 
alliance or quasi-alliance relationships. 
To accomplish greater understanding of Chinese perceptions of adversarial 
alliances, I will explore how well four concepts describe alliance behavior in the 
evidence.  The conceptual frameworks in Chapter 3 will layout the questions that I 
will ask of the three case studies, but first I want to introduce the concepts in the 
context of how a third-party state could perceive an adversarial alliance in regards 
to intentions, capabilities, and cohesion. 
First, Adversarial Alliance Intentions—this is a concept related to the 
judgement of motivations and goals of an actor.  Analysts often characterize 
intentions as being benign or malign.  Additionally, intentions can change and are 
not static.  Therefore, I want to determine when Chinese analysts have perceived a 
change in alliance intentions, and what factors precipitated those judgements.  
Lastly, I want to see when the alliance’s intentions have been judged as a conspiracy, 
and whether the judgements of conspiracy are countered by differing appraisals or 
corrected. 
Second, Adversarial Alliance Cohesion—this concept is concerned with 
Chinese evaluations of the unity of the adversarial alliances to work towards shared 
goals.  Often an analyst will judge whether an alliance possessed or lacked cohesion 
after a crisis tests the mettle of the alliance, which makes it difficult to judge the 
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present state of alliance cohesion.  I want to see what variables or factors inform 
such an appraisal. 
Third, Adversarial Alliance Capabilities—this concept focuses on the military 
capabilities possessed by the adversarial alliance.  I want to see what types of 
capabilities such as conventional or nuclear capabilities draw the most attention 
and what perceptions are formed.  Asymmetric alliances often do not aggregate 
capabilities as the small power has little military power to contribute, but the small 
power can aid the large power in projecting power over a great distance by allowing 
access to ports and bases. 
The fourth concept under investigation is Self-Perception of the Rising State in 
Relation to Adversarial Alliance—this concept concerns how China’s rise in 
comprehensive national power has influenced and changed its view of the 
adversarial alliances on its periphery.  In particular, I want to see how China’s 
relationship with the smaller alliance members, Japan and South Korea, changed as 
China has grown in economic and military power. 
 Undergirding this research project are some key concepts that need defining.  
The first is Costly Action—this concept relates to how states signal their intentions 
in to act ways that requires spending political or material resources.  I will divide 
costly action into the tangible and intangible costly actions.  For example, tangible 
costly actions involve material costs such as the deployment, reduction or complete 
withdrawal of military capabilities, the development, reduction or destruction of 
military capabilities, and outlay of monetary resources to base or relocate soldiers.  
In contrast, analysts cannot quantify intangible costly actions such as reputational 
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costs, the spending of political capital, and abandonment costs.  Lastly, Diplomatic 
Signaling relates to how states signal their intentions to act in non-costly or costly 
ways.  For example, a state, states, or states in an alliance can issue or sign joint 
declarations, joint statements, reports, treaties, and agreements.   
1.3 RESEARCH PROJECT 
This next section will detail how I used the three cases, how the case studies 
are similar to one another, and how they differ from other possible adversarial 
alliance cases since World War II.  Next, I will describe how I went about gathering 
the sample of journal articles, interviews with Chinese scholars, and the use of non-
Chinese sources to compare and contrast Chinese perceptions.   
1.3.1 Case Selection 
This research conducts a structured and focused comparison of three cases: 
the Soviet Union-Vietnam Alliance (1978-1989), the US-Japan Alliance (1990-2016), 
and the US-South Korea (ROK) Alliance (1990-2016).  The case studies will allow me 
to examine junctures in which Chinese analysts perceive adversarial alliance 
intentions, capabilities, and cohesion.  Thus, in each case study, I ask whether there 
is evidence supporting each of the three alliance perception concepts.  The US-Japan 
Alliance and US-ROK Alliance case studies will allow me to examine the self-
perception of a rising state in relation to two adversarial alliances. 
 7 
In terms of case selection, I chose these three adversarial alliance cases 
because they represent the most serious security concerns for China in the past 40 
years.  In each case, China’s smaller power neighbors were in alliance with a distant 
great power that possessed tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.  These alliance 
relationships dramatically altered or presently alter the smaller powers’ position 
relative to China, because the larger power’s possession of strategic offensive 
weapons greatly enhances the ability of the alliance to deter and coerce China.  
Additionally, these alliance relationships allowed the greater power access to the 
smaller powers’ territory; and thus, enhance the distant greater powers’ ability to 
project power in close proximity to China. 
Therefore, China as the target state perceived that the three adversarial 
alliances threatened or potentially threatens its vital interests.  I am defining vital 
interests in a rather conservative manner where the adversarial alliance cases were 
threatening or presently threaten the existence of the Chinese state.  This 
conservative treatment follows Timothy Crawford’s logic that vital interests concern 
the state’s self-preservation.  Thus, situations that involve self-preservation will 
cause states to “assess the intensity of each other’s interests similarly.”   It is 
analytically useful to control the cases in this way since it puts the perceived 
intensity of interests of all state actors on a common playing field.  In an anarchic 
international environment, all states are threatened by alliances formed on their 
periphery that could potentially destroy them.   
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1.3.2 Sources and Interviews 
As I worked through these three cases of adversarial alliances, I discovered 
how Chinese academics viewed the respective adversarial alliance developments.  
The Chinese government at present considers the first historical case, the Soviet 
Union-Vietnam Alliance, as a sensitive and potentially objectionable topic given that 
a portion of the case study coincides with the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966 to 
1976).7  Fortunately, Chinese scholars pointed me to a number of primary sources 
available on the Internet from the late 1970s regarding the Sino-Vietnam border 
war.  Yet, I have largely depended on secondary sources to construct the case study.  
The period for the two current-day cases, the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK 
Alliance, is from the end of the Cold War to 2015.  These cases are much too recent 
and government documents are not open to public viewing.  Currently, Chinese 
government archives are rather restrictive, and information concerning current 
events are definitely not open to the public.8  This restrictive nature of the archive 
system is a reality that I must work with and will guide the formation of the 
research.   
 Therefore, I have treated three kinds of Chinese sources as representatives of 
Chinese perceptions: 1) official government statements, 2) journal scholars, and 3) 
academic interview subjects.  First, when available, I have consulted official Chinese 
                                                        
7 Chen Bo [陈波], Personal Interview, 10 November 2015, East China Normal University—Center for 
Cold War International History Studies. 
8 Maura Cunningham, “Denying Historians: China’s Archives Increasingly Off-Bounds,” The Wall 
Street Journal blog China Real Time, 19 August 2014, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/08/19/denying-historians-chinas-archives-increasingly-
off-bounds/ (Accessed 30 June 2015). 
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government statements published by the People’s Daily and the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  Given the nature of the subject matter and the seriousness of 
adversarial alliances, I did not have any opportunities to interview elite policy 
makers or government figures.   
Second, I chose the five most highly regarded and well respected Chinese 
International Relations policy and academic journals from three think tanks and two 
universities in Beijing.  The three leading policy journals were World Economics and 
Politics [世界经济与政治] from the Institute of World Politics and Economics of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; China International Studies [国际问题研究] from 
the China Institute of International Studies; and Contemporary International 
Relations [现代国际关系] from the China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations.  The two academic journals selected for the research project were 
International Politics [国际政治研究] from the School of International Studies at 
Peking University, and Foreign Affairs Review [外交评论] from China Foreign Affairs 
University.  The five journals are all readily available from the China Knowledge 
Resource Integrated Database (CNKI).  After accumulating a sample of 64 articles, I 
found that the sample was lacking journal articles by Chinese scholars from the 
1990s.  Consequently, I decided to broaden the sample by supplementing with three 
articles from other respected Chinese scholars that appeared in a journal produced 
in the late 1990s entitled, International Strategic Studies [国际战略研究所].  
Additionally, I added two articles by Chinese scholars from Stanford University’s 
Asia-Pacific Research Center, a book chapter by Yuan Jingdong, and an article by Wu 
Xinbo from the The Washington Quarterly.  Table 1.1 details the sample size and 
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sources for the respective alliances; granted, some articles offered details on both 
alliances if the author focused on U.S. alliances in East Asia.   
Sample Sources Number of Articles 
China International Studies 15 
Contemporary International Relations 25 
Foreign Affairs Review 3 
International Politics 9 
International Strategic Studies 3 
World Economics and Politics 12 
Chinese author in Non-Chinese Publication 4 
Total 71 
Sample Topics  Number of Articles 
US-Japan Alliance 31 
US-ROK Alliance 12 
Both US-Japan Alliance and US-ROK Alliance 25 
USSR-Vietnam Alliance 3 
Total 71 
Table 1.1   Chinese Journal Articles Sample Size and Topics 
 Thirdly, I have used interviews with highly respected academics and policy 
analysts to collect their perceptions and those of high-level decision makers and 
policy makers.  As a non-Chinese citizen, I have limited access to high-level 
government documents and archives that would give a broader and more 
systematic observation of Chinese perceptions of adversarial alliances.  In this 
regard, I must depend on the interview subjects’ knowledge of elite discussions and 
perceptions of adversarial alliances.  During my field work in Beijing from 
September 2015 to January 2016, I interviewed highly respected Chinese academics 
and think tank analysts; some of whom possess access to Chinese policy makers.  
Each of the interview subjects gave me permission to quote them in this 
dissertation.  After I completed the transcription and translation of the interviews, I 
presented the important quotes that I found most useful to my research to the 
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interview subjects to read over and approve.  I am very grateful to the following 
interview subjects for their insights into Chinese perceptions of security 
cooperation on China’s periphery: 
Chen Bo [陈波] East China Normal University—Diplomatic Historian 
Li Danhui [李丹慧] East China Normal University—Diplomatic Historian  
Li Qingsi [李庆四] Renmin University—Political Scientist 
Sun Xuefeng [孙学峰] Qinghua University—Political Scientist 
Wang Dong [王栋] Peking University—Political Scientist 
Wu Riqiang [吴日强] Renmin University—Political Scientist 
Xin Qiang [信强] Fudan University—Political Scientist 
Xing Guangcheng [型广程] Chinese Academy of Social Sciences—Director of 
the Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies 
Yu Tiejun [于铁军] Peking University—Political Scientist 
Zhu Feng [朱锋] Nanjing University—Executive Director of the China Center 
for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea. 
To round out my case study observations, I have used non-Chinese primary 
and secondary sources to compare and contrast the Chinese perceptions presented 
in the Chinese sources.  In this way, I present both congruent and opposing 
viewpoints to support or challenge the varied Chinese perceptions.   
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1.4 DISSERTATION LAYOUT 
In Chapter 2, I will introduce the current state of alliance and perceptions 
scholarship that relates to research concepts.  Chapter 3 will build on the literature 
review and layout the conceptual framework that I used for the structured and 
focused comparison of the cases.  Next, the three empirical chapters cover the most 
critical adversarial alliances China faced over the past 40 years.  The three case 
studies highlight the different adversarial alliance developments that will be useful 
to validate the respective alliance perception concepts.  Chapter 4 analyzes the 
background and formation of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance from 1978 to 1989.  The 
chapter examines Soviet and North Vietnamese security cooperation in fighting the 
U.S in the Vietnam War and the formation of an alliance that threatened China.  Next, 
I turn to the two post-Cold War adversarial alliances that will offer a comparison 
within the U.S. alliance system in East Asia from 1991 to present.  Chapter 5 will 
examine the US-Japan Alliance, and Chapter 6 will analyze the US-ROK Alliance.  
Finally, Chapter 7 will display the results from the structured and focused 
comparison of Chinese perceptions towards the three adversarial alliances cases for 




2.0  CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The literature review introduces the current state of research on alliances 
and perceptions.  Both of these areas contain important International Relations 
debates, explanations, and interpretations.   
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON ALLIANCES 
The topic of adversarial alliances requires me to understand the crucial 
scholarship on security alliances; more specifically, how political scientists have 
developed and debated the concept.  After examining the differing conceptual and 
theoretical views of alliance formation, I have divided the alliance literature review 
into two interlocking components: the functional and the relational.  The functional 
component pertains to the purposes of alliances.  The relational component pertains 
to both the power symmetry of the alliance members, and how the adversarial 
alliance relates to the target state or third-party state.  Though I have delineated the 
functional and relational components they are not mutually exclusive. 
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2.2.1 Alliance Definition 
Among International Relations scholarship the definition of what is and what 
is not an alliance is rather diverse.  Melvin Small and David Singer offer a narrow 
conceptual definition that points towards three types of military alliances:1  
1) Defense pact,  
2) Non-aggression or neutrality treaty, and  
3) Entente.   
In this regard, Small and Singer’s conception is so narrow it would not include any 
unilateral or asymmetric security guarantees such as the 1951 Japanese-American 
security treaty.  They argue that only one state in the agreement committed to 
protect the other state.2  With this reasoning, David Lake termed the 1951 Japanese-
American security treaty a “loose protectorate” instead of an alliance relationship.3   
Douglas Gibler’s definition depicts a much broader and all-inclusive 
interpretation, “An alliance is a formal contingent commitment by two or more 
states to some future action.”4  As a result, Gibler’s alliance definition could include 
the World Trade Organization as an example of an alliance.  Commenting on the 
conceptual broadness of alliances, Edwin Fedder stated, “The concept of alliance in 
                                                        
1 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data,” 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), p. 261. 
2 Volker Krause and J. David Singer, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary 
Patterns,” from chapter in Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, eds., Small States and Alliances (New York: 
Physica-Verlag, 2001), p. 17. 
3 David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), p. 143. 
4 Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2009), p. xlix. 
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the literature of international relations is ambiguous and amorphous.”5  To rectify 
this conceptual ambiguity, Fedder offered nine necessary and sufficient conditions 
of an alliance:6   
1) Is comprised of member states,  
2) Has fixed territorial jurisdiction, 
3) Has a limited duration, 
4) Has either symmetric or asymmetric power distributions, 
5) Has an active or passive orientation, 
6) Is based upon unilateral or mutual commitments, 
7) Possesses a guarantee or force-in-being security mechanisms, 
8) Possesses a structured or unstructured organization, and  
9) Produces collective goods or both collective and non-collective goods.  
Stefan Bergsmann’s definition took Fedder’s insights and moved towards 
greater conceptual precision.  He stated, “an alliance shall be defined as an explicit 
agreement among states in the realm of national security in which the partners 
promise mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in 
the case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain.”7  For my 
research purposes, I will use Glenn Snyder’s definition because it points to the target 
of the alliance.  He wrote, “Alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or 
nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their 
                                                        
5 Edwin H. Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 
1968), p. 70. 
6 Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” pp. 80-81. 
7 Stefan Bergsmann, “The Concept of Military Alliance,” from chapter in Erich Reiter and Heinz 
Gärtner, eds., Small States and Alliances (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), p. 36. 
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own membership (Italics removed).”8  This definition is precise enough and does 
well to encapsulate the three adversarial alliance cases in the three empirical 
chapters because China remains the state outside of the alliance membership.  
Additionally, since Glenn Snyder’s definition does not include “mutual assistance in 
the form of a substantial contribution of resources,” his definition better suits the 
asymmetric nature of my three cases.  The Soviet Union was not dependent on the 
military resources of Vietnam, and the United States is not dependent on the 
military resources of Japan or South Korea. 
2.2.2 Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power 
Alliances play an important role in balance of power theory, but as Glenn 
Snyder reminds us, “These two subjects are far from identical, however.  The 
balance of power is a systemic tendency linked to anarchy; alliance formation is an 
instrument of statecraft.”9  Frederick the Great spoke of the balance of power as a 
guiding principle for foreign affairs in 1848, he stated, “when the policy and the 
prudence of the princes of Europe lose sight of the maintenance of a just balance 
among dominant powers, the constitution of the whole body politic resents it: 
violence is found on one side, weakness on the other.”10  Hans Morgenthau’s 
classical realist treatment of balance of power theory is put forward as a social 
                                                        
8 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4. 
9 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 156. 
10 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Edition (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), p. 189.  Quote from Frederick the Great, “Considerations on the 
present state of the political body of Europe,” Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand, Vol. VIII (Berlin: Rudolph 
Decker, 1848), p. 24.  Morgenthau supplied the translation himself from the French. 
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equilibrium found not in “isolated nations, but in the relations between one nation 
or alliance of nations and another alliance.”11   
In regards to the balance of power, it is important to recognize the impact of 
rising powers and declining powers.  International Relations scholars often cite 
Thucydides as the first to notice the impact of a rising power on the relative 
declining power.12  In the 20th century, A. F. K. Organski, noted the importance and 
quality of industrialization in the power transition process, and he was keenly 
aware of population and immigration as sources of power.  In regards to future 
challengers, Organski noted in 1968, “If China is successful, control of the 
Communist order will pass to her, and the Western powers will find that the most 
serious threat to their supremacy comes from China.”13  Robert Gilpin argued, “The 
rising state or states in the system increasingly demand changes in the system that 
will reflect their newly gained power and their unmet interests.”14  Potentially the 
“incompatibility” between the “existing international system and the changing 
distribution of power” could result in a hegemonic war to alleviate the 
“disequilibrium.”15  In contrast, Yang Shih-yueh offered an alternative to hegemonic 
war.  He wrote, “A power transition will be peaceful if the leading defender is willing 
                                                        
11 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 181. 
12 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, Robert 
B. Strassler, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1996), p. 65. 
13 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd Ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 361. 
14 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 
33. 
15 Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18,  
No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring 1988), pp. 601-602. 
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to accommodate the challenger appropriately, offering the rising challenger a 
proportional share of benefits and status according to its rising share of power.”16   
In relation to alliances, rising powers could gain allies that envision their 
state profiting from alignment.  Randall Schweller wrote, “Alliance choices, however, 
are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger, by appetite as well 
as fear.”17  China watchers have taken an interest in the rise of China as it has grown 
tremendously in comprehensive national power in comparison to the Maoist era.  
Scholars such as Robert Ross, Zhu Feng, and David Shambaugh have all noted 
China’s increase in power.18   
Kenneth Waltz later introduced his structural ideas concerning how the 
international system shifted from multipolarity to bipolarity.  Waltz argued that the 
balance of power in a bipolar system was more stable because the leading poles 
have greater clarity on “who will oppose whom.”19  Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing in 
agreement with Waltz, argued that in a bipolar system the alliances “register the 
general interests of the members,” and the “interests are clear and relatively 
unchanging” because they are based on the power structure of the international 
system.  In contrast, in a multipolar system the alliances “create interests that did 
not previously exist,” and “the interests are often ambiguous… and are imperfectly 
                                                        
16 Yang Shih-yueh, “Power Transition, Balance of Power, and the Rise of China: A Theoretical  
Reflection about Rising Great Powers,” The China Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 2013), p. 37. 
17 Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,”  
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 79. 
18 Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International 
Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008); and David Shambaugh, Power Shift: China 
and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
19 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 
884. 
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shared among allies.”20  In a later work by Waltz, he added that alliances, regardless 
of the polarity of the system, require constant intra-alliance maintenance and 
management.21   
 A significant criticism of Waltz’s neorealism rose from the neoclassical realist 
theorists that argued that Waltz had overemphasized the current distribution of 
power.  Though the theory achieved parsimony, it neglected “the role of domestic 
distributional politics” and the role of assessing threats.22  Notable neoclassical 
scholars have delved into the domestic politics of states to understand how it can 
contribute to foreign policy outcomes.  For example, William Wohlforth rejects 
balance of power frameworks as “flawed and ambiguous” formulations in 
comparison to the historic details of Soviet policy and the Cold War.23  An additional 
neoclassical work by Randall Schweller confronts the balance of power theory of 
alliance formation.  He concludes, “states are less concerned with power imbalances 
than they are about who holds power.  Interests, not power, determine how states 
choose their friends and enemies.”24  In another work, Schweller illustrates how 
domestic elite diffusion or concentration affects a state’s ability to balance against 
potential threats.  He concludes, “The closer the policymaking process and actual 
                                                        
20 Glenn H. Snyder, and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and 
System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 426, 428-
429. 
21 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, Inc., 1979), pp. 
168-169. 
22 Mark R. Brawley, “Neoclassical realism and strategic calculations: explaining divergent British, 
French, and Soviet Strategies toward Germany between the world wars (1919-1939),” from chapter 
3 in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, The 
State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 78. 
23 William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 16. 
24 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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state-society relations approximate a unitary actor, the more accurate realism’s 
predictions.  Conversely, when states are divided at the elite and societal levels, they 
are less likely to behave in accordance with balance of power predictions.”25  
Schweller and other neoclassical realists reject the structural determinism of 
neorealist scholars such as Christopher Layne, Arnold Wolfers, and John 
Mearsheimer that promote balance of power as a “law of nature;” instead, Schweller 
argued that balancing policy is a result of domestic political process and 
deliberation.26  Therefore, neoclassical realists bring greater attention to how the 
internal politics of a state contribute to the formation of alliances.   
2.2.3 The Functional Component 
This section will explore why states choose to form alliances.  George Liska’s 
foundational work from late 1960s provides the first three alliance functions, 
Kenneth Boulding provides the fourth function, and James Fearon and James 
Morrow provide the fifth function:27  
1) Aggregation of power,  
                                                        
25 Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” 
International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), p. 161. 
26 Schweller, “Unanswered Threats,” p. 163.  For neorealist examples see Christopher Layne, “From 
Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 
22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 117; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International 
Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 15; and John J. Mearsheimer, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 21. 
27 George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 24-25; 
Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); 
James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1, New Games: Modeling Domestic-International Linkages (Feb., 
1997), p. 70; James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2, Arms, Alliances, and Cooperation: Formal Models and Empirical Tests (June, 
1994), pp. 271-2; James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political 
Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 67-69. 
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2) Interallied control,  
3) International order promotion, 
4) Aid power projection across distance and geography, and 
5) Strengthen the credibility of commitments.   
A preponderance of international relations scholars spend most of their 
attention on the first function, aggregation of power, as it can be considered the 
most obvious function of alliances.  As James Morrow wrote, “The dominant view 
sees alliances as tools for aggregating capabilities against a threat; nations form 
alliances to increase their security by massing their capabilities against a common 
enemy.  The need for the alliance ends when the threat passes.”28  Thus, the 
aggregation of power would fall into the category of external balancing, as 
Morgenthau describes, a state’s leadership makes the decision to improve their 
relative power position when they “add to their own power the power of other 
nations.”29  The aggregation of capabilities function relates to the balance of power 
studies concerning alliance formation seeking to answer two questions: when do 
states bandwagon with the greater power or balance against the greater power, and 
under what conditions?  For example, Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen argued 
that elite perception of the offense-defense balance will help predict how alliances 
formed and behaved before the First and Second World Wars.30  Stephen Walt has 
                                                        
28 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, November 1991, p. 904. 
29 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 181. 
30 Thomas J. Christensen, and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance  
Patterns in Mulitpolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. 
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argued that instead of the balance of power, leaders consider the balance of threat 
faced by their state.31   
However, the formation of alliances for aggregating capabilities does not 
make sense to Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervis as they assess the value of allies in a 
bipolar system.  Waltz wrote, “Because allies add relatively little to the 
superpower’s capabilities, they concentrate their attention on their own 
dispositions.”32  Jervis agreed with Waltz in writing, “Under bipolarity, superpowers 
do not need allies because they have sufficient resources so that they can rely on 
‘internal balancing’ – the acquisition of arms through domestic building 
programs.”33  From Waltz and Jervis’s deductive reasoning from a bipolar 
international system such as the Cold War, the alliance function of aggregating 
capabilities made little sense for the Soviet Union to form the Warsaw Pact and for 
the U.S. to form NATO.  Both states would end up paying the majority of the military 
expenditures of their respective blocs.34  To answer this counter-intuitive decision 
we will have to turn our attention to the two remaining functions of alliances. 
Liska’s second alliance function, interallied control, is an often-overlooked 
function, but the purpose of one state allying with a weak power or even a potential 
rival is an important answer to Waltz’ question of why the Soviet Union and the 
United States would form alliances in a bipolar system.  Paul Schroeder expanded on 
Liska’s earlier work and used the term “alliance management”; he provided 
                                                        
31 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, Vol. 
9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43; and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987). 
32 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 171. 
33 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), p. 112. 
34 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 169. 
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numerous examples from European politics, post-Napoleonic Wars to 1945, where 
the alliance function was the management of the ally in contrast to the aggregation 
of military capabilities function.35  Schroeder agreed that the primary and most 
common function is capability aggregation, but he wants students of International 
Relations to understand the prevalence of alliance management.  Schroeder listed 
three alliance management goals, “the desire to control one’s ally, the aim of 
managing an international problem, and even the hope of avoiding conflict by 
allying oneself with a rival.”36  Thus, under certain conditions, great powers can use 
alliances for hegemonic domination.37   
In similar fashion, Glenn Snyder’s classic work on alliance theory explores 
how alliance management confronts the “alliance security dilemma.”  He argued that 
the remedy to abandonment anxiety is to bolster your commitment to your ally; yet, 
you do not want your ally to be emboldened to draw you in to an unwanted war 
leading to entrapment so a state reduces its commitment.38  Michael Beckley 
answers the above concern by illustrating how the U.S., even with its extensive 
alliance and allied involvement after World War II, has avoided entanglement.39  
Beckley concludes, “the empirical record shows that the risk of entanglement is real 
but manageable and that, for better or worse, U.S. security policy lies firmly in the 
hands of U.S. leaders and is shaped primarily by those leaders; perceptions of the 
                                                        
35 Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus 
Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-262. 
36 Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” p. 255. 
37 Liska, Alliances and the Third World, p. 32. 
38 Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 180-181. 
39 Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense 
Pacts,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 7-48. 
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nation’s core interests.”40  Beckley calls it dual deterrence: “simultaneously 
deterring aggressors and restraining allies.”41  Furthermore, Jeremy Pressman 
explored the entrapment theme on how weaker allies have the potential to 
undermine the powerful restrainer’s attempts to avoid conflict.42  Finally, a recent 
work by Gene Gerzhoy illustrates how the U.S. used alliance coercion to stymy West 
Germany’s determination to pursue its own nuclear deterrent.43  President Kennedy 
offered Chancellor Konrad Adenauer an ultimatum in early 1963: cooperate with 
the French to acquire a nuclear weapon and you will lose U.S. ground troops, or 
remain subordinate to NATO and keep a U.S. troop presence and extended nuclear 
deterrence.44   
The third alliance function, promotion of international order, Liska closely 
relates to the second function in writing, “Promotion of international order comes 
close to being international government if an alliance institutionalizes a ‘concert’ 
among great powers and is used to deal with interstate conflict as well as well as 
more fundamental threats such as social revolution.”45  Ikenberry’s work on 
international institution building after major wars points to the alliance system’s 
function of producing order between states.  For example, after the Napoleonic 
Wars, “the British were introducing an institutional innovation into the organization 
                                                        
40 Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances,” p. 47. 
41 Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances,” p. 21. 
42 Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008), p. 15-17. 
43 Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West 
Germany's Nuclear Ambitions,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 91-129. 
44 Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint,” p. 115. 
45 Liska, Alliances and the Third World, p. 26. 
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of European order.”46  Ikenberry’s thoughts on the third alliance function align well 
with Hedley Bull’s statement concerning international order, “NATO has fulfilled the 
role of providing a multilateral framework within which the inevitable recovery of 
West German power could take place while causing the minimum alarm to others.”47  
Another example of this ordering function comes from one of Timothy Crawford’s 
case studies detailing U.S. diplomatic efforts to manage a conflict between two allies 
within NATO; namely, Greece and Turkey, in their dispute over Cyprus in the mid-
1960s.48  In line with Crawford’s concern for the moral hazard problem is a recent 
work by Brett Benson.  Benson looks at the question of how a state carefully lending 
credibility to defend an ally while not emboldening the ally to commit to war; for 
example, the U.S. promising to defend Taiwan from China, but not emboldening 
Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kaishek] to attack the mainland.49  
The fourth alliance function aids in the projection of power across great 
distances.  As noted by Waltz and Jervis an alliance between a superpower and a 
lesser power does not enhance the aggregated power of the alliance.50  However, an 
alliance with a lesser power can offer strategic proximity.  This represents the logic 
of the Brookings Institution analysts in suggesting that after World War II the U.S. 
should establish a forward base in Asia similar to the role that Britain played in 
Europe.  Philippines would be an optimal place for the U.S. to establish a “bastion off 
                                                        
46 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 100. 
47 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd Ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 219. 
48 Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 100-134. 
49 Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 10-12. 
50 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 171; and Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political 
and Social Life, p. 112. 
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the continent of Asia” in the event of conflict.51  Geographic distance represents a 
large problem for great powers that want to project power and remain a presence in 
another region.  Kenneth Boulding defined the loss-of-strength gradient as “The 
amount by which the competitive power of a party diminishes per mile movement 
away from home.”52  This idea is in line with Mearsheimer’s writings on the stopping 
power of water that “large bodies of water profoundly limit power-projection 
capabilities of land forces.”53  Thus, great powers form alliances with small powers 
because an alliance “enables the powerful state to project power more effectively” 
by overcoming distance and geography.54  Along the same lines, Gartzke and 
Braithwaite concluded, alliances “overcome distance by creating opportunities for 
security partners to share territory.”55  Additionally, Edwin Fedder includes this 
strategic function in postulating, State A allies with State B “to gain use of B’s 
territory for strategic purposes such as military bases, refueling depots, ports, and 
forward deployment.”56  The security benefits are not all one-sided; Morrow argued 
that the smaller state enters a security-autonomy trade-off.  The smaller state makes 
                                                        
51 Frederick S. Dunn, Edward M. Earle, William T. R. Fox, Grayson L. Kirk, David N. Rowe, Harold 
Sprout, and Arnold Wolfers, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for Information No. 382: A Security 
Policy for Post-War America,” 29 March 1945, Naval Historical Center, Strategic Plans Division, Series 
14, Box 194, AI-2, pp. 13-14. 
52 Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, p. 79. 
53 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 83-84, 114. 
54 Patrick R. Bentley, “Alliances, Arms Transfers and Military Aid: Major Power Security  
Cooperation with Applications and Extensions to the United States,” Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, May 2013, p. 73, http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-03262013-
141440/unrestricted/Bentley.pdf (Accessed 17 June 2016); Bentley cites Harvey Starr, “Alliances: 
Tradition and Change in American Views of Foreign Military Entanglements,” chapter 2 from Ken 
Booth and Moorhead Wright, eds., In American Thinking About Peace and War (New York: Barnes & 
Noble, 1978); and Harvey Starr and Randolph M. Siverson, “Alliances and Geopolitics,” Political 
Geography Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1990, p. 241. 
55 Erik Gartzke and Alex Braithwaite “Power, Parity and Proximity: How Distance and Uncertainty 
Condition the Balance of Power,” University of California, San Diego, 2011, p. 22, paper available from 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.457.1921&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(Accessed 17 June 2016). 
56 Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” p. 67.   
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concessions to the large state to gain security, but the small state loses autonomy in 
its ability to determine its foreign policy or domestic policy without interference.57  
The large state is able to enhance its ability to project power by utilizing the smaller 
state’s territory and prepare for the potential future conflicts.58 
The fifth function that an alliance can serve is to strengthen the credibility of 
a commitment.  As Morrow wrote, “Alliances signal to parties outside the alliance 
the willingness of the allies to come to one another’s aid if threatened by other 
nations.  Such signals could enhance deterrence of threats by convincing threatening 
nations that intervention against them was likely.”59  Harvey Starr added that 
alliances “may be particularly useful in maintaining the credibility of a nation’s 
threats and promises.”60  James Fearon pointed to the signaling of alliance 
commitments to shared interests being tied to domestic and international 
reputation.  A states’ leader can make a credible threat by “tying their hands” to a 
certain policy that they cannot back down from without a reaction from the 
domestic political audience.  Additionally, a state could station a “trip-wire” force 
within an alliance partner’s threatened territory to signal commitment.61  Glenn 
Snyder warns in this situation, an alliance partner that does not fulfill its 
commitment could face abandonment costs.  He wrote, “The more explicit and 
                                                        
57 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances,” p. 930; Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” p. 79; and Chung Jaewook, “The 
Power Distribution between Allies, Alliance Politics and Alliance Duration,” Ph.D. dissertation, Rice 
University, August 2014, p. 18, https://scholarship.rice.edu/handle/1911/87736 (Accessed 17 June 
2016). 
58 Bentley, “Alliances, Arms Transfers and Military Aid: Major Power Security Cooperation with 
Applications and Extensions to the United States,” p. 95. 
59 Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” p. 272. 
60 Starr, “Alliances: Tradition and Change in American Views of Foreign Military Entanglements,” p. 
39. 
61 Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” p. 70. 
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precise the verbal commitment, the greater the cost in nonfulfillment and the lower 
the credibility of the threat of nonfulfillment.”62   
2.2.4 The Relational Component 
This final section on alliance scholarship will look at power disparities 
between allies and the relationship of the target state to the adversarial alliance.  
The works of George Liska and James Morrow help describe the relational 
component of alliances, as these two scholars focused primarily on asymmetric 
alliances.63  Additionally, I want to cover a third relational type developed by 
Thomas Christensen, adversarial alliances.64   
The first relational type, symmetric alliance, occurs when two powers of 
equal strength enter into a security agreement to fulfill one or multiple of the 
previous mentioned functions.  Theoretically, James Morrow postulated that the two 
great powers should both receive security and autonomy benefits by entering into a 
security alliance, with autonomy being defined as a “state’s ability to determine its 
own policies.”65  Morrow offered the Axis Alliance of World War II as an example 
where Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan all had common interests in 
changing the status quo and increased autonomy to pursue that shared goal.66  
Waltz also stated how defection in an alliance of equals was most damaging.  He 
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stated, “In alliances among equals, the defection of one party threatens the security 
of the others.”  The opposite will be true as we move to consider the relationship of 
asymmetric alliance members. 
The second relational type, asymmetric alliances, occurs when a great power 
aligns itself with a weak or small power.  Morrow’s writings are influential in 
understanding how weak powers make gains in security by forming an alliance with 
a great power, but at the cost of policy autonomy.67  Works by four scholars have 
focused in particular on the roles and strategies of the small states in the 
international system: Annette Baker Fox, Michael Handel, Robert Rothstein and 
Glenn Snyder.  Annette Baker Fox’s study illustrates two important details that 
analysts can miss if they overly focus on great powers.  First, “Both great and small 
states can employ economic, ideological, and diplomatic methods as well as military 
measures.”68  Second, “Another difference in perspectives between the great and the 
small powers was the acute sensitivity of the small to possible encroachments on 
their independence.  Characteristically, small state leaders strive to compensate for 
their military inferiority by emphasizing respect for their dignity.”69  Michael 
Handel’s work extended Annette Fox’s conclusions by showing numerous examples 
where “weak states” were far from impotent security “consumers.”70  Handel wrote, 
“There are two major ways in which the weak states can recruit the support of other 
countries.  They may either enter into a formal alliance with other states, or they 
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may reach an informal, though not necessarily less helpful, understanding with a 
partner sharing common interests.[emphasis in original]”  Morrow offered the U.S. 
and Israel as an example of an informal alliance.  He wrote, “Their military interests 
have been sufficiently similar that an alliance has been unnecessary.”71  Next, Robert 
Rothstein focuses on the differences in capabilities and commitment towards 
confronting a threat; the small power brings little in military capabilities in 
comparison to the great power, but is very much committed to confronting the 
threat.  Rothstein argued that the opposite is true for the great power; the great 
power contributes a lot in military capabilities, “but only a partial commitment,” and 
“not to the detriment of its other interests.”72  Finally, Glenn Snyder reminds us, 
“Paradoxically, a weak ally may lack influence because of its dependence but gain 
influence by reason of its vulnerability and essentiality.”73 
In relational terms, an adversarial alliance represents the vantage point of 
the target state or third-party state.  As George Liska wrote, “Put negatively, an 
alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as 
pressure which threatens one’s independence.”74  If we are to take the vantage point 
of State C, the activities of States A and B can be potentially threatening, divisive, or 
containing if we consider three different types of capability aggregating uses by 
States A and B.  Edwin Fedder offered three potential functions that work against 
State C: 
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1) Augmentive: A allies with B to add B’s power relative to the outside enemy C.  
A+B > C; 
2) Preemptive or Preclusive: A allies with B to prevent B’s power from being 
added to enemy C.  A > C—B; and 
3) Strategic: A allies with B to gain use of B’s territory for strategic purposes 
such as military bases, refueling depots, ports, and forward deployment.75 
On point three, Liska made an important point concerning three different types of 
alliance bases.  Integral bases are used for local defense, strategic deterrence, and 
retaliation; contingent bases are used for the defense of the host country or adjacent 
ally; and potential bases are essential facilities for air, land, and sea operations 
minus the dominant ally’s personnel and military assets.76  An alliance target or 
third-party state could judge the alliance relationship founded on the type of base 
the host alliance partner has allowed their alliance partner to station on their 
territory. 
The final relational area concerns the target or third-party state’s 
relationship to the alliance.  Christensen’s book, Worse Than a Monolith, views the 
diplomatic struggle the U.S. faced during the Cold War dealing with a Sino-Soviet 
relationship that was fractured and not cohesive.77  For example, Christensen notes 
how the Sino-Soviet split forced the Soviet Union and China to ramp up their 
revolutionary support of communist movements in Southeast Asia as the two states 
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competed for political influence; thus, making it more difficult for the U.S. to 
confront two active adversaries.  Similar scholarship by Timothy Crawford and 
Yasuhiro Izumikawa has focused on the target state’s ability to divide existing 
adversarial alliances or prevent the formation of an adversarial alliance by use of a 
“wedge” strategy.78  A successful division or prevention of an adversarial alliance 
would overturn two of Edwin Fedder’s alliance functions.79  For instance, State C 
works to prevent or remove the alliance functions that work against it:  
1)  Disaggregate: State C removes A from allying with B to decrease B’s power.   
2)  Remove Strategic Advantage: State C removes A’s ability to use B’s territory 
for strategic purposes such as military bases, refueling depots, ports, and forward 
deployment.   
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW ON PERCEPTIONS 
This section covers the rather large concept of political perceptions.  There 
are important debates and theoretical developments within the broad concept of 
perceptions that I was cognizant of when researching Chinese perceptions of 
adversarial alliances.  The formation of a perception involves calculations, 
reasoning, and the accumulation of facts for analysts and political leaders to 
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interpret and challenge.  After covering political psychology and decision making 
the literature review will focus on three topics: intentions, capabilities and cohesion. 
2.3.1 Political Psychology and Decision Making 
Psychology’s reach into the realm of political science began with Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman’s work on cognitive biases in judgmental heuristics.80  
They pointed to three examples of how individuals regularly make poor decisions: 
misunderstandings of probability, conflating correlation with causation, and 
exhibiting inflexible thinking processes.  A couple of years later, Robert Jervis 
further opened the way for psychological and cognitive research with his 
foundational work, Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics.81  Jervis 
made an important assertion concerning how a target state could interpret the 
formation and maintenance of an alliance that potentially threatened it.  Jervis 
asserted that the target state’s perception would display “overcentralization” or 
“over-Machiavellianism.”  The former regards events that might have happened for 
random reasons as events that an adversary planned against them; the latter refers 
to a target state or third-party state over-reading of malicious intent in every event 
as if it was conspiracy.82  Another book that provides an overview of political 
psychology remains Rose McDermott’s Political Psychology in International 
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Relations; her book serves as a compendium of various studies and experimental 
cases.83   
Jonathan Mercer’s research makes a crucial break from the previous 
scholarship.  He noted that much of the early political psychology works were 
explaining poor decision-making and irrational thinking.84  Instead, Mercer sets out 
to describe how rational choice scholarship cannot separate rational political 
decision-making from emotions; Mercer wrote, “Because rationality depends on 
psychology, psychology must do more than explain mistakes.”85  Mercer gains 
backing from Stephen Rosen’s work on U.S. presidential decision-making since 
Rosen sees the emotion as an integral part of decision making.  Rosen wrote, 
“Human beings who cannot react and decide emotionally can easily become 
paralyzed with indecision in settings far less complex than those faced by the 
presidents…”86    
Rosen’s work helps us bridge to a key component of political psychology: 
political decision making.  Scholars such as Yaacov Vertzberger, and Richard 
Neustadt and Ernest May extended Jervis’s research on understanding how political 
leaders make decisions.  Vertzberger’s expansive work on political decision making 
covers numerous issues ranging from information processing, decision maker 
personalities, social and cultural influences, to the “use and abuse” of history.87  
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Vertzberger also published a single case study on the Sino-Indian Conflict from 1959 
to 1962.88  Neustadt and May also paid particular attention to the use of history in 
the formulation of foreign and public policy; their book is a collection of valuable 
case studies that illustrate both good and bad uses of history.89   
In related fashion, Khong Yuen Foong’s contribution to the political decision 
making in his exploration of analogical reasoning; and more importantly, how 
analogies direct policy makers to a prescribed policy.90  On analogical reasoning 
Vertzberger wrote, “Decision makers who prefer little deliberation and swift, 
reflexive, intuitive decisions are particularly prone to use simplistic historical 
analogies to support the predicted outcomes of their decision-making process even 
when faced with complex problems.”91  Additionally, Christopher Twomey focuses 
on how military doctrinal differences can cause misperceptions.  He wrote, “States 
look at the world through the lens of their own military doctrine.  At times, the lens 
blurs the view, complicating statecraft, signaling, interpreting the adversary's 
signals, and assessing the balance of power.”92  Vertzberger points to this type of 
misunderstanding when U.S. intelligence misjudged Arab military initiatives in 
1973, because from the American understanding of war “one fights a war to achieve 
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victory”; instead, the Arab’s goal was to “upset the status quo in the Middle East.”93  
A recent article by Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller explores senior leaders’ 
“misplaced certainty.”  Their findings go against the expectation that leaders would 
be indecisive or make small incremental decisions.  Mitzen and Schweller wrote, “In 
security dilemma and spiral model cases, however, things go terribly wrong because 
leaders form very strong opinions and take bold and decidedly non-incremental 
actions.”94    
2.3.2 Interpreting Intentions 
This section will highlight the neorealist and neoclassical realist debate on 
whether states have the ability to determine intentions and interpret capabilities.  
To begin, Robert Jervis’s work on images sought to show the limits and 
untrustworthiness of images.  He wrote, “Few actions are unambiguous.  They rarely 
provide anything like proof of how the state plans to act in the future.  This is 
shown, first, by historical examples of successful attempts to project inaccurate, and 
even wildly inaccurate, images.  Aggressive states have convinced others they were 
peaceful.”95  Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer represent the neorealist camp 
that is primarily concerned with capabilities since they argue that a state’s 
intentions are uncertain and can change rapidly.96  Mearsheimer wrote, “intentions 
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are ultimately unknowable, so states worried about their survival must make worst-
case assumptions about their rivals’ intentions.”97  CIA analysts, tasked with the 
responsibility of judging the intentions and capabilities of other states, have long 
recognized the difficulty of judging intentions and capabilities.  Acting Director of 
Central Intelligence Charles Cabell stated, “In the future, we do not expect that 
military activity will provide conclusive evidence of intent to attack, except perhaps 
late in a crisis situation, since most indications will also be consistent with an 
intention to deter or to defend if attacked.”98   
In contrast to the neorealists, Charles Glaser designed his rational theory 
around the ability of states to discern the offense-defense balance and state 
intentions based on an information variable based on malign or benign signaling.99  
Randall Schweller challenges Glaser’s theory by arguing that states in the digital age 
are not concerned with the offense-defense balance, but are more concerned with 
creating environments of innovation and “generating dynamic growth.”100  A rather 
recent work by Keren Yarhi-Milo looks at how political leaders and the intelligence 
community judge intentions differently.  The former assesses intentions on “their 
own theories, expectations, and needs” that are often informed by “vivid” personal 
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and emotional information; in contrast, the intelligence organizations prioritize the 
collection and analysis of the adversaries military assets to evaluate intentions.101  
2.3.3 Interpreting Capabilities 
In regards to the capabilities debate, Andrew Marshall performed a study 
that discussed the difficulties of assessing military capabilities in 1966.102  This 
short 22 page paper outlined how force assessments are much more complex than 
simple tabulations of one state’s military in contrast to another state’s military.103  
Moreover, a political analyst must be careful when adding alliance members’ 
military strength because the allied forces “are not entirely complementary,” due to 
differences in training and logistical support.  Similarly, Marshall argued that the 
alliance members might have different interests in how valuable the respective 
states view a certain conflict or contingency.104  In a more recent study on 
capabilities, Ashley Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, Melissa McPherson 
wrote a critical RAND study entitled, Measuring National Power in the 
Postindustrial Age.  The chapter on military capability offers some important 
insights; they wrote, “A country may provide its military with generous budgets and 
large cadres of manpower, but if the military’s doctrine is misguided, the training 
ineffective, the leadership unschooled, or the organization inappropriate, military 
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capability will suffer.”105  For example, Italy and India have a very similar Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), but the two states have very different military resources, 
doctrines, and interests in their respective security situations.  Again, Mearsheimer 
gives primacy to capabilities as the determinate of threat in writing, “Capabilities, 
however, not only can be measured but also determine whether or not a rival state 
is a serious threat.”106  In contrast to Mearsheimer, Bernard Finel provides more 
nuance to the focus on capabilities.  Finel’s criticism of the offense-defense balance 
as a structural variable emphasized strategic interaction as a critical factor in war 
outcomes; he wrote, “Choices are only dominant vis-à-vis other states’ choices…  
The optimal choice depends on the opponent’s decisions.”107  Retired U.S. Air Force 
General Glenn Kent echoes the necessity of thinking about strategic interactions.  In 
his analytical memoir, Kent stated, “In military affairs, as in most fields of human 
endeavor, opponents react to each other’s moves.  Although this seems obvious, it is 
surprisingly common for advocates of certain policies or programs to assume that 
the adversary does not react to our initiative.”108  Thus, the task of assessing 
capabilities is much more complicated than counting troops and tanks, but it 
involves the strategic interaction and the military doctrine in how the state employs 
its capabilities. 
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2.3.4 Interpreting Cohesion 
The concept of cohesion is a seldom defined term in International Relations 
literature.  A work by Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan defined 
cohesion as “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon goals, strategy, and tactics, 
and to coordinate activities directed towards those ends.”109  The term’s usage is 
equally ambiguous in reference to alliances possessing or lacking cohesion.  Charles 
Kupchan’s analyzed intra-alliance cooperation and discord by measuring military 
assistance, policy compromise, and economic contributions.  He tested four theories 
of cohesion that represent four functions: 
1) External threat- alliance cohesion is a function of redressing “eroding 
security predicament through cooperation.” 
2) Alliance security dilemma- “alliance cohesion is a function of the coercive 
potential of the alliance leader and its ability to exact cooperative behavior from its 
weaker partners.” 
3) Collective action- alliance cohesion is a function of the “alliance leader’s 
willingness and ability to assume a large share of the costs of the collective good 
produced by the alliance.” 
4) Domestic politics- alliance cohesion is a function of popular support for 
cooperating or political elites perceiving an “electoral advantage in tightening 
alliance relations or raising defense spending.”  
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Kupchan admitted that the explanations are not mutually exclusive, and his findings 
on a non-war NATO case study showed a mixture of coercive bargaining by the U.S. 
and domestic politics at work.110  Along these lines, Patricia Weitsman’s first 
contribution was making the often-overlooked conclusion that alliance cohesion and 
the resulting intra-alliance politics are very different between wartime and 
peacetime alliances.111  Next, International Relations scholars have attempted to 
bring greater attention to alliance cohesion variables.  For instance, Sarah Kreps 
focused on two variables that encourage alliance cooperation and solidarity: elite 
consensus and intra-alliance politics.112  In comparison, Evan Resnick focused on a 
different set of variables in the context of war-fighting: threat of defeat, shared 
primary adversary, power symmetry between alliance partners, and regime type.113  
Lastly, Weitsman’s second contribution was the comparison of pre-existing alliances 
and impromptu coalitions in war-fighting conditions that included senior decision-
maker relationships and institutional relationships.114  From the vantage point of a 
target state, the evaluation of an alliance’s cohesion at various levels of analysis 
should point towards the question of whether an alliance is susceptible to “wedge” 
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strategies.115  Lastly, Jervis reminded his readers, “alliances usually appear more 
durable and binding from the outside than from the inside.”116  From the vantage 
point of the target state, it cannot see or discern the inner workings and arguments 
within an alliance, but the target state could surmise that the alliance is unified and 
coordinated in executing a plan.  The problem is made more acute when a target 
state and the alliance members are in conflict since the target state will not have as 
much information on the alliance partners’ bureaucracies and internal conflicts.117 
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3.0  CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The conceptual framework will begin by laying out the logic of the structured 
and focused comparison of the three adversarial alliance cases.  Next, each 
framework begins with a conceptual foundation offered by the literature review, 
moves to describe the purpose of the inquiry, and introduces specific questions 
evaluated in the three empirical case studies.   
3.2 STRUCTURED AND FOCUSED COMPARISON 
Provided the large amount of insights and debates from the literature review 
on alliances and perceptions, I have drawn out four concepts to form a conceptual 
framework.  The conceptual framework will aid our understanding of how China 
perceives adversarial alliances by facilitating a structured and focused comparison 
of the three case studies.  The four concepts abide by the same structure.  Each 
concept will establish the concept’s foundation from the literature review.  Second, 
the purpose of the inquiry will point to what information I want to find.  Next, I will 
introduce several questions that I will ask to evaluate the evidence within the case 
studies.   
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In constructing the conceptual framework, I have attempted to simplify the 
study and eliminate as many moving parts as possible.  Granted, the concepts of 
intentions, cohesion, and capabilities overlap and are not mutually exclusive, but I 
have attempted to parse them in such a way to draw out a certain distinctive 
feature.  For example, alliance cohesion and alliance capabilities are concepts that 
are not mutually exclusive.  If an alliance cooperates (cohesion) on a new weapon 
system (capability) they have affected both conceptual realms.  Therefore, when 
addressing cohesion, I will largely hold the capabilities constant and vice versa.   
The conceptual framework seeks to offer a logical and consistent 
examination of how China perceives the respective adversarial alliances at different 
points in time.  China’s leaders, policy analysts, and academics are the observers of 
the security cooperation on their state’s periphery.  For simplicity of developing this 
conceptual framework, I have labeled this diverse group of observers with their 
various interests, “Chinese analysts.”  The senior leaders, journal scholars, and 
interview subjects do not display uniform views of the adversarial alliances, and the 
variance between the analysts makes the study thought-provoking.  For instance, 
some Chinese International Relations scholars emphasize individual agency, others 
focus on history, and others focus on systemic and organizational structures.  The 
three case studies will offer evidence to confirm or disconfirm the specific concept 
questions.   
In regards to the perception of intentions, each case study will attempt to lay 
out a “baseline” intention that I will use to compare and contrast Chinese 
perceptions of conspiracy.  The great power in the alliance relationship will largely 
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determine the baseline intention.  The baseline intentions for the Soviet Union in the 
USSR-Vietnam case were ascertained by Soviet specialists Robert Gates, Odd Arne 
Westad, Kenneth Weiss, Sally Stoecker, and unnamed CIA analysts; the baseline 
intentions for the U.S. in the US-Japan case and the US-ROK case will be taken from 
official primary source documents, official pronouncements, and statements made 
by prominent policy makers such as Joseph Nye and Jeffrey Bader.  In some 
instances, I am able to describe the smaller powers’ intentions for pursuing certain 
policies within the case study. 
A final consideration is whether the concept points to Chinese foreign policy 
outcome.  In some instances, Chinese official statements or academic journal 
scholars will point to a certain concept influencing Chinese decision making.  In 
other instances, particularly the USSR-Vietnam Alliance, certain concepts will point 
to a correlation of events as evidence of influence on foreign policy outcomes.   
3.3 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE INTENTIONS 
The evaluation of an alliance’s intentions will be broken into two categories: 
perceptions of a change in the adversarial alliance’s intentions and perceptions that the 
adversarial alliance is engaged in a conspiracy against the target state.  
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3.3.1 Perceptions of Changed Intentions (1A) 
Conceptual Foundation 1A:  A basic principle of realism argues that a state’s 
intentions are uncertain and can change rapidly, thus, states focus on a potential 
adversary’s capabilities.1  Yet, no matter the uncertainty and propensity to change, 
states dedicate numerous resources to their intelligence services to judge the 
intentions of rivals.2   
Purpose of Inquiry 1A:  To see what factors or variables inform perceptions of 
adversarial alliance intentions, and how the perceived intention changes. 
Question 1Aa:  Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, 
reports, speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions? 
Question 1Ab:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the 
adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of benign intentions? 
Question 1Ac:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the 
adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of malign intentions? 
Question 1Ad: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of changes in alliance intentions 
influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? 
                                                        
1 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 105; and John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, p. 45. 
2 Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the 
Intentions of Adversaries,” p. 9. 
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3.3.2 Perceptions of Conspiracy (1B) 
Conceptual Foundation 1B:  It is natural for a target state or third-party state to 
discern that adversarial alliance developments are aimed at it, but over-
Machiavellianism refers to the tendency to perceive conspiracy and malicious intent 
behind every alliance event.3  Jervis reminded his readers: “the search for the 
devious plan believed to lurk behind even the most seemingly spontaneous 
behavior is neither uncommon nor totally unwarranted.”4 
Purpose of Inquiry 1B:  To see if perceptions of conspiracy cause foreign policy 
outcomes, and are these perceptions of conspiracy refuted or corrected to align with 
the baseline intentions. 
Question 1Ba:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well 
organized and planned moves against them? 
Question 1Bb:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a 
conspiracy aimed against them. 
Question 1Bc:  Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy? 
Question 1Bd:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese 
foreign policy outcomes? 
                                                        
3 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 329. 
4 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 320. 
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3.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION 
Conceptual Foundation 2:  International Relations scholars point to a host of 
variables that encourage alliance cooperation and solidarity such as threat, elite 
consensus, willingness of alliance leaders to coerce or provide common goods, 
power symmetry between alliance partners, and domestic politics.5   
Purpose of Inquiry 2:  To see how a target state or third-party state evaluates 
adversarial alliance cohesion. 
Question 2a:  Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is 
a function of external political context? 
Question 2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
institutional solidarity between the alliance partners? 
Question 2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
interactions between the alliance partners’ senior leadership? 
Question 2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
domestic politics of the alliance partners? 
Question 2e: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion 
influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? 
                                                        
5 Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International 
Alliances: Comparative Studies; Sarah Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: 
Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 
Vol. 6, Is. 3, July 2010, pp. 209-211; Kupchan, “NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance 
Behavior,” International Organization, pp. 323-326 & 344-346; Resnick, “Hang Together or Hang 
Separately?  Evaluating Rival Theories of Wartime Alliance Cohesion,” p. 673; Weitsman, Dangerous 
Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, p. 31 & 37; and Weitsman, “Wartime Alliances 
versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecution of 
Wars,” pp. 113-136. 
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3.5 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES 
Conceptual Foundation 3:  Scholarship on alliance formation suggest that alliances 
are useful for aggregating capabilities against potential or real threats as a form of 
external balancing.6  Additionally, scholarship on asymmetrical alliances suggests 
that alliances are strategic uses of a smaller power’s territory to enhance power 
projection capabilities.7  
Purpose of Inquiry 3:  To see how a target state or third-party state evaluates 
adversarial alliance nuclear and conventional capabilities and how great powers a 
use lesser power’s territory to aid in power projection. 
Question 3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial 
alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, 
and military bases? 
Question 3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the 
adversarial alliances? 
Question 3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the 
adversarial alliances? 
                                                        
6 Liska, Alliances and the Third World, pp. 24-25; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
pp. 155-157; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Edition, pp. 
181-197; Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances,” p. 904; Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 60-61; Snyder, Alliance Politics, Chapter 2, pp. 
43-78; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 164-165. 
7 Bentley, “Alliances, Arms Transfers and Military Aid: Major Power Security Cooperation with 
Applications and Extensions to the United States,” p. 73; Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General 
Theory, pp. 262-263; Chung, “The Power Distribution between Allies, Alliance Politics and Alliance 
Duration,” p. 18; Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” p. 67; Gartzke and Braithwaite “Power, Parity and 
Proximity: How Distance and Uncertainty Condition the Balance of Power,” p. 22; Morrow, “Alliances 
and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” p. 930; Morrow, 
“Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” p. 79; Starr, “Alliances: Tradition and Change in American Views 
of Foreign Military Entanglements,” chapter 2; and Starr and Siverson, “Alliances and Geopolitics,” 
Political Geography Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1990, p. 241. 
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Question 3d:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities 
and foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes? 
3.6 SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF RISING STATE IN RELATION TO 
ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE 
Conceptual Foundation 4:  Students of International Relations have long been 
concerned with rising states upsetting the balance of power and hegemonic 
transition.8 
Purpose of Inquiry 4:  To see how a rising power views adversarial alliance activity 
on its periphery as its economic and military power and influence expands.   
Question 4a: Have Chinese analysts become increasingly dissatisfied with 
adversarial alliances on its periphery? 
Question 4b: Do Chinese analysts tolerate the adversarial alliances and recognize the 
security benefits? 
Question 4c: Has China’s self-perception of its rise in power influenced its foreign 
policy outcomes? 
                                                        
8 Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” pp. 601-602; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 
33; Organski, World Politics, 2nd Ed., chapter 14, pp. 339-376; and Yang Shih-yueh, “Power 
Transition, Balance of Power, and the Rise of China: A Theoretical Reflection about Rising Great 
Powers,” p. 37. 
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3.7 CONCEPTS AND CASE STUDIES 
I will present the three adversarial alliance cases in a rough chronological 
fashion, and at different junctures, I will highlight a specific concept when it 
becomes most apparent or salient.  Table 3.1 offers a summary of the different 
instances that provide evidence for the six different concepts.   
Concept 
Adversarial Alliance Case Event 
















Treaty of Friendship 
and Co-operation 
2010 & 2012 Diaoyu 
incidents  
2006 and 2009 
North Korean 
nuclear tests & 






USSR deployment of 
nuclear missiles & 


































China’s rise in 
military power 
China’s rise in 
economic power 
Table 3.1.   Concepts and Case Study Events 
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4.0  CHAPTER 4: USSR-VIETNAM ALLIANCE 
4.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
From the Chinese standpoint, the USSR-Vietnam Alliance (1978 to 1989) will 
constitute one of China’s most critical threats and transform into a complete non-
threat.  The alliance would also determine China’s strategic interaction with both 
the USSR and the U.S. during its short history.  This chapter will begin with 
background information on the USSR-Vietnam bilateral relationship; discuss China’s 
political interactions with the USSR and Vietnam as alliance partners, and layout 
Soviet baseline intentions.  Specific junctures will arise that will offer an opportunity 
to evaluate particular concepts.  First, senior Chinese leadership will offer their 
perceptions of the formation of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance.  Second, the USSR’s 
deployment of nuclear missiles and troops along the border with China offers an 
evaluation of alliance capabilities.  Third, China’s interpretation of the treaty 
between the USSR and Vietnam will exhibit overcentralization but not conspiracy. 
Fourth, the USSR’s lack of involvement in responding to the China’s punitive war 
and subsequent border bombardments will display low alliance cohesion.  Fifth, the 
USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan and the ability of Gorbachev to walk back the 
tensions between the China and the USSR exhibits a change in perceived intentions.  
Accordingly, this chapter will cover three of the four alliance perception concepts by 
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highlighting five important events in the USSR-Vietnam Alliance’s interaction with 
China. 
4.2 CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND NORTH VIETNAM  
China’s problematic relationship with the Soviet Union, and Soviet and 
Chinese military aid to North Vietnam during the Second Indochina War (1965-
1975) shaped its perception of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance.  Sino-Soviet relations 
started to show signs of fracturing in 1958 when disagreements concerning the 
development of a long-distance radio communication system and a joint naval 
submarine fleet caused a rift between the two states.  At the time, Mao Zedong 
insisted that the Soviets “wanted to control China militarily.”1  The relationship 
between the two leading Communist states further deteriorated in the wake of four 
political disagreements: Chinese policy concerning the Great Leap Forward, the 
shelling of Taiwan’s Jinmen Island, the Soviets withholding of atomic secrets, and the 
fracturing of Sino-Indian relations over Tibet.2  The Chinese believed that the 
Soviet’s position on these policies “undermined the strength and goals of the 
international communist movement by accommodating the West.”3  Early on in the 
Cold War, the United States challenged China’s security environment, but after the 
Sino-Soviet split transpired in the late 1950s and early 1960s, China faced two great 
                                                        
1 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 
pp. 73-75. 
2 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, pp. 77-83. 
3 Edward O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War 
(London: Routledge, 2007), p. 40. 
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powers.  By 1963-1964, Mao repeatedly stated his apprehensions that the Soviets 
were a threat to China’s northern border.4  As Wang Dong stated, at this stage “China 
started thinking about ‘fighting with two fists’ in the mid-1960s; China viewed the 
Soviet Union as a revisionist and the United States was still the main enemy as an 
imperialist.  China wanted to fight both at the same time.”5  China and the Soviet 
Union maintained state to state relations during this period, but the states’ party-to-
party relations severed in 1964.  Subsequently, China broke its alliance relationship 
with the Soviet Union and began branding itself as the leader of the international 
Communist movement’s leftist forces.6   
Despite the Sino-Soviet split, both China and the Soviet Union supported 
North Vietnam in its war against the United States.  North Vietnam was greatly 
dependent on China for essential items ranging from food resources, uniforms, small 
arms, and soldiers.  China sent roughly 300,000 soldiers to serve in North Vietnam 
over the course of the war.  In 1967 alone, 170,000 Chinese troops were serving in 
North Vietnam building, maintaining, and defending North Vietnamese 
transportation lines and strategic assets north of the 21st parallel where Hanoi is 
situated.7  The aid from China fit Mao’s conception of North Vietnam waging a 
“people’s war” against the U.S.  In August 1965, Lin Biao published a book entitled 
Long Live the People's War.  As historian Douglas Pike writes, “In blunt terms Lin 
Biao implied that the Vietnamese now were breaking all the basic rules of people's 
war” when it shifted in early 1965 from “revolutionary guerilla war to what Hanoi 
                                                        
4 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 84. 
5 Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University. 
6 Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University. 
7 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 229. 
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generals call regular force strategy war.”8  Maoist doctrine insisted on a people’s 
war strategy that avoided large and costly offensives such as the Tet Offensive in 
1968 and Easter (Nguyen Hue) Offensive in 1972.9  For example, in the Easter 
Offensive alone North Vietnamese forces lost over 600 tanks.10  Despite China’s poor 
relations with North Vietnam and U.S. rapprochement, Beijing feared a unified 
Vietnam as a politically influential power in Indochina; and therefore, continued to 
provide large quantities of war material, aid, and weapons to the North Vietnamese 
until 1975.11   
Vietnam was equally dependent on the Soviet Union and sought aid that 
would help them confront a technologically advanced adversary.  Only the Soviet 
Union could provide expensive technologically advanced weapon systems and 
resources that could compete against the United States.  North Vietnam eagerly 
sought surface to air missiles, radars, and oil from the Soviets.  Table 4.1 below 
illustrates Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam from 1970 to 1974.   
Western historians argue that Vietnam manipulated the competition 
between the Soviet Union and the Chinese to gain resources from both states.  
Historian Steven Hood wrote, “Hanoi played the [Soviets and Chinese] against each 
other, giving outward praise to the superiority of protracted war as espoused by 
                                                        
8 Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1987), pp. 65-66. 
9 Nguyen Lien-Hang T., “The Sino-Vietnamese split and the Indochina War, 1968-1975,” from Chapter 
1 in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds., The Third Indochina War: Conflict between 
China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79 (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 14. 
10 Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, & Military History 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 113. 
11 Hood, Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War, pp. 23.; see Chen, Mao’s China 
and the Cold War, p. 228, See Table 1: China’s Military Aid to Vietnam- 1964-1975 for detailed 
numbers on the huge supply of Chinese rifles, bullets, artillery, shells, tanks, airplanes, telephones, 
radios, and uniforms sent to North Vietnam. 
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Chairman Mao, and claiming that sophisticated weapons supplied by the Russians 
would improve Hanoi’s position at the bargaining table.”12  Indeed, it is possible that 
both China and the USSR were willing participants in the manipulation, as both vied 
for Vietnamese influence. 




Combat Materiel 60 145 360 140 90 795 
Military Related 
Support 
45 55 130 85 65 380 
China 
Combat Materiel 75 90 200 85 180 630 
Military Related 
Support 
30 40 80 40 75 265 
Total Soviet and 
Chinese Military Aid 
210 330 770 350 410 2,070 
Table 4.1.  Communist Aid to North Vietnam 1970-1974 (millions of USD)13 
4.3 BASELINE ALLIANCE INTENTIONS 
The Soviet Union’s enthusiasm for intervention in the “Third World” gained 
new traction in 1968 after the Tet offensive.  When the President Nixon promised in 
1969 to withdrawal from South Vietnam, a key ally, Soviet activists within the 
Central Committee saw an opening to promote revolutions elsewhere in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America.14  Victory in Vietnam demonstrated that the Soviet Union could 
                                                        
12 Steven J. Hood, Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War (Armonk, New York: An 
East Gate Book, 1992), p. 22. 
13 “Communist Military and Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1970-1974,” CIA, 3 January 1975, 
Document No. 0001166499, http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0001166499 (Accessed 27 July 
2015), p. 5 [pdf p. 6]. 
14 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 169-
170. 
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assist a distant ally successfully.  Moreover, Soviet collective leadership, with 
Brezhnev as a key member, viewed China as a “direct and major threat” in the wake 
of the 1969 border clashes.15  On a cross-country rail trip with Defense Minister 
Ustinov, on 3 April 1977 Brezhnev told officers of the Trans-Baikal Military District 
that China was “the primary enemy” and “the number-one enemy.”16  In 1977, the 
CIA concluded that the Soviets were “conscious of weaknesses on their own side, 
particularly those arising from economic and technological deficiencies and conflict 
with China.”17  The Soviets were concerned that China’s strategic capabilities were 
going to grow exponentially for several reasons: an economic shift would produce 
more resources for the military, newfound access to Western technologies to 
enhance its defense industrial base, and continued research and development of 
strategic weapons and signal intelligence satellites.  Therefore, Soviet leaders chose 
to take advantage of the strategic opportunity in Vietnam as a way to counter both 
China and the United States.  As Robert Gates summarized, “Soviet aggressiveness in 
the Third World—at least in the mid-1970s—was initially directed as much at China 
as at the West and the United States in particular.”18  By 1977, CIA Soviet analysts 
listed four foreign policy goals directed at China: 
1) To combat and reduce Chinese influence both among nations and within the 
international Communist movement, 
                                                        
15 Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 194-195. 
16 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They 
Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), p. 82. 
17 “Soviet Strategic Objectives,” CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, (NIE 11-4-77), 12 January 1977, 
Document No. 0000268137, p. 2 [pdf p. 8], http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0000268137 
(Accessed 12 March 2015). 
18 Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the 
Cold War, pp. 80-81 & 83. 
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2) To limit Sino-US rapprochement, 
3) To exert military pressure designed to deter Chinese jabs along the border 
while impressing upon Chinese leaders the folly of making the Soviet Union 
their enemy, and  
4) Meanwhile to maintain a public posture of readiness to normalize relations 
against the time when Mao’s successors might unfreeze China’s implacable 
hostility.19 
Thus, at the time of the creation of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance we see that the Soviet 
Union was highly concerned about China’s growth in strategic capabilities, but also 
open to normalization of relations.  In sum, the USSR-Vietnam Alliance was a 
strategic contract for both parties: the Soviet Union gained access to strategic bases 
in Vietnam in return for much needed economic aid and military support for fighting 
the Khmer Rouge.   
4.4 PERCEPTIONS FROM SENIOR CHINESE LEADERSHIP 
Despite a dramatic shift in its strategic relationship with the United States 
and the Soviet Union, China’s leadership remained wary of the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and its influence in Southeast Asia.  Chinese apprehension is evidenced 
by the following three quotes from 1973 and 1974, prior to North Vietnam’s 
reunification.  In January 1973, Vice Chairman Li Desheng assessed, “in the past, the 
U.S. established the SEATO to blockade us.  Now the U.S. has failed, while Soviet 
                                                        
19 “Soviet Strategic Objectives,” p. 8 [pdf p. 14]. 
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revisionists are meddling by establishing the so-called ‘Asian Collective Security 
System.’  They will replace the U.S. in blockading us.”20  Two months later, during 
the US-Vietnamese Paris peace accords, Premier Zhou Enlai made an accurate 
prediction, stating, “the Soviet revisionists will intensify economic aid to the 
Vietnamese people after the Vietnamese war comes to an end to countervail our 
influence in Vietnam.  The struggle afterwards will be complicated and acute.”21  
Upon the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in April 1973 and the subsequent 
removal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam and Cambodia, the Soviet threat Zhou 
Enlai imagined came to fruition.   
A year later in May 1974, Chairman Mao in discussions with former British 
Prime Minister Edward Heath articulated China’s awareness of the Soviet threat and 
his countries readiness to face it: 
Edward Heath: But its military forces are growing incessantly.  Although the 
Soviet Union has encountered problems in many parts of the world, but it is 
constantly strengthening its power.  Therefore, we think this is the main 
threat.  Does the chairman believe that the Soviet Union does not pose a 
threat to China?   
 
Mao Zedong: We have prepared for the Soviet to come.  Nevertheless, if it 
comes, it will be its downfall!  It only has a few soldiers, you Europeans are 
so afraid!22 
 
To confront the Soviet Union-Vietnam Alliance, China pursued détente with 
the U.S. and Japan instead of forming new alliances.  Wang and Wu wrote, “During 
                                                        
20 Speech, “Li Desheng at the National Physical Education Work Conference,” 22 January 1973, 
Shanghai Municipal Archive, B246-2-840-47, pp. 5-6, Huang Yuxing’s translation. 
21 Charles McGregor, The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union, Adelphi Papers 232, 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 60. 
22 Record of Conversation, People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Selected Works of 
Mao Zedong's Foreign Diplomacy, [Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan] (Beijing: Central Literature Press 
[Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe], 1995), pp. 602-603. 
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the 1970s, although China advocated a united front against the Soviet Union it was 
reluctant to forge a formal alliance structure with the United States and Japan.  What 
China wanted was ‘parallel actions based on common interests.’”23  China, the US-
Japan Alliance, and the US-ROK Alliance all shared a common interest towards 
constraining the Soviet Union’s expansion in East Asia.   
4.5 VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION BRINGS A NEW THREAT 
From the Chinese vantage point, the USSR-Vietnam Alliance became a greater 
threat at the end of the 1970s.  The fall of Saigon and the demise of the South 
Vietnamese government paved the way for North Vietnam to reunify the country.  In 
examination of the Soviet Union-Vietnam Alliance, Yu Tiejun admits that the alliance 
relationship is rather complicated as both the Soviet Union and China supported 
North Vietnam in fighting the U.S.  It was not until Vietnam’s reunification that Sino-
Vietnamese relations deteriorated and Soviet-Vietnamese relations became closer.24  
A Rand analyst, Sally Stoecker, determined that the Soviet Union and Vietnam had 
separate goals in the burgeoning relationship.  For Vietnam, it relied “almost 
exclusively” on Soviet economic and military aid as it was seeking to recover from 
decades of war.  For the Soviet Union, it wanted access to Cam Ranh Bay and Da 
Nang military facilities “for its intelligence-gathering and power-projection 
                                                        
23 Wang and Wu, Against Us or With Us?, p. 35. 
24 Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University. 
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capabilities.”25  Thus, the Soviet Union was fulfilling strategic function of using 
Vietnam’s territory for military bases, refueling depots, and ports to extend its 
ability to confront China. 
A “Beijing Review” article offers a summary of China’s viewpoint of Soviet 
developments in Southeast Asia: 
After 1975 and the end of the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union altered its 
expansionist policies in Southeast Asia…  The Soviet Union's ultimate 
objective is to create another Cuba in Southeast Asia.  The Soviet Union is 
attempting to help Vietnam sell its “Indochina Federation” to the world….  
The Soviet Union also supported Vietnam in 1977 when it forced Laos to 
sign “friendship and cooperation” and “border” treaties.26 
 
Similarly, Wang and Wu contend that in 1975, “China had concluded that the 
Soviet Union was more dangerous than the United States since the former was on 
the offensive while the latter was on the defensive.”27  In September 1975, China 
warned Hanoi that its close ties with the “hegemonist” Soviet Union would hurt 
Sino-Vietnamese relations.  Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua speaking at the 
U.N. warned Vietnam to be careful not to “let the tiger in through the back door 
while repulsing the wolf through the front gate.”28  However, much to China’s 
chagrin Vietnam disregarded its warning, and Le Duan went to Moscow in October 
1975 to sign two large economic aid agreements.29  Moreover, the exigencies of war 
recovery led the Vietnamese to seek aid from both the Soviet Union and the United 
                                                        
25 Sally W. Stoecker, Clients and Commitments: Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978-1988, A RAND 
Note, N-2737-A (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1989), p. v [pdf p. 7] 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2737.pdf (Accessed 10 June 2016). 
26 Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance, p. 201, quoted from Beijing Review, 1 
March 1982. 
27 Wang and Wu, Against Us or With Us?, p. 16. 
28 King C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications (Stanford, Calif.: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p. 24. 
29 Hemen Ray, China’s Vietnam War (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983), p. 63. 
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States.  Vietnam gained membership in the Soviet sponsored International 
Investment Bank, as well as COMECON’s International Bank for Economic 
Cooperation.30  Figure 4.1 below illustrates Soviet Aid to North Vietnam/Vietnam.  
Additionally, playing both ideological sides, Vietnam became a member of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 1976.  Four months later, Vietnam 
drew $36 million in credit from the IMF.31 
 
Figure 4.1.  Soviet Aid to North Vietnam/Vietnam in USD     Source: Douglas Pike32 
 
The large source of economic aid led Chinese media commentators to argue 
that Vietnam had traded sovereignty for economic aid: “To get rubles from the 
Soviets, the Le Duan clique has acted against the dictates of conscience, despite its 
                                                        
30 Robert S. Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988), pp. 121-122. 
31 Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Publishers, 1986), p. 182. 
32 Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance, p. 139.  Note: Douglas Pike 
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claim to the contrary.  It calls for opposition to China, controls Laos, invades 
Kampuchea, has intruded into Thailand and threatens the other Southeast Asian 
countries.  It has become a pawn for the Soviet's expansionist scheme…”33  In 
addition to financial aid, Vietnam by the mid-1980s was heavily dependent on 
Soviet products; for example, 100% of its oil, 90% of its fertilizers, 90% of its cotton, 
and 80% of it metals came from the Soviet Union.34 
Two other developments display the growing influence of the Soviet Union in 
Vietnam by the end of 1976.  First, the Vietnamese Communist Party’s (formerly the 
Vietnam Worker’s Party) 4th Party Congress purged pro-Beijing party members 
from high-level positions in December 1976.35  Second, by the end of 1976, Vietnam 
granted the Soviets usage of Cam Ranh Bay port and airfield in exchange for military 
goods.36  In 1977, the CIA surmised, “The Soviets are… continuing to improve their 
Far Eastern naval forces capable of operations against Chinese domestic and foreign 
sea lines of communication.”37  By the mid-1980s, Cam Ranh Bay would host a Soviet 
naval presence of 25 to 30 surface ships, including a 37,000 ton displacement Kiev 
                                                        
33 Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance, p. 226, quoting “All-Around 
Cooperation or Thorough Sell-Out?” Xinhua, Radio Beijing Commentary, 19 September 1980. 
34 Liu Pu [刘朴], “Soviet-Vietnam Relations and Development Trends” [Yuesu guanxi ji qi fazhan 
qushi], World Economics and Politics [Shejie jingji yu zhengzhi], 1987, No. 5, p. 54. 
35 O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War, p. 41. 
36 Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979, pp. 92-93.  King C. Chen in his 
book, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications, pp. 27-28, p. 189 notes 69 
and 74, stated that the Agence Français de Presse (AFP) on 16 August 1978 reported that Vietnam 
had already let the Soviet Union build a military base.  The AFP would later record Hanoi’s 
confirmation that Soviet warships were in Cam Ranh Bay on 27 March 1979. 
37 “Soviet Strategic Objectives,” CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, (NIE 11-4-77), 12 January 1977, 
Document No. 0000268137, http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0000268137 (Accessed 12 March 
2015), p. 13 [pdf p. 19]. 
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class Vertical Short-Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft carrier,38 and four to six 
submarines.39  The Cam Ranh Bay airfield would host numerous Soviet aircraft 
including Tu-95 Bear bombers, four Tu-142 Bear F/J anti-submarine warfare 
aircraft, and 14 Mig-23 Flogger fighters.40  The USSR-Vietnam Alliance’s operational 
capabilities were completely dependent upon the Soviet Union’s heavy weaponry 
and conventional forces.  Thus, Li Qingsi argues that the threat of the Soviet-Vietnam 
Alliance rested primarily on the Soviets, and the Soviet-Vietnam Alliance was rather 
limited and was more aptly a part of Soviet expansion.41   
China’s leadership took notice of Soviet activities in Indochina during the late 
1970s.  For instance, the 1977 publication of “Chairman Mao’s Theory of the 
Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism” 
illustrates China’s perception of the above political and military developments in 
Indochina.  The publication stated that the Soviet Union was “taking advantage of 
the reduced U.S. presence in Asia after defeat in the war of aggression against 
Vietnam” and “intensifying expansion in the region to fill the ‘vacuum.’”42  
Additionally, Zhou Enlai informed two U.S. Congressmen that U.S. military forces 
should remain in Asia to keep a stable balance of power.43  The Soviet Union’s 
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military activities on Japanese claimed Northern Territories (four islands: Habomia, 
Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu) were described often in the Chinese media as part 
of the Soviet Union’s Far East and Pacific strategic system.  The Northern Territories 
bases were linked with Soviet bases in Vladivostok and “other places in the Far East” 
to threaten the U.S. Seventh Fleet and Japan.44   
 Two additional political conflicts affecting the Sino-Vietnamese relationship’s 
downward trend concerned the territorial border disputes and the ethnic Chinese 
population in Vietnam.  For instance, Vietnamese sources indicate that in 1976 and 
1977 there were 812 and 873 border incidents, respectively.  Normally the incidents 
involved an individual or a small group making a disruption, but on 4 May 1977, a 
large border clash between Chinese and Vietnamese troops represented an increase 
in “fierceness” and organization.  Ross notes that the Chinese “may have initiated 
many of the clashes” to signal “China’s intention to present Vietnam with a two-front 
war if it should invade Kampuchea.”45  Furthermore, in the midst of these border 
clashes came the controversial treatment of the ethnic Chinese population living in 
Vietnam.  Le Duan speaking to the Soviet ambassador in October 1977 remarked 
that the communists were going to end the economic influence of the Chinese 
minority, termed Hoa in Vietnamese.  In early 1977, the Hanoi government targeted 
the Saigon Chinese population when they launched the “Campaign against 
Comprador Bourgeoisie,” and a year later, they launched the “Campaign to 
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Transform Private Industry and Commerce.”46  These ethnic policies encouraged a 
mass exodus of 105,000 ethnic Chinese by May 1978, and another 65,000 by the end 
of the year.47  In July 1978, Vietnam closed the Chinese border, and the ethnic 
Chinese began leaving by boats to other states.  China responded by cutting off all 
aid to Vietnam on 3 July 1978.48  At the same time, Soviet arms shipments to 
Vietnam increased to help “ready Vietnamese forces for action.”49  Additionally, 
China criticized the Vietnamese socialist transformation policies as unjust and 
focused on ethnic Chinese, but refugees in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand 
confirmed that the application of the policies was independent of ethnicity.  The 
Vietnamese rebuttal pointed to the duplicity of the Chinese critique: China did not 
protest when the Cambodians killed ethnic Chinese because Cambodia is an ally of 
China.50  More importantly, Vietnam’s “ingratitude” and “insolence” angered Deng 
Xiaoping and Vice Premier Li Xiannian because China had provided Vietnam with 
4.26 billion RMB in aid from 1950 to 1974.51   
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The Vietnam problem was much more complicated than a simple border 
dispute or mistreatment of ethnic Chinese; rather, Deng Xiaoping saw Soviet 
influence at work.  On 22 September 1978, Deng Xiaoping in reference to the 
Vietnam problem would say to the Malaysian foreign minister, “Speaking globally, 
you can see the Soviet Union’s meddlesome hand at the root.”52  Another area of 
particular concern to China was Vietnam’s involvement with its ally, Cambodia.  The 
dispute started much earlier in the 1970s.  In March 1970 when the pro-U.S. coup 
d’état led by General Lon Nol removed Prince Norodom Sihanouk while he was on 
vacation.  The Soviets recognized the Lon Nol regime, and the Chinese-backed 
Prince Sihanouk who took refuge in Beijing.  The Chinese wanted to capitalize on the 
Soviet’s backing of a pro-U.S. regime.  Moreover, China was able to garner the 
support of the prince’s former enemies, the Khmer Rouge, and the North 
Vietnamese in opposing the Lon Nol regime.53  Yet, from 1971 to 1978 border 
clashes between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese hampered the 
bilateral relationship.  After victory over Lon Nol in April 1975, the Khmer Rouge 
escalated their attacks against Vietnam.  North Vietnam would wait to secure its 
own victory over South Vietnam before retaliating against Cambodian military bases 
in June 1975.54   
Throughout 1976, Vietnam negotiated with Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer 
Rouge, to end the border conflicts, but the two revolutionary sides were at an 
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impasse.  Pol Pot mounted aggressive purges to remove Communist Party of 
Kampuchea members associated with Vietnam, often termed the “Hanoi Khmer.”55  
It is reported that by September 1976, the Cambodian communist movement had 
eliminated “opponents and those who were suspected of Vietnamese connections 
and orientation.”56  Edward O’Dowd claimed: “Any person who was sympathetic to 
the Vietnamese revolution, who had trained in Vietnam, or who so much 
acknowledged that the Indochina Communist Party had once worked for the 
communist revolution in Cambodia was a target of Pol Pot and his faction.”57  The 
Cambodian military matched the political purges by imprisonment or execution of 
4,000 Vietnamese trained Cambodian soldiers serving in the Cambodian army.58  
Vietnam viewed the regime as an “ungrateful upstart,” and it took offense that the 
Cambodian leadership repeatedly called for all Vietnamese troops to leave 
Cambodia.59  The Vietnamese argued that the Cambodians should treat them as “Big 
Brothers” since they helped liberate Cambodia from the Lon Nol regime.60  In April 
and May of 1977, Cambodia launched several attacks along the Vietnamese border, 
and by December, the two states were regularly engaging each other with division-
sized forces.61 
 In February 1978, the Vietnamese Central Committee of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party made its decision to oust the Pol Pot regime by the end of 1978.  
By the autumn of 1978, Vietnam attempted border negotiations with the 
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Cambodians, mediation with the Chinese, and at least four coup attempts had all 
failed to solve the Cambodian problem—invasion was the final option to pursue.  In 
September and October 1978, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham van Dong visited all 
of the ASEAN states, promising that the Vietnamese would not interfere in the 
respective states’ internal affairs or support insurgent movements.62  The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) leadership learned of the Vietnamese invasion plans and 
began deliberation on how to respond to Vietnam.  Negotiations between China and 
Vietnam still did not resolve the Hoa refugee issue in September and October 
1978.63  As the pending invasion neared, China issued a “stern warning” to Vietnam 
in October 1978, stating, “Our patience is not unlimited.  Vietnam must pay the price 
and attack will be met with counter-attack.”64  The warning did not alleviate the 
Sino-Vietnamese rift, but Le Duan and Pham Van Dong signed a 25-year Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation in Moscow on November 3, 1978.  Even then, Le Duan 
criticized the Chinese for their “expansionist, chauvinist designs and great power 
hegemonism in South East Asia.”65  By late November Vietnam began pounding Pol 
Pot’s forces with “intense air and ground strikes” in Cambodia.66 
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4.6 PERCEPTIONS OF ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES 
This juncture provides an opportunity to examine how China evaluated the 
capabilities of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance.  The Soviet’s nuclear capabilities alone 
posed an enormous threat without having to aggregate Vietnam’s conventional 
capabilities.  For example, the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflicts at Zhenbao 
Island (2 and 15 March) and in Xinjiang (13 August) dramatically altered China’s 
calculation of its international security environment.67  These border conflicts 
reinforced the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities that 
could destroy China with a “surgical strike.”68  Soviet SS-20 ballistic missiles were 
“intended primarily to provide a decisive supplement to other Soviet firepower in 
compensating—and over-compensating—for the large and permanent Chinese 
manpower advantage.”69  The Sino-Soviet stand-off drove home the magnitude of 
the Soviet threat facing China.  Additionally, Li Qingsi stated that the Soviet’s 
deployment of 1,000,000 troops on China’s northern border during the 1970s and 
1980s made the Soviet Union an imminent threat.70  The USSR represented a serious 
threat to China’s security because the Soviet’s Southeastern Theater of Military 
Operations contained 25 Soviet Army divisions that could be ready for combat 
within four days, and an additional complement of 31 Soviet Army divisions could 
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be combat ready within eleven days of full alert.71  This comprehensive military 
capability represented a real military threat to China given the close proximity of 
the Soviet forces.72  China shared a roughly 6,800 mile (11,000 kilometer) border 
with the Soviet Union and Mongolia (a Soviet satellite state) since the old Soviet 
Union border contained modern day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  The 
Soviet’s manipulation of Mongolia put its troops only 350 miles (560 kilometers) 
from Beijing.73   
 Though Vietnam had an estimated 2.6 million people “under arms,” the 
Soviet Union had little to gain in aggregating its capabilities with Vietnam.74  
However, the Soviets gained an advantage in its ability to project power in the 
western Pacific with access to Cam Ranh Bay airfield and port facilities, in addition 
to the Haiphong and Da Nang port facilities.  By mid-April 1979, TU-95D Bears were 
flying missions over Cambodia and the Gulf of Tonkin.  Moreover, the Soviet Navy 
operating in the western Pacific could rest and service its crews without traveling 
back to Vladivostok, and it extended the range of Soviet naval vessels into the Indian 
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Ocean.75  The distance between Vladivostok and Cam Ranh Bay is roughly 4,000 
miles, so this greatly enhanced Soviet naval and air force capabilities.  Potentially a 
Soviet Backfire bombers stationed north of Vladivostok could bomb Chinese 
military targets in southern China, and land in Cam Ranh Bay.  In late 1982, U.S. Air 
Force Major General Burns estimated that the Soviets could move as many as 20 
Backfire bombers to Cam Ranh Bay within eight hours “almost instantly tilting the 
balance of power in Southeast Asia.”76 
Perceptions of Alliance Capabilities: 
Question 3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial 
alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, and 
military bases?  Supported.  Chinese analysts were acutely aware of the close 
proximity of Soviet forces on the extensive northern border with the USSR and 
Mongolia, and they recognized the strategic usefulness of Cam Ranh Bay port and 
airfield and Da Nang port. 
Question 3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the 
adversarial alliances?  Supported.  Chinese analysts were well aware of Soviet SS-20 
nuclear missiles deployed on their northern border. 
Question 3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the 
adversarial alliances?  Supported.  Chinese analysts were well aware of the 56 Soviet 
divisions on their northern border. 
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Question 3d:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities and 
foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes?  Supported.  Soviet capabilities 
alone were threatening to China and pushed China towards rapprochement with the 
U.S. and Japan.  Subsequent sections will detail how China will balance against the 
Soviet threat. 
4.7 PERCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY 
The Chinese interpretation of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation marks a juncture to see if Chinese analysts perceived a Soviet 
conspiracy against China.  The Vietnamese leaders went to Moscow to secure an 
agreement that would protect Vietnam from Chinese military pressure.77  The treaty 
agreement far from guaranteed military protection; yet, from the Chinese side, the 
USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was far more threatening.  The 
language of Article Six of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
provides a very ambiguous security guarantee: “In the event of an attack or the 
threat of an attack against one of the Parties, the High Contracting Parties shall 
immediately hold mutual consultations with a view to eliminating that threat and 
taking appropriate effective measures for the maintenance of peace and security of 
their countries.”78  Important terms that would add teeth and commitment to the 
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treaty such as “military” and “alliance” were clearly absent.  Additionally, the treaty 
made no mention of extended nuclear deterrence or any specific security 
guarantees beyond consultation.   
Indeed, the USSR-Vietnam treaty did not assure military aid to Vietnam if an 
aggressor attacked Vietnam.  By contrast, such a commitment was explicit in the 
Soviet Union’s treaties with North Korea and East Germany.79  The treaty language 
with North Korea (1961) states, “Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer 
armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, 
the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance 
with all the means at its disposal.”80  The treaty language in the USSR-East Germany 
treaty (1967) stated, “In the event of an armed attack in Europe on either of the 
High Contracting Parties by any State or group of States, the other High Contracting 
Party shall afford it immediate assistance in accordance with the provisions of the 
Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.”81   
The weaker treaty language between the USSR and Vietnam is very similar to 
the friendship treaties that the Soviets signed with Egypt (1971),82 Angola (1976),83 
Mozambique (1977),84 and Ethiopia (1978),85 Yemen (1979),86 and Congo (1981).87  
Along with Vietnam, all of these states represent far-flung Soviet interests in the 
1970s and early 1980s.  The Soviets could only guarantee that in the case of 
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breaches of peace that they will “seek urgent and immediate contact,” or 
“immediately contact” one another.88  Moreover, in response to the Chinese attack 
on Vietnam detailed below, the Soviets did not exceed the very cautious and 
ambiguous language in the USSR-Vietnam treaty.  An anonymous senior Vietnamese 
officer argued, “[National Security Adviser] Zbigniew Brzezinski told Carter the 
USSR would not take action against China because it had no vital interest at stake.  
He was right, and we did not expect Soviet military assistance.”89  Robert Gates’s 
account of November 1978 revealed that the CIA judged that the Soviets “would do 
as little as it could get away with and take little risk of a direct military clash with 
the Chinese.”90   
Chinese interpretation of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation viewed it as an agreement that emboldened Vietnam to act aggressively 
and dominate Southeast Asia.  Repeatedly, Chinese interpreters used the term 
“military alliance” to describe the treaty.  For example, a Chinese media source saw 
the 1978 USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation as a threat because it 
“explicitly provides for military cooperation and can be considered a military 
alliance that it (enables) Vietnam to escalate its aggression and expansion.”91  
Another Chinese commentator wrote, “On 3 November 1978, Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union signed the ‘Soviet-Vietnam Friendship and Cooperation Treaty’ that 
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possessed the characteristics of a military alliance.  The Soviets and Vietnamese 
were striving to encourage Vietnamese regional hegemony.  The treaty especially 
played an important role for the Vietnamese to launch a war to invade Cambodia.”92  
Another Chinese commentator argued that the treaty was a Vietnamese diplomatic 
maneuver to ensure a superpower was on their side for the December 1978 
invasion of Cambodia.93   
Indeed, Vietnam’s treaty with the Soviets was a diplomatic maneuver aimed 
at China.  I argue that Vietnam was moving towards the Cambodian invasion far in 
advance of the treaty with the Soviets, and the treaty served as one component of 
Vietnam’s diplomatic efforts prior to full invasion.  Vietnam’s planning stages had 
begun in February 1978, nine months in advance of the treaty.  The treaty was an 
agreement with a superpower that had already provided more than ten years of 
economic and security assistance.  Moreover, the Vietnamese had exhausted a 
number of other policies aimed at ending the border conflict with Cambodia.  
Vietnam tried bilateral negotiations with the Cambodians, it tried using the Chinese 
to mediate a solution, and Vietnam tried at least four coup attempts to bring about a 
solution to the border conflicts with Cambodia.  The Cambodians and Vietnamese 
were already engaged in division-sized conflicts by December 1977, eleven months 
before its treaty with the Soviets.  Vietnam’s last option was to launch a war to end 
the Khmer incursions with the dry-season offensive in 1978-1979.  The treaty with 
the Soviets was just one part of Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy in preparation for its 
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invasion of Cambodia.94  Chinese leaders correctly interpreted that the treaty was 
aimed at them, and it caused them to prepare extra measures to signal a limited use 
of force.  Even though the treaty did not explicitly promise military assistance to the 
Vietnamese in the event of a military threat, the Chinese assigned a higher level of 
cohesion to the nascent alliance.  More importantly, Chinese evidence does not point 
to “over-Machiavellianism” on the part of the Soviets and the Vietnamese because 
there is no mention of conspiracy.95  Therefore, China’s reaction to the treaty can be 
considered a reasonable over-reaction.   
Three weeks after signing the treaty with the Soviets, the Vietnamese 
established a “puppet” Cambodian government on 25 November 1978.96  
Subsequently, a month later, on 25 December, Vietnam invaded Cambodia with 13 
army divisions.97  Kenneth Weiss asserted that Vietnam and the Soviet Union had 
separate “but compatible goals” in launching the invasion of Cambodia.98  For 
Vietnam, to accomplish the goal of removing its bothersome neighbor it would need 
both military and economic political support to deter China’s reaction.  The Soviets 
were willing to bear these costs because it matched its geopolitical policy to contain 
China.99 
On the day of the invasion, a “People’s Daily” article stated China’s position: 
“The Vietnamese authorities have gone far enough in pursuing their strong anti-
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China course.  There is a limit to the Chinese people’s forbearance and restraint.  
China has never bullied and will never bully any other country; neither will it allow 
itself to be bullied by others.  It will not attack unless it is attacked.  But if it is 
attacked, it will certainly counterattack.”100  In terms of a tangible response, China 
suspended its oil exports to Vietnam.101 
Less than two weeks into the invasion, by 7 January, Vietnamese forces 
attacked and occupied the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh and inserted Heng 
Samrin as head of a pro-Hanoi government supported by 16 Vietnamese divisions 
(roughly 200,000 soldiers); Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge would escape to the refuge of the 
jungles of western Cambodia on the border of Thailand.102  Former Cambodian 
military purged by Pol Pot would form a segment of the new government’s 
leadership.103  Shen Zhihua wrote, “The mutual strategic interest between the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam clearly involved an intention to confront China, and it certainly 
gave rise to China’s vigilance and opposition.  China’s security interests mandate 
that it cannot accept a militarily powerful adversarial state too close to its 
borders.”104  Chinese analysts differ on what was accomplished at the Chinese 
Central Work Conference held from 10 November to 15 December of 1978, prior to 
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.  Zhang Xiaoming argues that the conference was 
most concerned with economic reform and “addressing the legacies of the Cultural 
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Revolution.”105  Yet, King C. Chen contends that Indochinese politics was a key 
discussion point, with Deng Xiaoping as the central figure since he was commanding 
both the Politburo and the Central Committee.106  Deng argued that China should 
engage in a “punitive” war that would accomplish the following goals:  
1) A limited counter-attack that would not provoke Soviet intervention;  
2) Attack Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia,  
3) Show China’s determination to fight a costly war even if it diverted it from 
its modernization efforts, 
4) Serve as a stimulus for military improvement, and 
5) Demonstrate to the Soviet Union, that China could break through any 
encirclement device.107    
To accomplish the first goal, China deliberately kept the military operation 
against Vietnam limited to achieve Deng Xiaoping’s number one goal of not 
provoking the Soviet Union.  The General Staff denied requests from Chinese 
commanders on the front for combat air support.108  The Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) 
did not carry out any combat missions, but did fly reconnaissance and helicopter 
evacuations of wounded soldiers.109  A Chinese source Guangjiaojing [Wide Angle] 
reported on 16 March 1979 that PLA forces were ordered not to advance more than 
50 kilometers into Vietnam.110   
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Deng Xiaoping admitted that during their deliberations over how to 
prosecute the war so as not to provoke the Soviet Union, the USSR and Vietnam had 
signed their treaty.  In his view, “Vietnam relied on the USSR-Vietnam Friendship 
Treaty to launch a massive attack on Cambodia, cause trouble on the Sino-Vietnam 
border, and caused us to be disturbed.”111  Shen Zhihua describes the predicament 
China faced after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia: 
There was a contradiction between the Sino-Vietnamese bilateral 
relationship at the regional level, especially Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.  
This factor quickly aroused China because the Soviet Union was supporting 
Vietnam’s confrontation of China.  The Chinese government finally decided 
to execute an attack against Vietnam as a punitive action, while at the same 
time preventing Soviet expansion, and encouraging other states to 
courageously resist Soviet policies of expansion.112 
To encounter this predicament China moved to bolster its strategic standing.  On the 
diplomatic front, in late 1978, China developed two “parallel strategic partnerships” 
with both the U.S. and Japan.  China and the U.S. shared the common goal of 
defending their interests against Soviet advances.  Thus, the Soviet-Vietnam alliance 
provided the prospect of normalization between China and the U.S.113  Chinese 
Premier Hua Guofeng, at the press conference after issuing the US-China 
communiqué on normalization said, “We think that the normalization of relations 
between China and the United States and the signing of the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between China and Japan are conducive to peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole.  Does this mean the formation of an 
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axis or alliance of China, Japan, and the United States?  We say that it is neither an 
alliance nor an axis.”114 
Likewise, during Deng Xiaoping’s scheduled trips to Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Singapore in early November 1978, Deng was clearly signaling China’s intentions to 
use force against Vietnam if Vietnam attacked China’s ally, Cambodia.115  Finally, 
Deng Xiaoping went to the U.S in late January 1979 and met President Carter at the 
White House to discuss the Chinese plans.  Deng said, “We consider it necessary to 
put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an 
appropriate limited lesson.”116  Carter insisted that the new Sino-American 
relationship was supposed to bring peace and stability to Asia, but Deng reportedly 
said that China would have to respond to its arrogant neighbors and could not allow 
them to disturb the region without consequences.117  Moreover, Deng was 
attempting to form a “United Front” against the Soviet Threat.  In an interview with 
American reporters Deng said, “in order to oppose hegemony and safeguard world 
peace, security, and stability, the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and other 
third-world countries should unite and earnestly deal with this challenge of the 
danger of war.  We do not need any kind of pact or an alliance.  What we need is a 
common understanding of the situation and common efforts.”118   
Subsequently on Deng’s return to China on 9 February, Deng called an 
enlarged Politburo meeting to discuss the rationale for attacking Vietnam.119  
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Additionally, the Chinese Central Military Commission made their final deliberations 
in early February, and it decided that the PLA was to launch a punitive war against 
Vietnam.120  The Chinese attack was limited in scope, but had a larger strategic 
purpose in confronting the Soviet Union as well.  As Shen Zhihua writes, “The 
Chinese government openly declared that the military attack on Vietnam was to 
attack the expansion of the Soviet Union in southeast Asia, because ‘the hegemonic 
collusion between Vietnam and the Soviet Union to carry out invasion and 
expansion, this brought the destruction of peace to modern Indochina and is the 
root cause threatening peace and stability in southeast Asia.’”121  As the Chinese 
invasion approached in early February, Soviet leaders never commented on the 
treaty and even a Pravda article by I. Aleksandrov (pseudonym) did not refer to the 
treaty.  The only mention of the treaty came from the Radio Peace and Progress 
broadcast.122  In terms of military signals prior to the Chinese invasion, the Soviets 
deployed approximately 15 naval vessels, cruisers and destroyers, off of the Chinese 
and Vietnamese coasts and increased Soviet military air patrols along Xinjiang 
(China’s northwestern border with the Soviet Union).123 
China for its part signaled to the Soviet Union that the invasion was in 
pursuant of limited goals and of limited duration.  China did not demand that 
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Vietnam should withdrawal from Cambodia as a condition of China’s withdrawal 
from Vietnam.  Deng Xiaoping told reporters, “The idea of a simultaneous 
withdrawal is very good.  But we would not make the simultaneous Chinese and 
Vietnamese withdrawal a bargaining condition.”124  Therefore, Beijing was 
attempting to signal that the Soviet Union would not need to use force to protect 
Vietnam.  Yet, China prepared for the worst.  In Xinjiang and Heilongjiang (China’s 
northeastern border) an estimated 300,000 civilians were evacuated and border 
forces were put on “maximum, first-order alert.”125  In terms of military 
preparations the Chinese assembled 31 divisions (roughly ten percent of total 
ground forces) and 1,200 tanks to the Sino-Vietnamese border.  Additionally, the 
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assembled between 800 and 1,100 aircraft deployed to 15 
air bases in Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan.  Kenneth Allen estimated that 
20,000 PLAAF troops prepared temporary fuel lines and storage facilities, water 
lines, and housing in preparation for the invasion.126  The Chinese deployed naval 
and air capabilities, but they did not use the assets in actual combat.  Center for 
Naval Analyses analyst Kenneth Weiss noted, “Chinese restraint in the air and naval 
weaponry was mostly a political signal of the limited nature of the incursion that the 
Vietnamese recognized on their own or were told as much by their Soviet allies.”127  
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Perceptions of Conspiracy: 
Question 1Ba:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well 
organized and planned moves against them?  Supported.  Chinese analysts correctly 
interpreted that the Soviet Union and Vietnam aimed the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of 
Friendship and Co-operation against Chinese interests.  This assessment aligns well 
with the baseline intentions of the alliance. 
Question 1Bb:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a 
conspiracy aimed against them?  Not Supported.  No evidence of Chinese analysts 
using conspiracy arguments to explain or describe USSR-Vietnam Alliance activities. 
Question 1Bc:  Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy? 
Not Applicable.  Yet, the Sino-Vietnam War revealed a lack of alliance cohesion 
between the USSR and Vietnam, and China corrected its perception that the Soviets 
would come to the aid of the Vietnamese. 
Question 1Bd:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese 
foreign policy outcomes?  Not Applicable.  Chinese analysis did not show perceptions 
of conspiracy.  It is possible that Chinese perception of enhanced security 
cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam may have played a part in how 
the PLA executed its punitive war against Vietnam in such a way to not cause a 
Soviet reprisal; for example, Deng’s planning not to incite a war with the Soviet 
Union, and limited use of air assets for reconnaissance and medical evacuations.   
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4.8 ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION 
The Sino-Vietnamese War offers an opportunity to analyze China’s 
perception of alliance cohesion in how the alliance responded to the invasion and 
repeated incursions of an alliance partner.  On 17 February 1979, no fewer than 30 
Chinese divisions (roughly 320,000 soldiers) launched a multi-prong attack towards 
three Vietnamese provincial capitals: Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Lang Son.128  The 
Vietnamese defenders were much smaller in number, predominantly local militia 
forces estimated between 75,000 and 100,000 men.129  In contrast to the Chinese 
forces, the Vietnamese were battle hardened from fighting the French and U.S. 
militaries for more than two and a half decades.130  Gates’s memoir of CIA 
intelligence at the time reported that the seasoned Vietnamese veterans “were 
giving a good account of themselves and that the Chinese were having problems 
maintaining command and control, that their equipment was outdated, and that 
Hanoi’s troops were seasoned veterans compared to the Chinese.”131  The 
Vietnamese did bring in reinforcements from Laos, southern Vietnam, and two 
divisions from Cambodia, but the punitive war failed to relieve pressure on the 
Khmer Rouge as fighting in Cambodia in April 1979 was more intense than in 
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February.132  The Vietnamese did not commit its best divisions to fight, but kept at 
least five divisions in reserve to defend Hanoi.133 
The main brunt of combat took place in two stages.  The first stage, from 17 
to 26 February, saw slow moving progress towards Lao Cai and Cao Bang.  The 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took heavy losses, and the morale of the men was 
greatly diminished due to the lack of supplies, losses due to human wave tactics, and 
Vietnamese death traps and mines.134 The second stage of the war, from 27 
February to 4 March, concentrated on capturing the provincial capital of Lang Son, 
20 kilometers from the Chinese border.  Heavy fighting between Chinese tanks and 
Vietnamese artillery characterized this stage.  The battle was a very destructive fight 
for the hills that surround Lang Son.  At the same time, fighting was taking place in 
other border areas, including Vietnamese incursions into Guangxi Province.135  The 
Chinese forces ultimately captured the three key provincial capitals, but the PLA 
suffered high losses.  The most recent Chinese casualty estimates state that 6,900 
PLA soldiers were killed in action, and 15,000 were wounded in action.136  The Far 
East Economic Review reported that several Vietnamese army divisions were “badly 
mauled” in combat with Chinese forces: the 3rd at Dong Dang, the 345th and 316A at 
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Lau Cai, and possibly the 346th at Lang Son.137  These are large amounts of casualties 
for only fighting 16 days in a time of modern warfare.138   
In response to China’s border war with Vietnam, the Soviet Union kept to the 
ambiguous wording of the USSR-Vietnam treaty.  There was no promise of Soviet 
military action to assist Vietnam, and the Soviet “airlift” was only ten flights.139  
However, the Soviet Union was active in signaling its displeasure to the Chinese.  
During the first stage of the war, 17 to 27 February, Soviet diplomatic leaders were 
making very strong statements that they were watching the progress of the war and 
hinted at involvement if the conflict did not remain limited.140  On 18 February, the 
Soviets public reaction to the invasion was to state that it would “honor its 
commitments.”141  Robert Gates summarized the Soviet response, “while Soviet 
political and propaganda support was strong, their practical efforts were modest 
and focused on helping Vietnam within its own borders.”142  Ten days into the 
Chinese punitive war, a Japanese newspaper, Mainichi Shimbun, interviewed Deng 
Xiaoping.  He stated: 
In deciding to launch military action against Vietnam we were ready to take 
certain risks and made sufficient preparations.  Because our objective is 
limited and fighting will not last long, most probably these risks will not 
materialize, although we cannot rule out the possibility of a Soviet attack on 
China...  The Vietnamese expected help from those who pulled the string 
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behind them and depended on the [Sino-Soviet] treaty.  But if we were afraid 
of that, other people would think we were soft.143 
 
Chinese commentators noted, “On the one hand the Soviet Union criticized 
China’s military attack on Vietnam, and on the other hand it increased the military 
activities on the China-Soviet Union border region such as holding military 
exercises, and clearly increased the adversarial atmosphere between China and the 
Soviet Union.”144  Deng Xiaoping’s evaluation of the Soviet response was tied to his 
apprehension that a conflict with the Soviet Union from the north would impact 
China’s Four Modernization plans, but Deng judged that the “North’s reaction was 
small, and the impact was small.”145  A year later, Deng Xiaoping would admit, “If 
someone should ask us if we were scared, frankly speaking, we were indeed 
scared.”146 
RAND analyst, Sally Stoecker provides three possible reasons the Soviets did 
not become physically involved in the conflict:  
1) The proximity of Chinese forces on the Soviet’s Far East border and 
Vietnam’s border would create a dual front conflict for the Soviets, 
2) The Soviets did not want to hurt relations with ASEAN states, and 
3) The Soviets were engaged in SALT II negotiations with the U.S. and did not 
want to provoke the West.147    
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Additional reasons include the Vietnamese assessment that Vietnam was not 
a vital interest to the Soviets, and the Chinese leadership had successfully signaled 
that their punitive invasion was a limited action that would not threaten the 
Vietnamese regime.  Also in the fall of 1978, the Soviet Union was preoccupied with 
deteriorating relations with Iran and Afghanistan, and by March 1979, the Soviets 
were discussing the utility of invading Afghanistan.148  Though the Soviet Union did 
not physically intervene in the Sino-Vietnam War, the Soviet Union would remain a 
solid supporter of Vietnam and Vietnam’s policy toward Cambodia.  From 1979 to 
1982, the Soviets provided Vietnam large amounts of materiel for operations 
including over 300 T-54, T-55 tanks, and armored personnel carriers, more than 
4,000 military trucks, 300 heavy artillery weapons, and Mi-24 HIND gunship 
helicopters, and Mi-8 HIP transport helicopters.  Estimates on Soviet aid to Vietnam 
varied widely.  In 1981, Bernard Weinraub of “The New York Times” estimated that 
the Soviets were spending between three to six million dollars per day on military 
and civilian projects which included support for an estimated 200,000 Vietnamese 
soldiers in Cambodia.149  Douglas Pike estimated that by 1986 “the war in 
Kampuchea was costing Vietnam about $12 million a day, about 80 percent of which 
came directly or indirectly from the USSR.”150 
On 21 March 1980, Radio Beijing registered China’s opinion of Soviet 
activities in Vietnam: 
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In Vietnam, Mr. Soviet Union has now replaced Mr. United States.  From the 
Soviets in Vietnam you see the shadow of the Americans and smell the 
neocolonialism.  On the highways near Hanoi you can see Soviet made 
command cars, trucks and tanks.  The port of Haiphong is crowded with 
Soviet vessels.  Soviet fighters are flying over Vietnamese skies…  These facts 
show that the relationship between the Soviet Union and Vietnam is one 
between a master and a lackey, and that such a relationship is founded on 
mutual collusion and utilization.151 
 
Nine days later, in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun, Deng Xiaoping would express 
how China learned its own lesson from the punitive war against Vietnam.  He stated, 
“China meted out punishment to Vietnam last year not just for China’s interests.  The 
world was afraid of touching the tiger’s arse but we did it.  As a result, we found that 
we can do it.”  China learned that it could attack Vietnam in limited ways and not 
have to face military repercussions from the Soviet Union. 
In the years following China’s “punitive” war against Vietnam, China’s 
military continued significant military operations on its southern border with 
Vietnam.  The military operations were often in response to Vietnam’s dry season 
offensives (December to March) in Cambodia that took place in the early 1980s.152  
For example, in April 1983 the PRC launched a “Symbolic Offensive”—characterized 
as small raids, psychological operations, occasional shelling, and destruction of 
property to punish Vietnam for its yearly dry-season offensives.153  For example, 
Vietnam’s 1984-85 dry-season offensive eliminated a number of Khmer Rouge 
camps on the Thai border and severely disrupted its supply bases and logistical 
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networks.154  In retribution for the campaign, China launched its own operation 
from 27 May 1985 to 13 June 1985; the PLA hammered Vi Xuyen District of Ha Tuyen 
Province with 226,900 artillery shells.155  In consideration of Chinese military 
activities and the concurrent Sino-Soviet negotiations on normalization, the lack of a 
Soviet response is telling of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance’s cohesion.  For example, 
after the 13-14 March 1988 clash between Vietnamese and Chinese sailors on 
Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands,156 the Soviets “maintained near total 
silence.”157  The USSR was not going to allow the Sino-Vietnamese conflict to stymie 
the Sino-Soviet normalization process. 
It is also important to see the punitive nature of the Chinese border war not 
as a single month long invasion in early 1979, but as the first movement of a long-
term strategy to pressure Vietnam to exit Cambodia.  The continued Chinese 
pressure on the border and the constant threat of “another lesson” forced Vietnam 
to maintain a large deployment of troops along its northern border with China, 
estimates range from 300,000 to 800,000 soldiers.158  A former Vietnamese 
ambassador summarized China’s “lesson” for Vietnam by stating, “We [China] can 
punish you at any time, even if you are allied with a big power.  You cannot escape 
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your geopolitical status as a tributary state.”159  Therefore, China was forcing Hanoi 
to sustain two fronts in a time when Vietnam had large economic difficulties.160  
China anticipated that the cumulative effect of being dependent on the Soviet Union 
for economic and military aid, the threat of another border attack, Chinese support 
for the Khmer Rouge, and the strain on the Vietnamese economy would force 
Vietnam to accede to Chinese demands.161 
In the 1980s, She Defeng noted Soviet dissatisfaction with its alliance 
partner, Vietnam.  He wrote, “The Soviet Union has actively provided military 
assistance such as arms and ammunition to Vietnam to support its invasion of 
Cambodia, oppose China, and dominate Southeast Asia, but to this day Vietnam does 
not allow Soviet military advisors to directly get involved with Vietnamese troops or 
command any Vietnamese troops, so much so that Soviet advisors are often 
excluded from Vietnamese operational information.”162  From this instance above, 
that the Soviets were providing plenty of capabilities, but the Vietnamese were 
resistant to cooperating with Soviet advisors.  “The New York Times” reported in 
1981 that Vietnam and the Soviet Union were experiencing tensions over Soviet 
influence in Cambodia, diplomats serving in Hanoi argued that, “the intensely 
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nationalistic Vietnamese leaders, who fought the French and the Americans, will 
never fall under the total sway of the Russians.”163  
Perceptions of Adversarial Alliance Cohesion: 
Question 2a:  Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is a 
function of external political context?  Supported.  The 1979 punitive invasion offers 
a good test of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance cohesion.  In the face of a crisis, the Soviet 
Union was practically unresponsive. 
Question 2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
institutional solidarity between the alliance partners?  Not Supported.  One Chinese 
analyst noted that Soviet advisors and the Vietnamese Army did not cooperate.  The 
Soviet’s supplied aid but were kept out of operational decision making. 
Question 2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
interactions between the alliance partners’ senior leadership?  Supported.  Chinese 
analysts paid attention to senior level meetings and subsequent economic aid 
packages flowing to Vietnam. 
Question 2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
domestic politics of the alliance partners?  No Evidence. 
Question 2e: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion 
influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?  Supported.  After the punitive war on 
Vietnam, Chinese analysts judged the USSR-Vietnam Alliance cohesion as weak; the 
Chinese were unrestricted by the Soviets to punish Vietnam for its dry season 
offensives in Cambodia year after year. 
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4.9 PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGED INTENTIONS 
The behavior of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance in the 1980s provides an 
opportunity to examine Chinese perceptions of alliance intentions.  China’s security 
environment would worsen with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 
1979.  Deng Xiaoping’s predictions of a dangerous decade were coming to 
fruition.164  “On 31 [December], Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Hai Fengyao met 
Soviet Ambassador to China, Shcherbakov, to denounce the Soviet invasion and to 
postpone the vice foreign minister meeting.  On 20 January 1980, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry issued a formal declaration, the invasion of China’s neighbor 
Afghanistan had installed an obstacle to the normalization process of China and the 
Soviet Union, and it was inappropriate to continue negotiations between the two 
states.”165  Wang and Wu contend that the Soviet threat of the late 1970s and early 
1980s pushed China to form a “united front” against “Soviet expansion.”166  Shen 
Zhihua wrote, “In January 1980 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
held a staff meeting and Deng Xiaoping raised the point that there were three large 
tasks in the 1980s: opposing hegemony, national reunification, and speeding up 
economic construction.  Concerning opposing hegemony was specifically opposing 
the Soviet Union.”167   
Thus, China attempted to further balance against the Soviet threat by 
increasing intelligence and defense cooperation with the U.S.  Concerning 
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intelligence cooperation, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner and 
Robert Gates traveled to Beijing at the end of December 1979 to discuss the 
establishment of collection facilities in western China.  After the Iranian Revolution, 
the CIA needed to replace the former Iranian-based collection stations to gain 
intelligence on Soviet missiles.168  In terms of defense cooperation, in January 1980 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown arrived in Beijing to discuss the potential for 
military cooperation.  These key meetings signified what Wang and Wu have termed 
the “quasi-alliance” between the U.S. and China.169  Two months later, in an 
interview with Yomiuri Shimbun, Deng Xiaoping described Soviet intentions: 
As they counter mounting obstacles in Western Europe, the Soviets have 
advanced their schedule and increased their emphasis on the East.  As a 
result, they utilize Vietnam in the East and, in combination of forming an 
Indochina federation, they try to build an Asian security system in a joint 
effort by big and small hegemonism.  At the same time, the Soviet Union has 
strengthened its Pacific Fleet so that it now equals the U.S. Pacific Fleet in 
strength.170 
However, disagreements between the two states concerning arms sales to 
Taiwan in 1981 and 1982 crushed the momentum of the formation of this Sino-
American “quasi-alliance.”  Shen Zhihua wrote, “Reagan entered the White House in 
1981 and issued the so-called dual track policy toward China: on one hand 
continuing to develop Sino-American relations; and on the other hand, in 
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, continuing to sell weapons to 
Taiwan such as the sale of the advanced FX fighter aircraft.  This policy caused 
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serious fluctuations in Sino-American relations.”171  The Chinese press noted the 
low-point in Sino-American relations, and the Soviets were attentive to the news.  
Subsequently, on 24 March 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed 
publicly in Tashkent that the USSR supported Chinese claims to Taiwan and was 
willing to improve Sino-Soviet relations.172  Brezhnev clearly played upon the 
Taiwan dispute by stating that the Soviet Union was opposed to the “concept of two 
Chinas.”173   
In October 1982, Deng Xiaoping made his “three obstacles” very clear to the 
Soviets to “stop supporting Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, and urge the 
Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia,” withdrawal from Afghanistan, and 
resolve the Sino-Soviet border issues.174  Six months after Brezhnev’s Tashkent 
speech, when the 12th CCP Congress met, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang pushed 
forward an “independent foreign policy” that would askew tilted relations toward 
the U.S. or the USSR and any bloc of countries; three years later, Hu Yaobang would 
reiterate that Chinese foreign policy would be free from strategic relations or 
alliances with any great power or bloc of powers.175  This new “independent foreign 
policy” direction slowly moved China towards détente with the USSR, and the two 
states began holding high-level rounds of meetings.176  Bilateral trade increases in 
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the early 1980s provides evidence of these nascent steps to mend the Sino-Soviet 
relationship.  Sino-Soviet trade in 1982 was $300,000,000 USD; yet, by 1985 
bilateral trade had increased to $1,840,000,000 USD.177  As a result, the CIA noticed 
that the Sino-Soviet negotiations were influencing the USSR-Vietnam Alliance in late 
1983.  A CIA analyst noted: 
      The Vietnamese clearly were worried about the reopening of the Sino-
Soviet talks last year.  Vietnam’s second-ranking Politburo member hastily 
arranged a visit to Moscow, and Hanoi said publicly that Beijing intended to 
use the talks to isolate Vietnam. 
       The Soviets, hoping to ease Vietnamese concerns, now consult Hanoi 
after each round of talks with China.  When Vietnamese Foreign Minister 
Nguyen Co Thach made his annual visit to Moscow last month, he saw 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa, presumably to discuss Kapitsa’s talks in 
Beijing in September. 
       Moscow also seeks to reassure Hanoi by publicizing most of the 
authoritative Vietnamese attacks on the Chinese, despite its own ban on 
media criticism of China.  General Secretary Andropov, in his meetings with 
Vietnamese leaders and in his public statements, has said there will be no 
Sino-Soviet rapprochement at Hanoi’s expense.  [Deputy Premier] Aliyev 
reiterated the message during his visit [in November 1982].178 
 Despite high-level negotiations between them, Chinese rhetoric on the Soviet 
threat in Indochina remained high.  Chinese media commentator, Tang Shan’s 
writings in the “Beijing Review” in November 1983, illustrate the Soviet military 
threat: “Military aid for the invasion of Kampuchea was only the opener.  The USSR 
had been granted use of Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang and other military bases in 
Vietnam which effectively moves its Asian and Pacific outposts south by 2,000 miles 
and completes its naval web…  menacing international sea lanes, especially the 
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Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”179  Tang Shan also described 
how the enhancement of the Soviet threat emboldened Vietnam in writing, 
“Vietnam, powerfully backed by the USSR, can step up its acts of aggression along 
the Sino-Vietnamese border… which helps meet the strategic needs of the USSR…  
[Thus] Vietnam becomes a knife that the USSR holds to China’s throat.”180  Shen 
Zhihua’s analysis of Soviet capabilities presents how threatening the Soviets were to 
the Chinese:  
Until 1984, the Soviet Union was strengthening its military power in East 
Asia to unprecedented levels.  The Soviet military deployed 140 SS-20 
ballistic missiles to the region and more than 100 nuclear capable Backfire 
bombers.  Of the four Soviet military aircraft carriers, the Soviets deployed 
two to the Pacific region; the Soviet Pacific fleet also added ballistic and 
nuclear powered submarines.  The Soviet side repeatedly explained that it 
did not have intentions to threaten China, but this strengthening of Soviet 
military power did not help China not feel threatened.181  
However, the threat environment in the Soviet Far East was going to change 
dramatically when Gorbachev came to power on 11 March 1985.  The Gorbachev era 
signaled the death knell of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance as Gorbachev was trying to 
right a failing economy and rein in an overstretched empire.  The next month, Deng 
Xiaoping met former British Prime Minister Edward Heath on 18 April.  Deng told 
him, “For the Soviets it would be a relatively easy and costless to get the Vietnamese 
to withdraw from Cambodia.”182 
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Subsequently, important Soviet-Vietnamese diplomatic activities signaled a 
shift in alliance intentions in June 1985 when Le Duan visited Moscow.  During the 
high level meetings, the two sides hinted that towards the purpose of peace both the 
Soviet Union and Vietnam desired normalization with China.  Additionally, the USSR 
and Vietnam issued a joint statement: “The two parties think that the Socialist 
Republics of the Soviet Union and Vietnam desire to normalize relations with the 
People’s Republic of China in accordance with the purpose of increasing peace in 
Asia and international security.”183  The Soviets and the Vietnamese wanted to 
maintain the status quo instead of bowing to Chinese demands.  Four months later, 
in October 1985, Deng Xiaoping asked Nicolae Ceaușescu to convey a message to 
Gorbachev.  Deng was willing to travel to Moscow to hold a summit meeting with 
Gorbachev on the condition that Gorbachev must remove the “three obstacles.”184  
The Soviets took their time in responding to Deng’s offer, but in early 1986, the 
USSR and Vietnam made two important statements independently that affected 
China’s peripheral security situation.  In February, at the convening of the 27th 
People’s Congress, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would be 
withdrawing from Afghanistan.  Next, on 4 March 1986, the Polish “Evening 
Bulletin” published the Vietnamese first vice minister of foreign affairs stating that 
the Vietnamese would be withdrawing from Cambodia before 1990.185  However, 
Vietnam had not issued a formal diplomatic statement; its intention to withdraw 
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from Cambodia by the end of the decade was published in an Eastern European 
newspaper.  Thus, the Chinese would wait for the Vietnamese withdraw to take 
place before they would move towards rapprochement with the Soviets or the 
Vietnamese. 
Another event for the USSR-Vietnam Alliance came when Gorbachev, on 28 
July 1986, made a speech in Vladivostok that signaled openness to rapprochement 
with China.186  Gorbachev stated, “A noticeable improvement has occurred in our 
relations in recent years.  I would like to affirm that the Soviet Union is prepared—
any time, at any level—to discuss with China questions of additional measures for 
creating an atmosphere of good-neighborliness.  We hope that the border dividing—
I would prefer to say, linking—us will soon become a line of peace and 
friendship.”187  This speech was a clear signal of receptivity to enhance the 
relationship between China and the USSR.188  Moreover, the Vietnamese read 
Gorbachev’s signal clearly, and the newly appointed Vietnamese Communist Party 
Chief, Truong Chinh, was waiting to meet Gorbachev in Moscow upon Gorbachev’s 
return, and the two leaders met on 12 August 1986.189  State media outlets publicly 
disclosed vague details about the two leaders discussing economic aid.190 
The normalization process between the Soviet Union and China and its 
connection to the USSR-Vietnam Alliance relationship was not lost on Chinese 
academics.  Liu Pu wrote, “From the outset of the Sino-Soviet consultations on 
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normalization of relations between the two countries, Vietnam has been very ill at 
ease worried that the Soviets would place relations with China above Vietnam.”191  
This was as a key cohesion test for the USSR-Vietnam Alliance as the larger power 
was seeking to mend diplomatic relations with the key target of the alliance.   
In response to Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech, Deng told an American 
reporter on 2 September 1986 that if the Soviets are able to get Vietnamese to 
withdraw from Cambodia, it would be a “solid step” in solving the Cambodia 
obstacle, and Deng would be ready to meet Gorbachev in person.192  In November 
1987 Deng would provide impetus to the normalization process; he told a Japanese 
delegation that in a couple of years he would be 85 years old and physically unfit to 
travel to Moscow.  Moreover, he pointed specifically to the Vietnam issue as the key 
issue causing the “undue delay.”193  Yet, by the summer of 1988, three important 
steps were showing signs that the Vietnamese were in-fact withdrawing from 
Cambodia and the Soviets were serious about making Vietnam’s departure a reality:  
1) After the 1987-1988 dry season campaign, between ten and twelve 
thousand Vietnamese soldiers withdrew from Cambodia,  
2) In June 1988, Hanoi removed its high command from Cambodia, and  
3) Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev went to Beijing to discuss 
Vietnam’s complete withdrawal from Cambodia.194  These military and diplomatic 
moves continue to illustrate the deterioration of USSR-Vietnam Alliance cohesion 
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since the USSR was working towards a policy end that was unfavorable to Vietnam’s 
desire to control Cambodia.   
The USSR had clearly placed normalization with China above its security 
cooperation with Vietnam.  Between April and June of 1987, the Soviets withdrew a 
“motorized division and some other units from Mongolia”—a positive step towards 
the border obstacle.195  Concerning the Afghanistan obstacle, Soviet troops started 
their withdrawal in the spring of 1988.196  On 18 September 1988, Gorbachev made 
a speech in Krasnoyarsk that again sent signals to the Chinese that the Soviets were 
seeking normalization with China.  He stated, “We are in favor of a full normalization 
of relations with the People’s Republic of China and the development [of relations] 
commensurate with our mutual responsibility for a peaceful policy.  We are ready to 
begin preparations immediately for a Soviet-Chinese summit meeting.”197  By the 
middle of February 1989, the Soviets had removed the Afghanistan obstacle by 
completing the withdrawal of 103,000 soldiers.198 
In fact, normalization of state and party relations between the USSR and 
China would occur nine months later in mid-May 1989 when Gorbachev traveled to 
Beijing to meet with Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Li Peng.199  Even though the 
Cambodia and border obstacles were not completely resolved, China was willing to 
hold the summit because it was observing increasingly positive interaction between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the Soviets were proposing a 200,000 troop 
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reduction.  In anticipation of the May summit, CIA analysts deduced that China was 
attempting to maintain its leverage with both of the superpowers.200  Subsequently, 
Vietnamese forces would complete their withdrawal from Cambodia at the end of 
1989.201  China’s peripheral environment changed dramatically when the USSR 
undertook costly actions to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay all of its surface ships and 
submarines, and Soviet air assets: a Mig-23 Flogger squadron, eight Tu-16 Badger 
bombers, two Tu-95 Bear bombers, and two Tu-142 Bear F/J maritime 
reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare planes.202  The Soviet military’s exit 
from Vietnam liquidated the alliance.  September of the next year, China and 
Vietnam held a “secret summit” in Chengdu towards normalizing relations.  The 
Vietnamese made a “major concession” by conceding to support a United Nations’ 
settlement of the Cambodian problem.203 
In conclusion, we see that Chinese analysts were able to discern the shifting 
intentions of the Soviet Union more than adequately.  Soviet baseline intentions held 
forth deterrence of Chinese offensives and an openness to normalization of 
relations. 
Perceptions of Changed Intentions: 
Question 1Aa:   Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, reports, 
speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions?   Supported.  
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Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok speech and 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech signaled 
détente towards China, but Deng Xiaoping held firm to the “three obstacles” before 
normalization would take place.  This assessment shows that Chinese analysts’ 
perceptions aligned well with the alliance’s baseline intentions. 
Question 1Ab:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the 
adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of benign intentions?  Supported.  The 
Chinese saw fulfillment of the speeches when the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, 
Vietnam started pulling out of Cambodia, and the reduction of Soviet troops on the 
Sino-Soviet border.  The USSR’s removal of air and naval assets from Cam Ranh Bay 
signaled the removal of threatening capabilities from China’s southern flank. 
Question 1Ac:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the 
adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of malign intentions?  Supported.  USSR 
naval and air capabilities in Vietnam aided Soviet projection of capabilities, and 
Soviet military aid to Vietnam facilitated Vietnam’s multi-year occupation of 
Cambodia. 
Question 1Ad: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of changes in alliance intentions 
influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?  Supported.  USSR signaled détente via 
speeches and large reductions of capabilities helped facilitate normalization 
between China and the USSR. 
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4.10 USSR-VIETNAM ALLIANCE SUMMARY 
The USSR-Vietnam Alliance is an important case to understand because 
within the twenty year history of this alliance China and Vietnam would fight a 
limited war and a protracted border conflict.  China’s willingness to punish Vietnam 
for its invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia regardless of Vietnam’s 
alliance with the Soviet Union demonstrates a high resolve on the part of the China’s 
leadership.  From China’s vantage point, the Soviet Union comprised the main threat 
of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance.  Vietnam was only a small part of the overall Soviet 
threat.204  Yet, China’s bilateral relationship with the USSR dramatically recovered 
by the end of the 1980s.  Thus, Yu Tiejun describes the Soviet-Vietnam Alliance as a 
bell curve: the alliance was a low threat in the early 1970s since Vietnam was 
fighting the U.S. and South Vietnam, but quickly ramped up in the late 1970s, and it 
slowly decreased towards the end of the 1980s.205 
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5.0  CHAPTER 5: US-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
5.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This case study will trace through the political and military developments of 
the US-Japan Alliance from 1991 to 2015.  After providing the baseline intention of 
the alliance and the context to the post-Cold War alliance activities, the chapter will 
progress in a chronological fashion to bring attention to four alliance perception 
concepts.  Specific junctures within the chronology offer opportunities to assess the 
descriptive validity of the concepts in light of the case study evidence.  First, the 
1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines will provide an opportunity 
to see a change in perceived intentions.  Second, the Hatoyama administration will 
offer a point to evaluate alliance cohesion.  Third, the recovery of alliance 
cooperation in 2010 will offer evidence of Chinese perceptions of over-
Machiavellianism.  Fourth, Japan’s retention of a nuclear fissile material stockpile 
and the alliance’s development of Theatre Missile Defense will display insights on 
alliance capabilities.  Fifth, Sino-Japanese relations in the first fifteen years of the 
new millennium offer insight into China’s perception of itself as a rising power in 
relation to the US-Japan Alliance.  Each of these perception shaping concepts will 
have varying degrees of influence on Chinese foreign policy outcomes.   
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5.2 BASELINE ALLIANCE INTENTIONS 
The Nye Initiative clearly lays out the objectives of U.S. engagement in the 
Asia-Pacific region in stating: 
United States military presence in the region supports many 
of our broader objectives and those of our allies.  It 
guarantees the security of sea lanes vital to the flow of 
Middle East oil, serves to deter armed conflict in the region, 
and promotes regional cooperation.  It also denies political or 
economic control of the Asia-Pacific region by a rival, hostile 
power or coalition of powers, preventing any such group 
from having command over the vast resources, enormous 
wealth, and advanced technology of the Asia-Pacific region.  
The United States presence also allows developing countries 
to allocate resources to economic growth and expands 
markets for United States exports.  By helping to preserve 
peace, expenditures on our continuing defense presence 
deter conflicts whose costs would be far greater.1 
 
The Nye Initiative advanced geopolitical understandings that the Brookings 
Institution introduced to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the close of World War II.  The 
Brookings Institution analysts clearly stated a fundamental understanding of 
Spykman’s rimland geopolitics when they wrote, “In eastern Asia as in Europe, 
American security policy must be to oppose any aspirant for continental 
hegemony.”2  The U.S. and Japan have undertaken a “core strategic bargain” that is 
the basis of the bilateral security treaty: the U.S. is committed to defend Japan in 
return for U.S. “access to bases for forward deployments and operational capacity to 
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maintain regional peace and security.”3  Furthermore, the Nye report called for a 
new benchmark to be set around 100,000 U.S. military personnel to be forward-
deployed in the Western Pacific.4  This report would set the stage for a revitalization 
of the US-Japan Alliance and serves as a baseline intention to measure Chinese 
perceptions of alliance intentions.  
5.3 PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGED INTENTIONS 
The end of the Cold War offers a valuable opportunity to examine a shift in 
Chinese perceptions of the US-Japan Alliance intentions.  The 1996 Clinton-
Hashimoto Joint Declaration and the 1997 Revised Defense Guidelines issued by the 
US-Japan Alliance was a critical turning point in Chinese understanding as the event 
was heavily linked to the Taiwan issue.5  This section will include a discussion of the 
Taiwan issue as it relates to the shift in intentions.  As Yu Tiejun concluded, “The 
Chinese perspective towards the [US-Japan] alliance changed in the mid-1990s 
because of Taiwan.”6  The shift in perceived adversarial alliance intentions pushed 
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China towards two foreign policy outcomes: security dilemma avoidance and 
external balancing with Russia. 
In February 1990, the US-Japan Alliance marked its 38th anniversary.7  At the 
time, U.S. Marine Corps General Henry Stackpole told a “Washington Post” 
correspondent that U.S. troops must remain in Japan until the beginning of the 
twenty-first century in large part because “no one wants a rearmed, resurgent 
Japan.  So we are a cap in the bottle, if you will.”8  Soon after the conclusion of the 
Cold War, the preparations for the First Gulf War proved to be a cohesion test for 
the long-standing US-Japan Alliance.  Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki’s 
Government desired to support the U.S. led multinational coalition to oust Iraqi 
forces out of Kuwait; yet, the Japanese Diet in October of 1990 “failed to pass” the 
United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to support noncombat activities.9  Therefore, 
Japan’s largest contribution to the war came in the form of “checkbook diplomacy”: 
a $13 billion payment to cover an estimated 20% of the costs of prosecuting it.10  
After the conclusion of combat, Japan was successful in sending six minesweeping 
ships to the Persian Gulf to aid the U.S.; the seven month deployment marked the 
first time the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) operated outside of Japan.11    
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Despite the mixed performance in security cooperation, the George H.W. 
Bush administration continued to emphasize the US-Japan Alliance with Secretary of 
State James Baker’s 1991 article in Foreign Affairs, “America in Asia: Emerging 
Architecture for a Pacific Community.”  Additionally, the president’s 1992 Tokyo 
Declaration promoted the global partnership.12  Three years later, the Clinton 
administration released the “Nye Initiative” on 27 February 1995.  Officially entitled, 
“United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” this report, most 
notably, reaffirmed the importance of the US-Japan Alliance.13   
During Clinton’s first term in office, Beijing and Washington had numerous 
disagreements over China’s human rights issues, nuclear tests, and most-favored-
nation trade status.  Moreover, tensions rose on the Korean Peninsula when North 
Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in March 1993, tested a 
mid-range missile two months later, and withdrew from the IAEA in June 1994.14  
However, the most serious conflict between China and the U.S. concerned Taiwan 
President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University in 1995.15  China fired a total of 
six missiles (two per day on 21, 22, and 23 July 1995) and conducted a ten day joint 
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PLA Navy and PLA Air Force live fire exercise off of the coast of Fujian Province.16  
Four months later, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto were supposed 
to meet in Tokyo to issue a joint declaration to reaffirm the alliance, but due to the 
November 1995 sequestration, the Clinton administration had to postpone the 
summit.17  In March 1996, the PLA launched four missiles in to the Taiwan Strait and 
held a large joint military exercise with an estimated 150,000 personnel.18  Yoichi 
Funabahi pointed to the Taiwan Straits missile tests of 1995 and 1996 as a shock to 
the Japanese public.  He wrote in 2000, “The incident has manifestly affected the 
Japanese security psyche, as it prompted Japan to join the West in criticizing China 
for its missile diplomacy and added to Japan’s motivation to formulate new Japan-
U.S. defense guidelines.”19   
When Clinton and Hashimoto held their long-awaited summit in April 1996 
and signed a joint declaration affirming the alliance, Chinese analysts viewed it as a 
direct response to the PLA’s March 1996 military exercises.  Mike Mochizuki 
summarized, “With the reaffirmation of the bilateral alliance coming so soon after 
the Taiwan Strait crisis, however, the Chinese not surprisingly feared that the U.S.-
Japan security relationship was being directed against China and might even 
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encourage Taiwan to move toward independence.”20  Wang and Wu concluded, “In a 
time that saw the growth of suspicion and distrust between China on the one hand 
and the United States and Japan on the other, it is no surprise that the Clinton-
Hashimoto declaration on April 1996 aroused strong concern in China’s policy and 
academic circles.”21  Joseph Nye argues that the Clinton administration was taking 
an “integrate but hedge” strategy towards China.  The U.S. achieved the integration 
piece by bringing China into the WTO.  The U.S. performed the hedging piece when 
“the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration of April 1996 affirmed that the U.S.-Japan 
security treaty, rather than being a Cold War relic, would provide the basis for a 
stable and prosperous East Asia.”22   
The 1996 joint declaration marked a clear transition in China’s view of the 
US-Japan Alliance.  Approximately 14 months later, on 8 June 1997, the U.S. and 
Japan would jointly release the “Intermediate Report on the Revision of Guidelines 
for Defense Cooperation” to prepare the ground for the eventual revised 
guidelines.23  Three months later, on 24 September, the U.S. and Japan would release 
the 1997 New Japan-US Defense Guidelines.24  The revised guidelines officially 
paved the way for greater Japanese cooperation in regional contingencies; thus, the 
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alliance expanded from protection of Japan proper to potential hotspots on the 
Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.  To support the conclusion Yuan Jingdong 
wrote, “The new [1997] defense guidelines in effect give Japan the green light to go 
beyond the original exclusive self-defense to a collective defense function, therefore 
providing justification for Japan to intervene in regional security affairs.”25  
Therefore, the Chinese perception of the U.S.-Japan Alliance altered from a 
“constraint on Japan’s remilitarization” to a more active “partner.”26  Many policy 
analysts were starting wonder if the new defense guidelines removed General 
Henry Stackpole’s “cap in the bottle.”  According to National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake, when Chinese Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian visited 
Washington around the time of the revisions, Chi Haotian repeatedly said, “It would 
not do to unleash Japan.”27  The next section will detail how China’s perceptions of 
the defense revisions directly related Taiwan. 
5.3.1 The Centrality of Taiwan 
As a natural outworking of the 1996 and 1997 defense revisions between the 
U.S. and Japan, and much to China’s displeasure, the security relationships between 
the U.S. and Taiwan and Japan and Taiwan were both “remarkably enhanced.”28  Sun 
Xuefeng argued that before 1996, when the US-Japan Alliance was not concerned 
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with confronting China, the alliance was more focused on economic exchange.  After 
Lee Teng-hui came to power in Taiwan, Chinese International Relations scholars 
noted the quick transformation in how the alliance dealt with China.29   
To illustrate this shift, Chinese policy makers quickly noted the difference of 
phrasing within the 1996 joint declaration, the intermediate report, and the 1997 
Guideline Revisions regarding the geographic scope.  First, the U.S. and Japan 1996 
joint declaration contained new phrasing that shifted from “the Far East” to “Japan’s 
surrounding areas.”30  Second, the intermediate report on 8 June 1997 did not 
clarify what geographic limits “Japan’s surrounding areas” were referencing.  
However, on 17 August 1997, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama 
stated that “Japan’s surrounding areas” should “naturally include the Taiwan 
Straits.”31  Thus, if China used military force against Taiwan, the revised guidelines 
would provide a so-called “legal” basis for both Japan and the U.S. to intervene 
militarily.32  In response, two days later, the Chinese would demand that the 
Japanese government “issue a full clarification” of Kajiyama’s remarks.33   
Diplomats for the U.S. and Japan tried to assuage Chinese fears that the US-
Japan Alliance was overly focused on China by claiming, “the scope of their defense 
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cooperation is not geographically determined but scenario-specific.”34  Yet, Chinese 
scholars remained unconvinced, as Wang and Wu concluded, “intentional ambiguity 
only deepens Beijing’s suspicion and aggravates its concern over the alliance.”35  
Additionally, Yang Bojiang raised the point that after signing the 1996 joint 
declaration, Japan repeatedly defended the purview of the US-Japan Alliance by 
asserting that the original 1960 interpretation of the Japan-US Security Treaty 
included Japan and the surrounding territories of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and 
a large area north of the Philippines.36   
From the Chinese viewpoint, the 1997 revision did more than alter US-Japan 
accords, but seriously infringed on Sino-Japanese agreements going back to 
November 1972 when the Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ōhira recognized 
that the conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan was “China’s 
internal affairs.”37  Moreover, Chinese analysts pointed to Japanese Foreign Minister 
Sunao Sonoda’s 1978 declaration that Taiwan was no longer covered by the security 
pact.38  Therefore, the Chinese viewed the inclusion of military cooperation in the 
Taiwan Straits as a reversal of the normalization negotiations between the U.S and 
China, and Japan and China in the 1970s that insisted on a “one China policy.”39  
Finally, two days after the US-Japan Alliance guideline revisions were released, 
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Shen Guofang stated, “The Chinese 
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government and people will never accept violations of or interference in China’s 
sovereignty by directly or indirectly including the Taiwan Strait in the scope of 
Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.”40  Thus, China’s leaders viewed the 1997 revisions 
as a threat to one of China’s preeminent national security objectives: national 
reunification.41  Wang and Wu argued that China is “extremely sensitive” to alliance 
maneuvers that affect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; they concluded, 
“China may accept the expansion of the scope of the two security alliances beyond 
bilateral relations to cover other regional issues, but it is unlikely to tolerate their 
jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait and to a lesser extent over the Diaoyu [Senkaku] 
islands and the South China Sea.”42  Therefore, the 1997 guideline revisions greatly 
concerned China that Taiwan might fall into the “parameters” of the US-Japan 
Alliance.43   
China’s perception of the US-Japan Alliance has historically been tied to 
Taiwan.  For example, after Japan and Taiwan concluded a peace treaty in April 
1952, Zhou Enlai asserted that the U.S. was using the peace treaty between the two 
states as a way to align allies against the PRC.44  Another point of tension concerning 
Taiwan was in 1969 when Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s government 
included Taiwan inside Japan’s “sphere of security.”45  Xin Qiang offers China’s 
current-day calculus of its goals for Taiwan in stating, “Short-term, prevention of 
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independence; mid-term, prevention of perpetual separation; and in the long-term, 
a desire for re-unification.”46   
Furthermore, Taiwan is of great concern to China because of Japan’s bilateral 
ties with Taiwan span multiple policy realms.  Taiwan and Japan have significant 
“unofficial” cultural, economic, political, and academic ties, and China is concerned 
about Japan’s influence.47  In terms of Taiwan-Japan military ties, in addition to 
intelligence sharing between the two states, Chinese analysts report interactions 
between the two militaries via retired military officers:  
1) Taiwan and Japan both appointed retired officers to serve in the 
respective “quasi-official representative offices,”  
2) Retired Japanese officers often engaged in bilateral security dialogues with 
Taiwanese military officers, and  
3) Retired Japanese officers often served as advisors to Taiwanese military 
exercises.48     
In this regard, Chinese analysts feared that retired Japanese officers served as a 
conduit to transfer operational information that the JSDF gains from the alliance 
with the U.S. military.  Thus, in the eyes of the Chinese, the 1996 joint declaration 
and the 1997 guideline revisions expanded the US-Japan Alliance from a bilateral 
security pact primarily concerned with protecting Japan proper to an expanding 
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agreement that threatens a key national interest.49  To illustrate the gravity of the 
Taiwan issue to China, Yao Yunzhu wrote, “Taiwan is China’s top security concern, 
and the only scenario for which China seriously considers the use of force.”50  
Therefore, Chinese International Relations scholars have pointed to the 1996 joint 
declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines as a key turning point because it 
affected the US-Japan Alliance’s ability to intervene in the Taiwan Strait.51  As 
Thomas Christensen wrote, the 1997 revised guidelines “only confirmed conspiracy 
theories among Beijing elites regarding the potential inclusion of Taiwan and the 
South China Sea in the alliance's scope.  Following the issuance of the revised 
guidelines, Jiang Zemin announced that China is on ‘high alert’ about changes in the 
alliance.”52 
Furthermore, Japan’s implementation of the 1997 revised guidelines raised 
Chinese suspicions of the alliance’s intentions when both houses of the Japanese 
Diet passed three related acts in April 1998 to fulfill the new guidelines.  The laws 
required significant amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Act and the Cross-
Serving Agreement between the U.S. and Japan.53  Thus, the 1997 revised guidelines 
threatened China’s reunification goals because they greatly expanded Japan’s ability 
to support U.S. military operations in critical areas such as telecommunications, 
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logistical support for frontline US troops, intelligence collection, surveillance, and 
mine sweeping.  In total, the new guidelines laid out 40 specific items that expand 
the scope of cooperation between U.S. military forces and Japan’s military and 
civilian facilities.  Yang Bojiang argued that in the original Japan-US Security Treaty 
supported only six of the forty items.54  The expansion of the new guidelines was so 
great, that one official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted, “the sixth 
article of the Japan-US Security Treaty should have been revised or a new treaty 
should have been signed.  But the idea was dropped in fear of opposition of the 
Japanese citizens.”55  Subsequent Chinese commentators would note that the 1996 
joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines brought about a qualitative change 
in the US-Japan Alliance to “play a role of ‘NATO in the Far East’ in Asia-Pacific 
Security.”56   
However, some Chinese scholars drew very different conclusions on the 
1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines.  For example, Liu Jiangyong 
argued that the expansion of the relationship did “not signify any change in the 
unequal patron-client relationship between the two sides.”57  Liu points to the 
regional activities of the U.S. as separate from Japan’s purpose towards “building a 
global military hegemony.”58  In support of Liu’s argument, Wang Jianwei and Wu 
Xinbo contend that the U.S. part of the US-Japan Alliance serves as an oversight 
component that keeps Japan from being free to exercise full remilitarization.  They 
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concluded in 1998, “To some extent, what worries China more in this alliance 
structure is Japan rather than the United States.”59  China desires to keep the U.S. as 
a restraint on Japanese militarism; yet, it is unclear how widespread this viewpoint 
is among Chinese analysts. 
5.3.2 Chinese Foreign Policy Outcomes 
 The 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines changed Chinese 
perceptions of the US-Japan Alliance, and China responded in two ways.  On one 
hand, China’s senior leaders issued statements that promoted avoiding the security 
dilemma; and on the other hand, we witness China strengthening its security 
cooperation with Russia.  On the former response, Chinese scholars noted China’s 
experience from the early to mid-1990s informed its cautious approach.  For 
instance, Yuan Jingdong argued that China’s foreign policies did not want to raise 
the suspicions of its neighbors and cause them to balance against China.  He argued 
that China’s early 1990’s growth in “hard power capabilities” were actually 
unproductive when combined with strong “anti-hegemony rhetoric” and a 
“reluctance in endorsing and participating in regional security dialogues.”60  
Reflecting on the US-Japan Alliance’s reaction, Yuan reasoned that the 1995-96 
Taiwan missile exercises made the “China threat” tangible and revitalized the US-
Japan Alliance.61  China learned its lesson that its rise in power would have to 
pursue a more careful path of “soft balancing” against Washington’s attempts to 
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weaken, encircle, or contain China.62  Yuan asserted that China’s new course, the so-
called “New Security Concept,” involves China’s endorsement of multilateral 
security dialogues such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative 
to military alliances.63   
     China’s official statements evidence this cautious approach.  For example, a 
month after the U.S. and Japan issued the intermediate report, the “People’s Daily” 
published an article regarding former Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s position towards 
arms races.  It stated, “Security cannot depend on the increase of armaments, nor 
cannot it depend on military alliances.  Security ought to depend on mutual trust 
and shared security interests.”64  Two months later, on 12 September 1997, Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin addressed the 15th Party Congress with a message to avoid 
the security dilemma.  He stated: 
However, the Cold War mentality still exists, and hegemonism and power 
politics continue to be the main source of threat to world peace and stability. 
Expanding military blocs and strengthening military alliances will not be 
conducive to safeguarding peace and security.  We should adhere to Deng 
Xiaoping’s thinking on diplomatic work and firmly pursue an independent 
foreign policy of peace. In international affairs, we should determine our 
position and policies by proceeding from the fundamental interests of the 
people of China and other countries and judging each case on its own merits. 
We shall not yield to any outside pressure or enter into alliance with any big 
power or group of countries, nor shall we establish any military bloc, join in 
the arms race, or seek military expansion.65 
                                                        
62 Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 102. 
63 Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 102. 
64 Cao Zhangsheng [曹长盛], “Major Change and Its Impact on the Japan-US Security Partnership,” p. 
49; and Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], “The Japan-US Alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of 
Japan,” [Rimei tongmeng yu lengzhanhou riben de junbei kuozhang], International Politics [Guoji 
zhengzhi yanjiu], 2008, No. 1, p. 26, quoted from People’s Daily [Renmin ribao], “Qian Qichen 
elaborates on his perspective and position on the Asia-Pacific situation” [Qian Qichen jiu yatai xingshi 
chanshu wo guandian he lichang], 28 July 1997.  
65 Chu Shulong, “China and the US-Japan and US-Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia,” pp. 5-
6, quoted from Jiang Zemin, “Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping’s Theory for an All-round 
 122 
To reinforce this idea of avoiding a security dilemma, the day after the US-
Japan Alliance issued its revised “Guidelines for Defense Cooperation” on 23 
September 1997, China held to Deng Xiaoping’s prescribed policy.  Chinese Foreign 
Ministry Spokesman Shen Guofang reiterated, “We believe that the practice of 
strengthening military alliances and expanding military cooperation runs counter to 
the trends in the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, which is witnessing relative 
political stability, sustained economic growth, and an active security dialogue.”66   
Yet, instead of avoiding the alliance spiral and holding to Deng Xiaoping’s 
prescribed policy, China repeatedly moved towards Russia in the wake of the 1996 
joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines.  Liu Jiangyong noted that in the 
late 1990s there was a “qualitative change” taking place in the US-Japan Alliance and 
the NATO alliance.67  He concluded, “Regionalization of US-Japan alliance and 
globalization of NATO’s military functions have objectively spurred somewhat the 
advance of China-Russia cooperative strategic partnership.”68  In April 1996, the 
same month as the US-Japan Joint Declaration, China and Russia signed the “Security 
Partnership for the 21st Century”69  The next year, Jiang Zemin interrupted Boris 
Yeltsin’s vacation on the Black Sea to hold a summit in Moscow.70  Subsequently, the 
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two leaders issued the “Joint Declaration Concerning Multipolarization and the 
Establishment of a New World Order.”71  The declaration euphemistically pointed at 
the United States in stating, “No country should seek hegemony, engage in power 
politics or monopolize international affairs,” and “The Parties express concern at 
attempts to enlarge and strengthen military blocs, since this trend can pose a threat 
to the security of individual countries and aggravate tension on a regional and 
global scale.”72  Jiang’s trip to Moscow in April 1997 also included meetings with 
leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to reduce troop deployments 
on each other’s borders.73  Concerning the 1996 and 1997 joint statements signed 
by China and Russia, Sun Xuefeng pointed to a convergence of both domestic and 
international policies.  He offered a potential reason for the establishment of 
stronger relations with Russia would be China’s desire to develop stronger 
economic relations with Central Asia as part of China’s development plan to enhance 
the provincial economies of Xinjiang, Gansu, Qianghai, and the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region.74   
In summary, the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines 
changed Chinese perceptions of the US-Japan Alliance from restraint to greater 
involvement in East Asian affairs—namely Taiwan.  Sun Ru argued that the US-
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Japan Alliance “is the primary prop for U.S. intervention into Asia-Pacific security 
affairs with region-wide influence.”75  As a result, Yu Tiejun concluded that US-Japan 
Alliance security enhancements and the security dilemma pushed China towards 
Russia.  He stated, “Strengthening of the alliance will always encourage the security 
dilemma.  Military alliances can be useful in emergencies, but in a peaceful time, the 
strengthening of a military alliance will usually have negative consequences.”76  
China may continue to pursue its “quasi-alliance” or “special partnership” with 
Russia since both states feel that the alliance developments are encircling and 
containing them, and they have to respond.77   
Perceptions of Changed Intentions: 
Question 1Aa:  Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, reports, 
speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions?  Supported.  
Chinese analysts perceived that the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised 
guidelines signaled a shift in alliance intentions.   
Question 1Ab:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the 
adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of benign intentions?  No evidence in this 
instance, but the Adversarial Alliance Cohesion section will speak to this issue. 
Question 1Ac:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the 
adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of malign intentions?  No evidence. 
Question 1Ad: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of changes in alliance intentions 
influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?  Supported.  Chinese senior leaders 
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signaled that they would keep with Deng Xiaoping’s policy of avoiding alliance 
relations and arms races; however, in the wake of the 1996 Joint Declaration and the 
1997 revised defense guidelines, Chinese diplomatic activity with Russia increased 
with yearly summits and regular agreements. 
5.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION 
The US-Japan Alliance during the Hatoyama administration sheds light on 
alliance cohesion concept.  Alliance cohesion is the mutual willingness of the alliance 
partners to cooperate towards a shared goal.  An adversary’s assessment of the 
cohesiveness of an adversarial alliance is important because cohesiveness indicates 
the willingness of the alliance partners to fight for each other which contributes to 
alliance credibility.   
As background, in the late 2000s, North Korea’s ballistic missile tests and the 
collapse of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing continued to spur U.S. and Japan security 
concerns in East Asia.  For example, in October 2005, the two states would negotiate 
the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa; and on 1 May 
2006, the two sides would release the “Roadmap for Realignment 
Implementation”78  The implementation of the plan to move a number of military 
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installations to Guam would cost Japan $6 billion.79  The next year, the U.S. and 
Japan would successfully negotiate the replacement of the USS Kitty Hawk with the 
nuclear powered USS George Washington and the deployment of Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles to bases on Japanese territory.80   
Yet, in September 2009, the newly installed Democratic Party of Japan’s 
leadership under Prime Minister Hatoyama (16 September 2009 to 8 June 2010) 
would disrupt the cohesiveness of the US-Japan Alliance.  The Hatoyama 
Government ushered in the lowest point in US-Japan Alliance history.  Even though 
his government was in place for roughly nine months, it required the work of two 
more Japanese Prime Ministers to restore the military relationship to its prior state.  
Jin Linbo wrote, “The reshuffle of the Japanese foreign policy after the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power led to cracks and even [an] unprecedented crisis 
of political confidence in the bilateral relations.”81  Yuan Peng points to several 
problems during Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s administration that damaged 
U.S.-Japan Alliance cohesion:  
1) Interruption of Japan’s Indian Ocean oil and fresh water supply to U.S. and 
British naval vessels, 
2) Marine Corps Air Station Futenma relocation was suspended,  
3) Four secret US-Japan nuclear agreement were exposed, and  
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4) Hatoyama’s desire to construct an “East Asian Community” tilted him 
away from the American axis.82    
The Hatoyama government’s decisions were damaging to the cohesion of the 
US-Japan Alliance because two previous agreements were broken, and the Japanese 
government revealed diplomatic secrets to the public.  The first agreement broken 
was the suspension of fuel and water supplies to the U.S. and British fleets operating 
in the Indian Ocean conducting counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.  The 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces provided roughly 30% of the allied warship’s 
fuel.  Previously Japan’s legislature blocked the refueling mission in 2007, it was 
later renewed, but Hatoyama let the refueling bill expire in January 2010.83  The 
second agreement broken was the 2006 Futenma relocation plan agreed to by the 
previous Liberal Democratic Party to move the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to 
Camp Schwab in Nago, Okinawa.84  The plan called for the construction of two 1,800 
meter runways in a “V-shape” configuration built over reclaimed land adjacent to 
the sea.85  The Futenma relocation agreement was a “hard-won” agreement between 
the U.S. and Japan, but Hatoyama wanted the airbase out of Okinawa.86  Liu 
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Jiangyong wrote that these two issues brought serious contradictions between the 
two states.87   
The third problem area concerns US-Japan Alliance nuclear weapons policy.  
It is of note that Chinese analysts do not mention Japan’s foreign minister, Okada 
Katsuya, publicly calling on the U.S. to renounce its policy of first use of nuclear 
weapons.88  Jeffrey Bader, Obama’s National Security Council specialist on East Asia, 
concluded that this idea would have reversed decades of U.S. nuclear doctrine—“a 
long-standing pillar of U.S deterrence and defense of Japan.”89  Instead, Chinese 
analysts focused their attention on the Hatoyama’s investigation of nuclear 
agreements made with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders.  Hatoyama 
government broke the trust of the U.S. by divulging secret information when 
Hatoyama in the fall of 2009 ordered the Japanese Foreign Ministry and an 
independent committee to investigate a secret nuclear agreement between the U.S. 
and Japan.  All previous LDP governments had denied the existence of a secret 
nuclear treaty, but in March 2010, the committee findings confirmed the existence 
of four secret agreements to the Japanese public:  
1) Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 included a “broadly 
defined secret agreement” that US Navy ships could be carrying nuclear weapons. 
                                                        
87 Liu Jiangyong, “US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands 
Dispute,” China International Studies (English Edition), No. 3 (May/June 2011), p. 54. 
88 Leon V. Sigal, “The Politics of a Korea-Japan NWFZ,” Nautilus Institute, NAPSNet Special Reports, 17 
April 2012, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-politics-of-a-korea-japan-
nwfz/ (Accessed 2 May 2016). 
89 Jeffery A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 43. 
 129 
2) Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 also included a 
“narrowly defined secret pact” that if hostilities broke out on the Korean Peninsula, 
Japan would promise use of bases. 
3) The agreement to revert Okinawa to Japan included a “broadly defined 
secret pact” that the Japanese would cover all of the costs to restore plots of land 
used by the U.S. military to there original condition.90   
4) In November 1969, Nixon and Prime Minister Satō agreed that the U.S. 
could use the existing four nuclear storage facilities on Okinawa in case of 
emergency after the U.S. returned Okinawa to Japan in 1972.91   
Though the agreement between Nixon and Satō did not technically violate 
Article 9 of Japan’s Peace Constitution; however, it constituted a violation of Japan’s 
“three non-nuclear principles” adopted by Prime Minister Satō two years previously 
when he stated, “My responsibility is to achieve and maintain safety in Japan under 
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing and not 
permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan's Peace 
Constitution.”92 
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The fourth problem area the Hatoyama government raised was its Asian-
centric focus.  Instead of holding the policy of expressing that the U.S. was the 
primary axis of Japanese diplomacy and emphasizing the importance of the U.S. in 
the maintenance of Asian peace and stability, Hatoyama expressed a new direction.  
He emphasized equality with the U.S. and a desire to build an East Asian Community.  
As Liu Jianping asserted, “Japan’s political strategic requirements of its East Asia 
Community foreign policy strove to serve as ‘the diplomatic axis of East Asia’ was a 
change from the position of a strategic tool in America’s East Asia strategy.”93  
Hatoyama pushed forward a diplomatic strategy that departed from U.S. leadership.  
Another Chinese scholar, Jin Linbo, wrote, “What [made] the White House more 
anxious and embarrassed was that the blueprint of the East Asian Community 
intended to exclude the United States from the community and even from Asia.”94  
Bader reported that when Hatoyama revealed his plans towards an “East Asian 
Community” at the East Asia Summit meeting in October 2009, the president of 
Vietnam expressed his concern to a U.S. regional ally.  Bader concluded, “The irony 
that Vietnam, of all countries, should have understood the strategic foolishness of 
such a proposal while America’s strongest ally in the region did not was not lost on 
anyone.  Friends in Australia, Singapore, South Korea, and Indonesia, among others, 
made clear they regarded this idea as unacceptable.”95 
                                                                                                                                                                     
House of Representative(December 11th, 1967), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/ (Accessed 17 March, 2016). 
93 Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism,” 
[Dongya de Zhongguo: diqu zhengzhi jingyan yu diqu zhuyi sixiang], World Economics and Politics 
[Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi], 2011, No. 6, p. 62. 
94 Jin Linbo, “U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government,” p. 55. 
95 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, p. 44. 
 131 
These four policy disruptions severely tested the US-Japan Alliance.  
President Obama personally pressured Prime Minister Hatoyama in November 
2009 in Tokyo to settle the Futenma relocation plan by the end of the year, but 
Hatoyama promised a solution by May 2010.96  In the same visit, Hatoyama left in 
the middle of Obama’s visit to Tokyo, and the Obama administration was not 
pleased.  President Obama reciprocated by holding a short ten minute “unofficial” 
conversation with Hatoyama when the prime minister came to Washington in April 
2010.97  The next month, Hatoyama was unable to fulfill his promise to find a 
solution to the Futenma relocation plan, and he handed in his resignation.98  Liu 
Weidong offers a summary statement of the Hatoyama government’s relationship 
with the U.S., “While Hatoyama Yukio was in office, he made the U.S. so furious to the 
degree that the U.S. would declare war against him.”99  The discord over Hatoyama’s 
desire to build an “East Asian Community” did not align with Obama’s goal for the 
United States to be the primary provider of Asia’s security and prosperity.   
The decrease in the cohesion of the US-Japan Alliance during the short nine 
month tenure of the Hatoyama government is well-documented by Chinese analysts.  
A key policy direction presented by Prime Minister Hatoyama was his call for the 
building of an “East Asian Community,” and China’s senior leadership read Tokyo’s 
signals clearly and quickly.  China welcomed this policy by echoing the call for the 
construction of community that was different from and exclusive of the U.S. call for 
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greater “Asia-Pacific” relations.  Sun Xuefeng asserted that China’s leadership moved 
on the opportunity to welcome Hatoyama’s desire for the building of an East Asian 
Community would enhance regional integration.  Japan’s economy and military are 
both assets to be welcomed.100   
During the short nine month tenure of the Hatoyama government, Chinese 
officials encouraged the “East Asian Community” on six separate occasions.  First, on 
10 October 2009 Premier Wen Jiabao at the second meeting of Chinese, Japanese, 
and South Korean leadership expressed, “Support for ASEAN unification and East 
Asian integration as pushing forward multiple forms of regional and district level 
cooperation that promoted East Asian economic and societal development.”101  
Second, fifteen days later Premier Wen Jiabao at the fourth East Asia summit 
meeting in Thailand emphasized, “forging ahead with the unremitting advancement 
of East Asian community was a long-term goal.”102  Third, while serving as the 
Chinese Vice Chairman, Xi Jinping visited Japan in December 2009.  In a meeting 
with Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama, Xi expressed support for Hatoyama’s 
thoughts on “East Asian Community” by expressing his hopes that China and Japan 
would “strengthen the course of Asian cooperation and especially the course of East 
Asian Community cooperation” and “the realization would be advantageous to both 
parties and mutually beneficial.”103  Fourth, April 2010, President Hu Jintao 
emphasized to Hatoyama that, “Collaboration would impel the regions trade, 
financial, and infrastructure construction towards regional cooperation, and a 
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common push would be a constructive first step on a continuous path towards Asian 
integration.”104  Fifth, the next month Premier Wen Jiabao at the third meeting of 
Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean leaders expressed the need for the 
construction of an East Asian Community as way to respond to the financial crisis at 
the time.105  The sixth and final time came after the resignation of Hatoyama, in June 
2010 President Hu Jintao met with newly installed Japanese Prime Minister Kan and 
raised the topic of East Asian Community by emphasizing, “the international 
financial crisis, climate change and other global challenges were advancing dialogue, 
negotiations, and cooperation.”106  These six instances prove that China’s senior 
leadership were well aware of the decrease in alliance cohesion and did not miss the 
opportunity to press for increased engagement with Japan. 
Zhu Feng stated that China’s reaction to the short-lived Hatoyama 
administration was not a squandered opportunity to reshape Sino-Japanese 
relations towards an “East Asian Community.”  Hatoyama wanted to pursue a policy 
redirection that both Japan and China were not ready to undertake.  Zhu concluded, 
“It is not a squandering of a historic opportunity, but an episode to illustrate that a 
policy readjustment is not able to create a systemic effect.”107  Sun Xuefeng argued 
that the current alliance relationship was too important to Japanese leaders to be 
jeopardized; Hatoyama had to resign because of greater Japanese interests in 
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preserving the alliance relationship with the U.S.108  To illustrate Sun’s point, Jeffrey 
Bader said Hatoyama’s successor, Prime Minister Naoto Kan “immediately began to 
distance himself from the dalliances with neutralism that had undermined 
Hatoyama and to make clear that the alliance with the United States was the 
centerpiece of his cabinet’s foreign policy.”109   
Perceptions of Alliance Cohesion: 
Question 2a:  Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is a 
function of external political context?  Supported.  The low point in adversarial 
alliance cohesion was in a time of relative calm between China and Japan. 
Question 2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
institutional solidarity between the alliance partners?  Supported.  Sun Xuefeng and 
Zhu Feng offer post-hoc assessments that the institutional solidarity of the alliance 
was at work behind the scenes.  Sun offered that government elites pressured 
Hatoyama to resign because he jeopardized the alliance relationship. 
Question 2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
interactions between the alliance partners’ senior leadership?  Supported.  A large 
amount of Chinese analysis is focused on the discord between President Obama and 
the Hatoyama government. 
Question 2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
domestic politics of the alliance partners?  Supported.  Numerous Chinese analysts 
described the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma issue as a domestic concern. 
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Question 2e: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion 
influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?  Supported.  Six times senior China’s 
leadership echoed Hatoyama’s calls for the construction of an “East Asian 
Community.” 
5.5 PERCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY 
The alliance developments in the early 2010s provide us an opportunity to 
examine two types of misperception.  The September 2010 Diaoyu/Senkaku Island 
fishing boat captain arrest and threat of a rare earth embargo against Japan 
disrupted Sino-Japanese relations, and maritime disputes in the South China Sea and 
the Yellow Sea.110  The interpretation of the events went past overcentralization 
(alliance activities as well organized and planned moves against them) to 
perceptions of conspiracy, over-Machiavellianism.  Over-Machiavellianism refers to 
a target state or third-party state’s over-reading of malicious intent in every event 
as if it was conspiracy against it.111   
Some Chinese analysts perceived a U.S. conspiracy behind the disruption of 
bilateral relations between China and Japan in 2010.  The examples will illustrate 
what Jervis posited: alliance activities can cause a third-party state to speculate that 
the alliance is targeting it.  However, some Chinese scholars will offer different 
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interpretations of what the U.S. is trying to accomplish in East Asia that fell in line 
with the baseline intentions of the alliance. 
The year 2010, began with China’s leaders echoing support for Hatoyama’s 
calls for “East Asian Community,” but it would end with the Diaoyu Island issue 
between China and Japan “coming off the shelf.”112  After a Chinese fishing boat 
captain on 8 September 2010 rammed two Japanese Coast Guard ships in close 
vicinity to the Diaoyu Islands, the issue remained a sensitive topic to the respective 
domestic audiences.113  Two years later, the Diaoyu Island issue would erupt as 
Japan “nationalized” the uninhabited islands.  Throughout the Sino-Japan territorial 
disputes, U.S. leadership from Secretary of State Clinton to Secretary of Defense 
Gates continually promulgated support for Japanese “administration jurisdiction” 
over the Diaoyu Islands.114  In addition to verbal affirmations of the US-Japan 
Alliance, the U.S. military and JSDF held joint exercises to practice island defense 
operations to send signals of resolve.115   
Liu Jiangyong asserted that the U.S. does not want to see good relations 
between China and Japan.  Liu wrote, “the U.S. would chuckle to himself if China and 
Japan were in dispute over the Diaoyu Islands.”116  Liu makes the presumption that 
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this conspiracy helps the U.S. military accomplish two goals: “disturbing the Chinese 
navy’s action from penetrating the First Island Chain to the Second Island Chain, and 
also beneficial to the improvement of intervention capability of the US and Japan in 
the Taiwan Strait to prevent from the deadly threat to Taiwan in Easter Hualian 
posed by the Chinese mainland.”117  Thus, Liu draws the issue from containment of 
China to the unresolved national reunification problem of Taiwan.  Liu later asserts 
that when tensions across the Taiwan straits are moving towards reconciliation, the 
U.S. steps in to use the Diaoyu issue to “stir the nerves of the Japanese citizens, 
estranging them from China while enhancing the US-Japan alliance.”118  This 
conspiracy makes the U.S. look like a puppet master that intentionally disrupts Sino-
Japan and Sino-Taiwan bilateral relations.   
The theme of presenting the U.S. as instigator of tensions and hotspots 
continued into 2012 as U.S. foreign policy pointed towards a return to the Asia-
Pacific.  In Wang Xiangsui’s article on the global shift in power, he repeatedly asserts 
that since the U.S. derives benefits from the enhanced cohesion of its respective 
security alliances when tensions arise, the U.S. must be the instigator.  Wang’s 
argument begins by stating that U.S. bases its hegemony upon three pillars: finance, 
technology, and military.  Of the three pillars, military power is the only one not 
waning.  Therefore, the U.S. currently cannot attract Asian countries as it did in 
Europe with the Marshall Plan; instead, the U.S. must “stress the value of its military 
power through increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and by manipulating 
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‘the South China Sea Dispute.’”119  Again, Wang portrays the U.S. as the hegemonic 
puppet master: “Its strategy is to cause trouble but at the same time to keep crises 
from spinning out of control.  The U.S. wants to benefit from any conflict but it does 
not want the conflict to escalate into a crisis, especially one between large powers.  
So the U.S. will seek to maintain and control tensions in the region, in order to 
maximize its own interests.”120  Wang concluded that the U.S. pivot to Asia was an 
attempt to “lead the Asia-Pacific region by ‘manipulating crises’ and ‘manufacturing 
issues.”121  As Jeffrey Bader summarized, instead of China acknowledging the 
diplomatic failures of 2010, “[China’s] foreign policy analysts confused cause and 
effect and blamed the United States for the deterioration in China’s relations with its 
neighbors.”122 
Qi and Zhang, likewise, concluded that the U.S. was scheming with China’s 
neighbors.  They wrote, “The United States is egging on Tokyo to collude with 
Manila and Hanoi in military collaboration, thus linking up the crises in the East and 
South China Seas.  Meanwhile, Tokyo and New Delhi have been pushing security 
cooperation with China in mind, thus threatening a pincer attack on China in the 
future from both east and west fronts.”123  Again, Chinese analysis portrayed the U.S. 
as the strategic mastermind behind the plot to encircle China.  The U.S. does hold 
policies of engagement with strategic partners as a core value for ensuring peace 
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and stability in the region.  U.S. Pacific Command notes the importance of India in its 
official strategy statement, “India is a particularly important partner in shaping the 
security environment, and we will continue to deepen our cooperation to address 
challenges in the Asia-Pacific.”124   
Writings of a conspiratorial nature are not limited to academic journals.  
Chinese officials can level accusations against the smaller alliance partner as well.  
The Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming wrote an article in 
“The Daily Telegraph” in 2014.  He stated, “Mr Abe has worked hard to portray 
China as a threat, aiming to sow discord among Asia-Pacific nations, raising regional 
tensions and so creating a convenient excuse for the resurrection of Japanese 
militarism.”125 
However, perceptions of conspiracy do not represent all Chinese scholarship 
on the increase in US-Japan Alliance cooperation.  In contrast to the puppet master 
theme we can turn our attention to Sun Cheng; he quoted former U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye’s opinion on the importance of stable relations 
between the three states:  “American interests rest on regional stability and 
continued growth in trade and investment, hence the United States welcomes good 
relations between Japan and China; the East Asian balance of power rests on the 
triangle of China, Japan, and the United States though the U.S.-Japan alliance remains 
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crucial to stability in East Asia.”126  Sun Cheng is quoting the baseline intentions of 
the alliance.  If the U.S. did not want Japan to engage China, but rather contain it, we 
would not expect to see such an abundant and growing economic bilateral 
relationship between China and Japan in the late 2000s and early 2010s.  Instead, 
even with Japan’s increase in security cooperation with the US, Japan’s economic 
relationship with China prospered at the same time.  Table 5.1 below illustrates the 
expansion of exports sent between the two states and the percentage of total 
exports sent to the partner state.  
Year Japan Exports to 
China (billions USD) 
Percent of 
Total Exports 




2007 109.27 15.30% 102.06 8.37% 
2008 124.90 15.98% 116.13 8.12% 
2009 109.73 18.90% 97.91 8.15% 
2010 149.45 19.41% 121.04 7.67% 
2011 162.04 19.68% 148.27 7.81% 
2012 144.21 18.06% 151.63 7.40% 
2013 129.4 18.10% 150.13 6.80% 
2014 124.99 18.28% 149.41 6.38% 
Table 5.1.    Japan’s Import and Export Record with China127 
The U.S. Alliance system in East Asia does not mandate that alliance partners 
avoid improving trade and finance relations with China.  The empirical record 
shows much the opposite taking place.  Since the end of the Cold War to present 
Japan has both increased its security cooperation with the U.S. and increased its 
economic cooperation with China.  The two processes can occur concurrently and 
are not mutually exclusive.   
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An additional non-conspiracy scholar, Yuan Peng, brought greater nuance to 
the understanding of events in East Asia.  Yuan wrote, “the U.S. has not 
fundamentally changed its basic strategy to maintain the balance between itself, 
China and Japan, nor has it adopted a policy of clever checks and balances vis-à-vis 
the Asian giants.”128  Yuan presents the case that Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. 
Bush, and Barack Obama all took steps to both enhance the military alliance with 
Japan, while also improving the political relationship with China.  For example, 
during the Clinton administration the U.S. and Japan issued the 1997 revised 
guidelines, and the next year Clinton made a historic visit to Beijing and agreed to a 
“constructive strategic partnership oriented towards the 21st century.”129  Yuan 
Peng concludes, “Currently, the U.S. is trying to strengthen its military alliance and 
political relationship with Japan.  But at the same time it is also responding 
positively to China’s overtures of building a new type of big-power relationship 
between the two.”130  Jeffrey Bader’s summary of the Obama administration’s policy 
towards both China and U.S. allies supports Yuan Peng’s concluding statement: 
The administration endeavored to build a stable, predictable, and positive 
relationship with China, with substantial cooperation on political and 
security issues...  This entailed frequent and respectful interaction between 
Obama and top Chinese leaders, extensive strategic dialogue on the 
administration’s perception of U.S. interests, the possible impact of 
unexpected developments, and firmness when the Chinese appeared to be 
overreaching, or allies needed to be reassured.131 
Liu Weidong agrees that the U.S. is trying to walk a middle path between the 
two Asian powers.  Liu Weidong of the American Research Branch of the Chinese 
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Academy of Social Sciences argued that the U.S. “pivot” to Asia was far from 
dangerous manipulation of Sino-Japanese relations.  Liu wrote, “Under the 
circumstances both China and Japan both hope to avoid getting embroiled in a war, 
a relatively neutral outside power to help maintain the development of a peaceful 
and stable environment at least for a short period of time could help China and 
Japan to accept this phase.  In actuality, the only outside power capable is the U.S.  
Therefore, the U.S. has the requirement of serving the purpose as the external 
balancer.”132  Similarly, Liu is realistic that serving this type of role is very difficult in 
light of the rising strength of China.  He wrote, “This [balancing] strategy towards 
the U.S. has very high requirements: the U.S. must from beginning to end use its hard 
power to maintain its regional hegemonic position, while at the same time 
guaranteeing relations with China and Japan are foundationally sound in order to 
avoid one or both of the states feeling betrayed or the risk of being America’s 
enemy.”133   
Moreover, to those that would portray the U.S. as a “puppet master” that 
makes use of tension between China and Japan as a cunning strategy, Liu answers 
that China possesses agency.  He wrote, “China cannot allow the U.S. to use the 
continual tension between China and Japan’s relationship, and possibly take 
initiative in the scope of possibilities to try one’s best to improve Sino-Japanese 
relations, and this could also lead to the weakening of the U.S. balancing of China 
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and Japan.”134  Thus, while assigning the U.S. the malign intention of using Sino-
Japanese relations as a way for the U.S. to remain the regional hegemon of Asia, Liu 
is asserting that China has a role to play in its own affairs as well.  China is not 
merely a marionette in the great game of power politics. 
In respect to the US-Japan Alliance, Liu contends the U.S. has both enhanced 
the capabilities and cohesion of the alliance while also strengthening U.S. control 
over Japan.  On the former, he lists the continual joint military exercises the two 
states hold, and the expansion of the scope and size of the military exercises.  While 
on the latter, Liu contends that forcing or compelling Japan to purchase the F-35, 
increasing information sharing, and enhancing the interaction of the U.S. and 
Japanese military forces works toward increasing U.S. influence and Japanese 
dependence; thus, increasing U.S. ability to control Japan.135  The logic might seem 
counter-intuitive, for example, if the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) procures the 
F-35, Japan will enhance its air power capabilities; yet, Japan will be more reliant on 
the U.S to provide parts and maintenance training.  Likewise, in intelligence 
collaboration, if the U.S. halts the flow of information, Japan will not have 
independent intelligence gathering resources to gather its own intelligence for 
supporting military operations.  In conclusion, the U.S. can control what 
contingencies and types of operations the JSDF can plan to fight against China as a 
potential adversary. 
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 To emphasize the balancing role that the U.S. plays in East Asia, Liu Weidong 
stated that even in the midst of strengthening the US-Japan Alliance, the U.S. is 
adamant that China and Japan must work out their territorial disputes peacefully.  
Again, we find alignment with the baseline intentions.  Likewise, the Obama 
administration has been open to Xi Jinping’s desire to increase the bilateral military 
relations between the U.S. and China.  In 2013, the PLA received its first invitation to 
take part in joint military exercises on U.S. soil; in 2014, the PLA Navy received its 
first invitation to take part in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) joint naval exercise.136  
Yet, the ability of the U.S. to balance between China and Japan continues in this 
instance as well.  The 2014 RIMPAC joint exercise also saw the first participation of 
Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces as well, a move that required Prime Minister 
Abe to sign a document “revising the government’s interpretation”  of Article 9 of 
the Japanese Constitution.137 
Finally, Liu Weidong illustrated how the Obama administration carefully 
balanced its messages to both China and Japan.  In February 2012, Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe visited Washington hoping to gain support for his government to lift 
the ban on collective self-defense—a move towards Japan’s “normalization.”  
However, the Obama administration was very clear that it was “worried about 
stimulating China, and could lead to instability in the situation.”138  Two years later, 
during Obama’s April 2014 visit to Japan, he accomplished an important first when 
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he was the first U.S. President to say that the US-Japan Security Treaty covered the 
Diaoyu Islands.  Chinese analysts took note of the single preceding sentence, but 
they often disregarded President Obama’s three subsequent sentences that affirmed 
China.  Liu included Obama’s affirmations of China to provide a more balanced 
portrait of the strategic balancing act.  President Obama stated, “The U.S. and China 
relationship is extremely close, the U.S. supports China’s peaceful rise,” “The U.S. has 
not set a red line,” and “The inability of Japan and China to establish a conversation 
is a serious problem.”139  Jeffrey Bader’s account of the Obama administration’s 
policies toward Asia supports this fact.  Bader stated concerning the prospect of 
improved Sino-Japanese ties, “Indeed, we welcomed such a change.  Rising tensions 
between these historic rivals would have consequences for global and regional 
peace and make it difficult for the United States to maintain good relations with 
China while remaining true to its alliance with Japan.”140 
Conspiracy theories could drive a state to react in very nervous and rash 
ways in reaction to adversarial alliance activities; however, another group of 
Chinese analysts point to China’s senior leaders avoiding the security dilemma and 
acting cautiously.  For example, in late 2013, Tang Yongsheng of the National 
Defense University noted that the U.S. strengthening of military alliance ties and 
deployment of soldiers was “a clear move against China.”141  Tang asserted that the 
U.S. was targeting China because it was “the source of anti-access and area-denial 
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challenges.”142 Yuan contends that China’s use of a “soft power approach” such as 
multilateralism as an alternative security structure “avoids the mistake of playing 
into the hands of proponents of the US-Japan alliance.”143  Similarly, Yuan argued 
that Beijing’s response to the U.S. global strategy has been rather careful and 
pragmatic because, “China recognizes its own limitation and the need to avoid direct 
confrontation with the United States.”144   
However, in great contrast to Yuan Jingdong’s mention of Chinese decision 
making in the 2000s, China took a new direction in 2012 and 2013.  China 
confronted the United States when it issued the Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) and repeatedly challenged the Japan’s administrative position over the 
Diaoyu Islands by repeatedly sending in Chinese government vessels into the islands 
contiguous and territorial waters.  These methods do not resemble a “soft power 
approach” or a multilateral approach to conducting international relations.  As 
Brookings Institution analyst, Jun Osawa wrote, “China unilaterally established its 
ADIZ over two-thirds of the East China Sea without any consultation [with its] 
neighbors.”145  Concerning maritime incursions in the waters surrounding the 
Diaoyu Islands, Japan complained that Chinese government vessels were in the 
contiguous waters almost daily (weather permitting), and 83 vessels entered within 
12 nautical miles of the islands on 25 separate occasions between 11 September 
2012 and 6 February 2013.  As a result, Japan almost daily lodged “strong protests” 
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with its Chinese diplomatic counterparts.146  Two other provocative actions were 
the late January 2013 “radar lock” incidents.147  Both incidents occurred in the East 
China Sea, the first on 19 January 2013 when PLA frigate Wenzhou [526] locked its 
fire-control radar on either the Japanese destroyer Onami [DD-111] or the 
helicopter attached to the destroyer.  The second incident was on 30 January 2013 
when PLA frigate Lianyungang [522] locked its fire-control radar on Japanese 
destroyer Yuudachi [DD-103].  On 5 February 2013, Japan lodged a formal complaint 
with Beijing concerning the incidents.148   
Perceptions of Conspiracy: 
Question 1Ba:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well 
organized and planned moves against them?  Supported.  Some Chinese analysts 
regularly view the US-Japan Alliance activities as promotion of “containment” policy.  
These assessments do not align well with the baseline intentions of the alliance. 
Question 1Bb:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a 
conspiracy aimed against them?  Supported.  Some Chinese analysts present 
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conspiratorial logic that the U.S. benefited from the 2010 and 2012 Diaoyu Island 
crises, so the U.S. must have been the instigator. 
Question 1Bc:  Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy? 
Potentially.  Chinese analysts such as Sun Cheng, Yuan Peng, and Liu Weidong 
offered a different viewpoint of the U.S. acting as a mediator between China and 
Japan that aligned with the alliance’s baseline intentions. 
Question 1Bd:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese 
foreign policy outcomes?  No evidence to suggest that perceptions of conspiracy 
influenced Chinese foreign policy outcomes.  Potentially this finding is important 
because it could indicate that perceptions of conspiracy are not taking hold and 
rational thought processes are prevailing. 
5.6 SELF-PERCEPTION OF RISING STATE IN RELATION TO 
ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE 
In the first 15 years of the new millennium, China’s growth in comprehensive 
national power has been both dramatic in speed, scope, and size.  In the year 2000, 
China’s GDP was $1.3 trillion USD, and it grew exponentially to $5.3 trillion USD by 
2014 (in constant 2005 USD).  Moreover, China’s GDP purchasing power parity rate 
in the same time span grew from $3,678 to $12,609 (in constant 2011 international 
dollars).149  Economic latent power has directly influenced China’s ability to spend 
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more on its military.  Table 5.2 below details the estimated defense budgets of Japan 
and China with the year on year percent increase or decrease.  The year 2004 
marked the year when Chinese defense budget spending overtook Japanese defense 
spending.  Granted, defense spending is just one of many measures that an analyst 
can use to evaluate the relative growth or decline of two states, but it is informative 
for our purposes to see how China’s rise in economic power has translated into  
Year Japan (USD) Percent Change China (USD) Percent Change 
2000 60,284 1.4% 36,995 7.7% 
2001 60,249 -0.1% 45,367 22.6% 
2002 60,954 1.2% 52,769 16.3% 
2003 61,459 0.8% 57,325 8.6% 
2004 61,200 -0.4% 63,503 10.8% 
2005 61,288 0.1% 71,425 12.5% 
2006 60,891 -0.6% 83,850 17.4% 
2007 60,574 -0.5% 96,702 15.3% 
2008 59,139 -2.4% 106,592 10.2% 
2009 59,735 1.0% 128,701 20.7% 
2010 59,003 -1.2% 136,220 5.8% 
2011 60,452 2.5% 147,258 8.1% 
2012 60,017 -0.7% 161,409 9.6% 
2013 59,396 -1.0% 174,047 7.8% 
2014 59,033 -0.6% 190,974 9.7% 
Table 5.2.   Japan and China Yearly Defense Budget Estimates (Constant 2011 USD in 
millions)150 
yearly spending increases to bolster its military power.  Influential Chinese scholars 
are cognizant of China’s growth causing alarm in Japan, in particular.  Yuan Jingdong 
observed how China in the late 2000s kept proclaiming its “peaceful rise” as a way 
to assuage the fears of its neighbors concerning China’s growth in economic and 
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political influence.151  He notes that it is natural for the U.S. and Japan to enhance 
their security relationship as a way to hedge against China’s growing economic and 
military power.152  For example, Yuan Jingdong noted in 2010 that the rise of China 
had brought about an “implicit competition for a regional leadership role if not 
hegemony or dominance.”153   
Chinese scholars are cognizant of Japan’s fears of a rising China.  Yuan quotes 
a noted Japanese scholar, Funabashi Yōichi, “A rising China will induce critical, 
painful, and psychologically difficult strategic adjustments in Japan’s foreign policy.  
Japan has not known a wealthy, powerful, confident, internationalist China since its 
modernization in the Meiji era [1868-1912].”154  Furthermore, Yuan Jingdong wrote, 
senior Chinese leaders promoted a “peaceful rise” strategy in the 2000s because 
they discerned that a “strong rhetoric and military buildup of its own” would only 
provide “the very rationale for Washington and Tokyo to give new lease of life to the 
alliance.”155  For instance, Xin Qiang points out the China has not sought to maximize 
its power by increasing its nuclear weapons arsenal, but has consistently 
maintained its minimal deterrence doctrine.  He concluded that arms racing the U.S. 
would not be in the best interest of China.156   
By the end of 2011, Chinese International Relations scholars were adamant 
that America’s “pivot” to Asia expanded the capabilities of the US-Japan Alliance 
with the distinct purpose of containing China.  One such scholar, Zhang Jingquan, 
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argued that the US-Japan Alliance formerly served a dual purpose in containing both 
China and Japan, but has now shifted to the single purpose of containing China.157  
Zhang draws this conclusion by deducing that the U.S. and Japan are both states 
declining in power relative to the increasing power of China.  Zhang asserts, “With 
the passing of time, we will see the U.S. as a hegemonic state return to being an 
ordinary state, and we will also see the defeated Japan state return to being an 
ordinary country.”158  Thus, the U.S. and Japan will seek to balance against power.  
Zhang wrote, “China’s rise has caused the greatest change in the Asia-Pacific power 
structure.  America’s return to Asia is certainly at a higher level, and it is confronting 
the impact and challenge to the Asia-Pacific power structure brought about by 
China’s rise.”159  Zhang also explained how the US-Japan Alliance intends to contain 
China, “With the background of America’s pivot to Asia, a trend is developing where 
the US-Japan Alliance’s purview extends to the East China Sea and the South China 
Sea, and this trend is a critical threat to China’s maritime strategy.”160  Thus, for 
Zhang the strengthening of the US-Japan Alliance was to contain China’s rise in 
power.  Zhang interprets the forward presence of the U.S. as containment, but the 
U.S. sees security benefits from remaining engaged in Asia.  For example, Jeffrey 
Bader does not use the words contain or containment, but he does offer that one of 
the many “fundamental principles of the Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific 
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strategy” was to “Expand the overall U.S. presence in the western Pacific and 
maintain its forward regional deployment.”161 
Months after the “pivot” to Asia announcement, the 2012 Diaoyu Island 
dispute drastically soured Sino-Japanese relations.  Approximately two years later, 
an official statement by China’s ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, stated, “that 
the China-Japan relations have been plunged into a severely difficult situation, with 
bilateral high-level exchanges being suspended and practical exchanges and 
cooperation suffering negative impact.  This is not in line with the interests of both 
countries and peoples.”162  Figure 5.1 below shows evidence of high levels of 
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing to China, and Japanese FDI to 
China declined from an all-time high of $13.5 billion USD in 2012 to $9.1 billion USD 
in 2013.163  
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Figure 5.1.   Japan and China Bi-Lateral Foreign Direct Investment (millions USD)     
Source:  OECD164 
In contrast to Zhang Jingquan’s containment argument, China’s senior 
leaders and scholars recognize the interconnectedness of the international 
economy.  China possesses the ability to signal good will as well as punish its 
neighbors economically.  As Xin Qiang stated, “Enhancing economic development 
with the allies of the U.S., rather than competing sends the signal that China is not a 
threat.  It also sends the signal to the U.S. alliance partner that they will need to 
maintain good relations with China, so that when they [Japan and South Korea] are 
tempted to do something that will challenge or harm China, it will think twice.”165  
Therefore, China possesses agency to operate in an international environment.  
Additionally, in March 2016, former Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo addressed 
the rise of China in relation to the United States.  He stated:  
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First, no country can take the place of the US as the super-power, and the US 
will not decline.  Second, no country can obstruct the rise of developing 
countries including China, Russia, and India.  China's development can both 
benefit the Chinese people and contribute to the development of the world 
and the mankind.  If China succeeds in its development, the US will be the 
biggest beneficiary.  On the contrary, if China does not develop and falls into 
poverty, turmoil or chaos, that would be the most terrible situation to the 
US. 166 
This official statement shows that China’s leaders recognize the state’s limitations as 
a rising power in comparison to the United States, and they recognize the inter-
connectedness of the United States and China.  As the great global recession proved, 
China had not “decoupled” from the world economy, and China is highly dependent 
on its export based economy.  In conclusion, Zhu Feng summarized, “China should 
not be under the delusion that economic incentive can be turned into strategic 
assets, so Beijing should know where the limit is with regard to commercial 
diplomacy.  In other words, don’t have illusions that China’s rise could undermine 
the U.S. strategic anchor in the region.”167  Therefore, Zhu Feng argued that China 
should learn how to coexist rather than challenge the U.S.  He stated, “This type of 
nuance in understanding the strategic situation offers China an important chance for 
strategic recalibration instead of pursuing the traditional historic path of a rising 
power challenging the dominant power.”168   
However, China’s foreign policies in 2012 and 2013 did not match the 
peaceful rise rhetoric and nuanced statements from Zhu Feng and Xin Qiang.  As 
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Table 5.3 illustrates, China was displeased with Japan’s “nationalization” of the 
Diaoyu Islands and regularly sent ships from China’s Marine Surveillance (MS) and 
Fisheries Administration (FA) within the territorial waters of the islands. The 
repeated territorial incursions have challenged senior Japanese leaders.  For 
instance, on 8 August 2013, in response to the incursion of the day, Foreign Minister 
Fumio Kishida stated, “Intrusion by Chinese government ships into Japanese 
territorial waters have been observed frequently, which is truly regrettable.  And 
any attempts to change the status quo by use of coercion or intimidation shall not be 
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Table 5.3.  Chinese Territorial Incursions of Diaoyu Islands  (<12 nautical miles)170 
                                                        
169 “Press Conference by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 8 
August 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken24e_000021.html (Accessed 16 June 
2016). 
170 “Due to fear of airspace violation by Chinese aircrafts, Japan sends helicopter equipped ships into 
Senkaku waters” [Senkakushoto ni heri tosai-sen taio tsuyomeru Chugoku, ryoku shinpan no kenen], 
Asahi.com, 3 March 2013, http://www.asahi.com/shimen/articles/TKY201303020492.html 
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Additionally, outside observers of China’s Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) announcement on 23 November 2013 viewed it as a confrontational move by 
China to assert its administration over the Diaoyu Islands.  The day of the 
announcement, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel responded, “We view this 
development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region.  This 
unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations.”171  
Five months later, Hagel stated, “China’s ADIZ announcement was a provocative, 
unilateral action that raised tensions in one of the world’s most geopolitically 
sensitive areas, including territory administered by Japan.  It clearly increases the 
risk of a dangerous miscalculation or accident that could escalate quickly and 
dangerously.”172  China’s repeated territorial incursions and the ADIZ in the East 
China Sea from 2013 point to a more confident and powerful China that is realizing 
its rise in power. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Accessed 8 June 2013);Michael Cucek, “Chinese Ship Incursions In and Around the Senkakus,” 
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Coast Guard to strengthen their vigilance” [Senkaku shinpan, tsuyomeru Chugoku `kanshi-sen, kore 
made ni nai ugoki], Sankei News, 24 March 2013, 
http://www.iza.ne.jp/news/newsarticle/event/crime/640761/ (Accessed 8 June 2013); and “Japan 
Coast Guard Region 11 is looking to prolong fulltime service for increased patrols” [Kaiho ga Senkaku 
senju butai choki-ka nirami 11-kan ni junshi-sen zokyo], Sankei MSN News, 24 December 2012, 
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/121224/plc12122410000005-n1.htm (Accessed 8 June 
2013). 
171 “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone,” U.S. Department of Defense, 23 November 2013, 
http://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392 (Accessed 16 June 2016). 
172 “Hagel Discusses U.S.-Japan Defense Relations in Interview,” U.S. Department of Defense, American 
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Self-Perception of Rising State in Relation to Adversarial Alliance:   
 
Question 4a: Have Chinese analysts become increasingly dissatisfied with adversarial 
alliances on its periphery?  Supported.  Chinese analysts such as Zhang Jingquan have 
argued that the U.S. uses the US-Japan Alliance to contain China. 
Question 4b: Do Chinese analysts tolerate the adversarial alliances and recognize the 
security benefits?  Supported.  Xin Qiang and Yu Tiejun noted that the alliance 
benefited China’s security by extending nuclear deterrence over Japan.  Thus, Japan 
did not feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons. 
Question 4c: Has China’s self-perception of its rise in power influenced its foreign 
policy outcomes?  Supported.  Attempts to signal a “peaceful rise” and measures to 
avoid the security dilemma play a role in China’s decision-making.  However, China 
has also acted more assertively against Japan by continually sending ships into 
Diaoyu Island contiguous and territorial waters and formation of the East China Sea 
ADIZ. 
5.7 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES 
This final section of the US-Japan Alliance case study will highlight Chinese 
perceptions of the alliance’s capabilities.  In relative terms, the conventional 
capabilities draw the least attention.  In contrast, the alliance’s strategic capabilities 
draw a preponderance of attention, namely Japan’s retention of a nuclear fissile 
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material stockpile and the US-Japan Alliance’s research, development, and 
deployment of Theatre Missile Defense (TMD).   
5.7.1 Japan's Conventional Capabilities 
In terms of conventional capabilities, Xu Wansheng and Liu Jiangyong paid 
attention to the aviation assets possessed by the alliance.  In 2008 by Xu Wansheng 
described in great detail the large numbers of U.S. manufactured weapon systems 
purchased by Japan since the end of the Cold War.  Table 5.4 below displays the 
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Table 5.4.   Japanese Purchases of U.S. Manufactured Aircraft from 1991 to 2005173 
                                                        
173 Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], “The Japan-US Alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of Japan” 
[Rimei tongmeng yu lengzhanhou riben de junbei kuozhang], International Politics [Guoji zhengzhi 
yanjiu], 2008, No. 1, p. 19. 
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Table 5.4 does not include Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji’s licensed 
production of the Japanese F-2 support fighter that is based on the General 
Dynamics F-16.  Upgrades on the Japanese built fighter aircraft included advanced 
flight controls, improved land and maritime war-fighting capabilities, aerial 
refueling, and stealth materials for the 130 fighters that started production in the 
year 2000.174  Liu Jiangyong made mention of the US-Japan Alliance enhancing its 
aviation capabilities in 2010 when the US Marine Corps deployed two MV-22 Osprey 
squadrons to Marine Corp Air Station Futenma.  The Osprey squadrons joined the 
existing 24 Sea Knight transport helicopters already based at Futenma.  Liu noted 
that this addition of Osprey tiltrotors will “strengthen the operational capability of 
the US troops in the region.”175 
In terms of conventional weapons transfers, Xu Wansheng provided 
numerous examples of how Japan regularly purchased equipment that would 
enhance the interoperability of the alliance.  Japan’s main battle tank, the Type 90, 
shares the same German 120mm cannon used by the Abrams M1A1.  Japan’s long-
distance torpedoes are domestically produced, but share the same diameter as their 
U.S. Navy counterparts.  Lastly, from the 1990s to present all of the aircraft GPS 
navigation, electronics, and radar systems are all U.S. products.176  Indeed, the 
interoperability of a large amount of shared weapon systems and Japan’s desire to 
acquire high quality military products points to enhanced capabilities and 
                                                        
174 Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], “The Japan-US Alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of Japan,” 
p. 19. 
175 Liu Jiangyong, “US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands 
Dispute,” p. 45. 
176 Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], “The Japan-US alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of Japan,” 
pp. 24-25.  For example, the F-15J uses advanced fire-control radars from the U.S. 
 160 
effectiveness.  Yet, Xu Wansheng fails to mention the alliance management angle of 
shared weapon systems and dependence on the alliance partner for weapon sales.  
For instance, if Japan seeks to prosecute a war it will need the full material support 
of the United States to provide spare parts, munitions, and technical assistance.  This 
dependence on U.S. weapon systems can benefit the U.S. as the provider of such 
goods and can limit Japanese willingness to leave the alliance structure.   
In consideration of alliance capabilities, discussion of alliance doctrine was 
absent from the journal articles in the sample.  As noted before, the task of assessing 
capabilities is much more complicated than counting troops and tanks, but it 
involves the strategic interaction and the military doctrine in how the state employs 
its capabilities.  To address the question of how Chinese analysts perceive alliance 
capabilities, I will need to find Chinese military journals that delve into doctrinal and 
warfighting analysis. 
The key contribution that Japan serves the US-Japan Alliance is its shared 
territory that facilitates U.S. deployment.  Zhang Jingquan recognized the fact that 
Japan sharing of its territory helped the U.S. overcome what Boulding termed the 
“loss-of-strenght gradient” by allowing forward deployment and logistical 
support.177  In 2013, an estimated 30,000 U.S. military personnel were forward 
deployed to Japan.  Table 5.5 offers the details of the U.S. military presence in Japan 
for 2013.  The forward presence of U.S. military personnel not only aids U.S. power 
projection capabilities in the western Pacific Ocean, but also signals U.S. 
commitment to defending Japan. 
                                                        
177 Zhang Jingquan [张景全], “The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy,” p. 53. 
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Servicea Installationb Major Units Personnelb 
Air Force Kadena 18th Wing; 733 AMS; 82nd Recon; 




Misawa Task Group 72.4; 35th FW 3,500 
Air Force Yokota 374th Airlift Wing; 730th AMS 3,000 
Army Camp Zama I Corps 800 
Army Torii Station 78th Aviation Battalion 700 
Marine Corps Camp Butler 5th Element of III MEF 5,600 
Marine Corps Camp Courtney 3rd Marine Division 2,300 
Marine Corps Camp Hansen 31st MEU HQ, 12th Marine Regiment - 
Marine Corps Futenma 36th Marine Air Group, 18th Marine Air 
Control Group 
- 
Marine Corps Iwakuni 12th Marine Air Group, 242nd Marine 
Fighter Attack Squadron, 171st Marine 
Wing Support Squadron 
600 
Navy Atsugi Carrier Air Wing 5 900 
Navy Sasebo 1 Amphibious transport dock, 1 
amphibious assault ship, 2 landing ship 
docks, 4 Mine Countermeasure Ships 
2,550 
Navy Yokosuka 7th Fleet HQ, 6 destroyers, 1 amphibious 
command ship, 2 carrier groups, 1 carrier 
3,000 
Table 5.5.  U.S. Military Posts, Units, and Personnel in Japan in 2013178 
5.7.2 Japan's Nuclear Material Stockpile 
A key concern for China is Japan’s nuclear material stockpile.  Even though 
the U.S. has repeatedly provided statements to confirm the nuclear protective 
umbrella since President Johnson’s January 1965 reassurance, Japan insists on 
                                                        
178 “Marine Corp Base Camp Smedley D. Butler,” U.S. Marine Corps, 
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possessing a nuclear fissile material stockpile.179  This stockpile in conjunction with 
Japan’s latent power when considering its industrial and technological advances 
makes it a threat to China, especially when considering that Japan could perform a 
“nuclear breakout” in a relatively short period.180  Reportedly, in 2004, Japan held 
an accumulated surplus of 43 tons of plutonium which could be an adequate supply 
to produce 5,000 nuclear warheads.  Also of concern to Yuan was the introduction of 
a new spent fuel reprocessing center in Rokkasho-mura and plans for fast-breeder 
reactors.181  Chinese analysts have complained that Japan has not honored its 1997 
pledge to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to give up its surplus 
plutonium.182  Additionally, Liu Weidong noted in January 2014 that Japan had still 
not fulfilled a U.S. security condition to hand over plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium.183  It is of consequence to note that Japan did handover 1,000 pounds of 
fissile material in March 2014, one month before President Obama’s trip to Japan in 
April 2014.184  
From Wu Riqiang’s viewpoint, Japan has cooperated with the IAEA and has 
placed the nearly 50 tons of nuclear fissile material under the management of the 
IAEA.  Yet, he conceded that the large stores are a concern to China because Japan is 
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just under the nuclear threshold for producing a large amount of nuclear weapons 
very quickly.  China continues to question: what does Japan want to do with 50 tons 
of nuclear fissile material?  Wu Riqiang felt that the U.S. policy does not fully 
recognize the contradiction in stating, “On one hand, the U.S. does not want Japan to 
have large stores of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium that it can use 
to build nuclear weapons, but at the same time, the U.S. does not address or 
recognize Japan’s nuclear material problem.  Moreover, the nuclear stockpile is only 
growing larger as Japan’s nuclear reactors for energy production contribute more 
materials each year.”185  The 2015 report by China’s Arms Control and Disarmament 
Association [Zhongguo junkong yu caijun xiehui] entitled, “Study on Japan’s Nuclear 
Materials,” confirmed that of the 47.8 tons of separated plutonium owned by Japan, 
France and the United Kingdom hold 37 tons on its behalf.  Moreover, the report 
calculated that Japan could use its domestically based 10.8 tons of separated 
plutonium to construct nearly 1350 nuclear warheads.186 
There is discussion within China over the ability to distinguish Japan’s 
purposes of maintaining such a large stockpile of fissile material.  Professor Yu 
Tiejun argued that it is too difficult to distinguish the use.  The Japanese could keep 
their nuclear stockpiles for future energy resources or making nuclear bombs.187  
From a different angle, Wang Dong views the nuclear material stockpile as Japan’s 
way to improve its de facto nuclear capability.  Since Japan could produce a nuclear 
                                                        
185 Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University. 
186 “Study on Japan’s Nuclear Materials,” China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and China 
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weapon quickly, it represents Japan’s unique form of nuclear deterrence.188  As 
Japanese Foreign Minister Muto Kabun said in 1993, “if North Korea develops 
nuclear weapons and that becomes a threat to Japan, first there is the nuclear 
umbrella of the United States upon which we can rely.  But if it comes to a crunch, 
possessing the will that ‘we can do it ourselves’ is important.”189   
Concerning China’s ability to change Japan’s nuclear stockpile policy Wang 
Dong stated, “China wants to pressure Japan to give up the nuclear material 
stockpile, but since the U.S. does not want to make an issue.  China does not possess 
the mobilizing power to make Japan give it up.”190  Instead, China’s Arms Control 
and Disarmament Association regularly publishes reports on Japan’s nuclear 
stockpile problem as a type of “naming and shaming” tactic to keep Japan 
accountable to the IAEA; reportedly, these yearly reports were published even 
before Sino-Japanese relations started declining in 2006.191  For instance, the 2015 
report cites lax security procedures and missing material.  Of particular concern is 
unaccounted plutonium at the Rokkasho-mura and Tokai reprocessing plants, and 
the Mixed Oxide fuel fabrication plant—a sum of 5.1 kilograms in 2014.192  Due to 
the complexities of plutonium reprocessing, the Japanese have admitted that it is 
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impossible to insure with 100% accuracy because of “high-measurement 
uncertainty.”193 
5.7.3 Missile Defense and Strategic Stability 
Ballistic Missile Defense and Missile Defense are blanket terms to describe 
the multiple levels of defense against a diverse range of missile threats.  In this 
regard, these capabilities are often termed strategic defensive weapons.  For 
example, Patriot Systems that have upgraded to the Patriot Advanced Capability 
(PAC-3) systems defend against short-range ballistic missile threats; Theater High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) are for 
defending against mid-range ballistic missile threats; the Aegis Standard Missile 
(SM-3) system and the Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) are pointed at 
intercepting Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) before the warheads re-
enter the Earth’s atmosphere.194  Different missile systems can theoretically target 
and intercept different phases of a missile attack such as the launch, boost, mid-
course, or terminal phases.195  For instance, the PAC-3 has a range of 22 miles high 
and the THAAD has a range of 93 miles high to defend against the terminal phase—
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when the missile is coming back down to Earth.  The SM-3 system has a range of 378 
miles high to intercept missiles in the mid-course phase.196 
The actual ability to intercept incoming ballistic missiles or even negate the 
early launch phases of a potential adversary’s Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs) is highly complex and represents the highest level of military information 
technology.  An effective TMD system requires full integration of satellite 
surveillance, missile trajectory tracking, target discrimination, communication 
relays, intercept capabilities, and an over-arching command and control structure.  
Thus, a state pursuing missile defense must overcome enormous technological 
challenges that are extremely challenging and expensive.  Yet, the U.S. and Japan, as 
the world’s two leading high-technology states have sought to combine their efforts 
in researching and developing missile defense system that is highly threatening to 
target states. 
US-Japan Alliance Missile Defense Background    
Advanced technological research and development has a long history in the 
US-Japan Alliance.  For instance, in 1983, Japan formally participated in research 
work on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.197  After the results of the First Gulf 
War, China fully recognized that advanced uses of information technology were 
driving a new revolution in military affairs.  One such technology that received a lot 
of attention during the First Gulf War was the Patriot missile system that the U.S. 
                                                        
196 Jeffry Lewis, “Are You Scared About North Korea’s Thermonuclear ICBM?” Foreign Policy, 19 
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deployed to intercept Iraqi Scud missiles fired towards Saudi Arabia and Israel.  The 
Patriot system displayed the burgeoning of a new technology developed jointly by 
American and Japanese researchers.  Two years after the First Gulf War, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Japanese Director General Nakanishi agreed to 
set up a TMD Working Group.198  Chinese estimates report that in 1995 the Japanese 
Self-Defense Agency spent 550 million yen (roughly $5.4 million USD) conducting a 
covert study on the technical feasibility of TMD.199  Furthermore, the US-Japan 
Alliance’s strategic interaction with North Korea has played a role as well.  North 
Korea’s launch of the Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998 that flew over Japan was a 
final catalyst that encouraged the U.S. and Japan to sign a memorandum of 
understanding on joint TMD research and development formally in September 
1998.200  Chinese analysts Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo concluded in 1998 that a 
TMD system would “undermine the strategic stability in East Asia because it would 
possibly nullify China’s limited strategic deterrence and place it in a 
disadvantageous strategic position.”201   
The next year, Liu Jiangyong attached great importance to a U.S. Department 
of Defense leak in February 1999 that the US was developing TMD to confront China 
as a “potential threat.”202  That very same month, Sha Zukang, serving as the 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department in the Chinese Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs stated that China was not concerned with “what we call genuine 
TMD.”203  Sha Zukang said, “what China is opposed to is the development, 
deployment, and proliferation of antimissile systems with potential strategic 
defense capabilities in the name of TMD that violate the letter and spirit of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and go beyond the legitimate self-defense needs of relevant 
countries.”204  In 1999, Thomas Christensen noted that Chinese analysts believed 
“development of U.S.-Japan TMD is also designed to counter China's missile 
capabilities, which the PLA and civilian analysts recognize as China's most effective 
military asset, especially in relations with Taiwan.”205  As Yao Yunzhu wrote in 2008, 
“An upper-tier BMD system jointly deployed by the two countries [U.S. and Japan] in 
the name of protecting allies and overseas troops could be readily turned into a 
BMD system to offset a mainland missile attack against Taiwan.”206 
Wei Min noted that U.S. behavior changed during the George W. Bush 
administration.  He wrote, “After the 9/11 incident, the U.S. even more clearly 
pushed its unilateral policies.  While the U.S. planned to deploy theater missile 
defense (TMD) to East Asia to pursue its own absolute security it also raised the risk 
for China’s strategic security.”207  The U.S. unilaterally abrogated its commitment to 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in December 2001, and its subsequent development 
of multiple levels of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) has heightened the nuclear 
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tensions with states that possessed secure second strike capabilities such as Russia 
and China.   
Wu Xinbo asserted, “Military cooperation has been substantially deepened 
between U.S. and Japanese forces, with Japan deciding to join the United States in 
deploying a theater missile defense system, which will require the integration of U.S. 
and Japanese command, control, and communication systems.”208  Effective TMD 
systems require advanced surveillance capabilities to detect and monitor missile 
launch sites or mobile launcher locations, and detect missile trajectories and up-to-
date positioning.  Japan’s space program allows it to launch surveillance satellites 
that can aid in alliance intelligence capabilities.  On 24 January 2006, Japan launched 
a rocket from the Yoshinobu Space Complex to put a Japanese Advanced Land 
Observation Satellite named “Earth” into orbit.209  Another important TMD 
development occurred at the RIMPAC joint naval exercise in June 2006 when the 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Kirishima used its Aegis radar 
system to successfully track a target missile.210   
The US-Japan Alliance’s strategic interaction with North Korea continued to 
play a part in the alliance’s rationale for TMD developments.  For example, after 
North Korea’s first nuclear test on 31 October 2006, U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice traveled to Japan to reassure the Japanese of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella and to dissuade the Japanese from pursuing its own nuclear arsenal.211  
Five months later, on 30 March 2007, the U.S. successfully deployed PAC-3 missiles 
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at Iruma Air Base.212  By the end of 2007, the JSDF would successfully carry out a 
missile intercept test using the PAC-3.213  The same year Sun Cheng noted, “Japan’s 
spending on missile defense system was reported to increase by 30.5% in 2007.”214    
In conclusion, Yuan Jingdong points to five strategic reasons why the U.S. is 
pursuing TMD:  
1) Remain the dominant military in the region and be able to conduct 
military operations “with little inhibition,”  
2) Take advantage of Japan’s technological development, 
3) Increase its allies’ reliance on U.S. security guarantees “by integrating their 
defense systems into the US East Asian security architecture”, 
4) “Further consolidate its lead in the Revolution in Military Affairs”; and  
5) Force China to spend more money on defense expenditures with the goal 
of delaying its economic development.215    
By 2010, Zhang Jingquan’s research points to the fulfillment of points 2, 3, and 4.  He 
argued that when Prime Minister Noda decided to lift Japan’s weapon export 
restrictions in late December 2011, Noda was pushing Japan towards further global 
development of TMD.  Zhang argued that while US-Japan cooperation on TMD 
system was deepening, the U.S. was asking to Japan to accomplish two tasks: first, 
enhance its Asia-Pacific military containment capabilities, and second, contribute 
towards the European TMD system.  To work towards the second task, the U.S. 
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Department of Defense urged Japan to make an exception to the three principal 
weapon export restrictions to help the U.S. fulfill its offer to construct a ballistic 
missile intercept system in Europe.216  This linking of the European and Asian TMD 
systems could have substantial strategic consequences for both Russia and China. 
Chinese Interpretation of Missile Defense and U.S. Responses 
At present, Wu Riqiang, one of China’s leading experts on US missile defense 
asserted that TMD is that it is technologically “effective,” but NMD is currently 
“average.”217  He contended that the U.S. would need to launch three or four NMD 
interceptors to assure interception of one ICBM.  He continued to express Chinese 
concerns over U.S. policy developments to deploy more X-band radars to enhance 
the NMD system’s performance.218  Another Chinese analyst, Xin Qiang, argued that 
the U.S. already has forward deployed X-band radars in Japan and Guam, but it is 
planning to deploy X-band radars in the Philippines, and another one in southern 
Japan.  He stated, “Therefore, the additional THAAD deployment in South Korea is 
another challenge to China’s security.”219  Australian defense expert, Rod Lyon, gives 
credence to this argument by stating that THAAD system X-band radar could 
transfer data to NMD assets protecting the continental United States.220   
However, Bruce Bennett of Rand argues that China’s position is 
disingenuous; he stated, “Chinese commentators raise concerns regarding the 
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THAAD radar's range, which reaches well into China, but this is a modest addition to 
other observational means already deployed on satellites, aircraft, and ships.”221  
For example, the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar based in the Pacific Ocean already 
provides “missile tracking, discrimination and hit assessment functions to the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense.”222  X-band radar (8-12 GHz) is a fire-control 
radar system used for tracking and killing missiles; it is qualitatively different from 
over-the-horizon radars such as L-band radar (1-2 GHz) and UHF radar (300 MHz-1 
GHz) systems used for surveillance and searching functions.223  Thus, X-band radar 
provides both “advanced ballistic missile detection” and “discrimination” for 
distinguishing between warheads, decoys, and missile defense countermeasures.224 
The current estimate is that the U.S. would employ multiple NMD 
interceptors to intercept a single ICBM.  Therefore, from the Chinese side, the 
viability of the system in countering a state with a small to medium sized arsenal 
would require a counterforce first strike.  In the case of China’s strategic posture, 
potentially a nuclear first counterforce strike on China could destroy most of China’s 
nuclear ballistic missiles, and the NMD system would be able to confront a smaller 
survivable nuclear arsenal launched to strike the United States.  Thus, a pre-emptive 
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or preventive counterforce attack of this nature would compromise China’s secure 
second strike capability.225  This scenario requires two effective capabilities:  
1) a counterforce strike that would be able to nullify both fixed and mobile 
targets, and  
2) Effective capabilities to counter a limited nuclear response.   
On the first capability, Austin Long and Brendan Green argue that space based radar, 
signal intelligence, ground sensors, and stealthy UAVs “the US military has 
harnessed a technological explosion to significantly improve intelligence 
capabilities” to find, track, and target mobile missiles.226  Second, anti-ballistic 
missile capabilities have progressed in sophistication from the Patriot missile 
systems of the First Iraq War to the latest tests of a new kill vehicle in June 2014.  As 
of January 2016, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) planned to deploy 44 Ground-
based Interceptors in Alaska and California.227  Testimony from the director of the 
MDA, Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, indicates further testing and development of a 
complicated and expensive capabilities; the MDA conducted 25 field tests that 
“feature operationally realistic conditions” in a joint service environment to 
demonstrate BMD capabilities.228  These missile defense developments led to “many 
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Chinese assessments of the nascent U.S. missile defense deployments in East Asia 
anticipate the deployment of an integrated, multilayered system that enhances U.S. 
strategic deterrence at China’s expense.”229  Chinese assessments will certainly 
become more circumspect of U.S. strategic intentions as the U.S. MDA moves 
towards developing the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) program.  In an effort to 
move the defense cost curve towards a more advantageous position, the MDA 
desires to add multiple kill vehicles to a single interceptor.230 
This new estimation marks a shift in thinking from the 1990s when Thomas 
Christensen noted that Chinese scholars while noting the psychological and political 
aspect of a TMD system, “expressed serious doubts about the likely effectiveness of 
such a system, particularly given the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland in the 
ability of the PRC to launch a large number and wide variety of missiles.”231  
Therefore, as Japan and the U.S. have invested in satellites, missile assets, and a 
command structure, TMD has moved from a theoretical threat to an actual threat.  
Moreover, the repeated mention of TMD in Chinese analysis points to the 
psychological pressure that a system of this kind brings to bear upon a potential 
adversary.  It is similar to the effect that ballistic nuclear weapons possess in that 
the technical demands of such a system are extremely complex and unproven in 
real-life scenarios.232   
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Zachary Zwald argued that the psychological effect of TMD and NMD on the 
adversary’s choices is the greatest advantage of the defense systems.  It could 
potentially cause an adversary to hesitate in launching a ballistic missile if they 
calculate that it could be intercepted.233  Yet, if the system causes other states to 
build larger arsenals to overwhelm the missile systems, the barrage could 
potentially inundate the limited arsenal of interceptors.  Alternatively, a greater risk 
is that a missile system could cause an adversary to strike preemptively in the event 
of a crisis.   
In consideration of the missile defense and its effect on the strategic stability, 
Wu Riqiang asserted that the U.S. has not properly considered the strategic 
consequences of the decision to pursue national missile defense.234  Li Bin and Nie 
Hongyi argued, “The reason is that given the large comparative advantage in 
numbers of U.S. missile compared to China’s, the increase in the number of Chinese 
nuclear missiles would likely be used to absorb a U.S. first strike, and only the 
surviving few could be used to breakthrough missile defenses.  So the United States 
does not need many interceptors to weaken the Chinese capability for nuclear 
retaliation.”235  However, as Robert Pfaltzgraff argued, the missile defense systems 
currently deployed and planned by the U.S. are “not designed to be effective against 
larger and more sophisticated missile forces, such as those of Russia and China.”  
The U.S. has fielded a system that is focused on the problem presented by “rogue 
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states” and “terrorist launch.”236  Pfaltzgraff made this point as he was actually 
presenting an argument on why the U.S. should deploy space based missile defense 
systems to counter Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals.   
The U.S. has attempted to signal the defensive intentions of NMD to China 
and Russia via official publications such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 
but the official proclamations are unlikely to convince China and Russia that NMD 
has only defensive purposes.237  The NPR stated, “We must continue to maintain 
stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats posed by 
any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our 
allies and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any 
incentives our non-nuclear allies and partners might have to seek their own nuclear 
deterrents.”238  The same year, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Verification, 
Compliance and Implementation stated:  
The United States missile defense systems would be employed to 
defend the United States against limited missile launches, and to 
defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional 
threats.  The United States intends to continue improving and 
deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against 
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limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to 
strengthening stability in key regions.239   
 
The U.S. issued a statement to clarify its position found in the New START treaty 
with Russia, “that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability 
and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the parties.”240     
In 2015, the 2010 NPR was further backed by Assistant Secretary of State 
Frank Rose in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.  With a 
specific focus on China he stated, “The United States is committed to maintaining 
strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a dialogue on 
strategic stability and nuclear postures aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, 
and transparent security relationship with China” and “Ground-based Midcourse 
Defense System (GMD) is designed to protect the U.S. homeland only from limited 
ICBM attacks from states such as North Korea and Iran.”241   
The US-Japan Alliance’s research and development of TMD systems are a 
threatening capability that forces China to respond.  With the threat of losing 
strategic stability, China has no choice but to oppose TMD since it has a small 
nuclear arsenal and maintains a minimal deterrence doctrine against the U.S.242  As 
Yao Yunzhu argued, “A national missile defense system, no matter how limited it 
                                                        
239 “Statement by the United States of America Concerning Missile Defense,” U.S. Department of State,  
Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Washington, DC, 7 April 2010, document 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140406.pdf (Accessed 22 April 2016). 
240 “Treaty Between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” U.S. Department of State,  Bureau of 
Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, p. 2, document available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf (Accessed 22 April 2016). 
241 Speech, Frank A. Rose, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia,” U.S. 
Department of State, 20 February 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/237746.htm 
(Accessed 22 March 2016). 
242 Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies 
Center. 
 178 
might be, would no doubt reduce the effectiveness of China’s deterrent against U.S. 
nuclear use.”243  Naturally, China wants to avoid an arms race with the U.S., but TMD 
will neutralize a force posture built on the doctrine of minimal deterrence.   
Therefore, China has a choice to accept the loss of strategic stability or build 
up its nuclear arsenal.  As Yao Yunzhu argued, “China has to think about how to 
maintain a guaranteed, retaliatory, second strike capability in the face of a U.S. BMD 
system.”244  Wu Riqiang argued that the choice for building up its nuclear weapons 
is inevitable, a decision that would break China’s minimal deterrence doctrine and 
undoubtedly spur on the security dilemma between the U.S. and China.  Wu Riqiang 
argued that for China, ICBMs are the most trustworthy way to deliver nuclear 
weapons and that in comparison to other delivery methods China’s technological 
position is not in a place to develop strategic bombers or nuclear submarines.  
Therefore, the loss of strategic stability between the U.S. and China will force China 
to build more nuclear missiles and will lead to an arms race between the two 
states.245  Wang Dong agreed, “If China views the US-Japan Alliance as doing 
something hostile or targeted against China, China will respond in kind.  Perceptions 
are an important factor because it deepens the security dilemma.  For example, the 
TMD and THAAD developments contribute to a spiral in the security dilemma.”246   
Xin Qiang of Fudan University argued that TMD poses a security threat 
because of its close proximity to the Chinese mainland.  He stated, “China must 
oppose it because it is a political and diplomatic issue with implications upon the 
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regional security.  If China does not oppose it, it will allow the U.S. to do anything it 
wants in the region.”247   
Chinese Foreign Policy Outcomes 
The US-Japan Alliance’s development of NMD and TMD systems have pushed 
China to respond.  One area that none of the Chinese scholars in the sample of 
journal articles or interview subjects mentioned was China’s development of Anti-
Satellite (ASAT) missile systems and China’s own BMD systems.  China’s evaluations 
of adversarial alliance capabilities in the area of missile defense may have pushed 
China to develop its own ballistic missile defense systems, and it has conducted 
eight known tests.248  After the ground-based intercept test in January 2013, a 
professor from the Second Artillery Force Engineering Institute claimed, “the 
success of this missile defense test means that China has already successfully 
resolved the issue of upper atmosphere target identification, tracking, and terminal 
guidance issues and that its mid-course missile defense technology is at the 
forefront of world technology.”249  Table 5.6 below offers details on the ASAT and 
BMD tests details.  The BMD tests correlate to US-Japan BMD cooperation that 
accelerated after North Korea’s long-range rocket test on 5 April 2009.250    
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Test Date Missile Target Test Type & Comment 
7 July 2005 SC-19 None known 
ASAT—Modified DF-21 
(NATO CSS-5) rocket test 
6 February 2006 SC-19 Unknown satellite 
ASAT—Possibly flyby of 
orbital target Unknown 
altitude reached 
11 January 2007 SC-19 FY-1C satellite 
ASAT—Destroyed orbital 
target, 3,000+ pieces of debris  
11 January 2010 SC-19 
CSS-X-11 ballistic 
missile 
BMD—Destruction of target 
at altitude of 250 kilometers  
20 January 2013 Possibly SC-19 
Unknown ballistic 
missile 
BMD—Destruction of target 
at unknown altitude 
13 May 2013 Possibly DN-2 Unknown 
BMD—Destruction of target 
10,000 to 30,000 kilometers 
23 July 2014 Unknown Unknown 
BMD—Non-destructive test at 
low orbit altitude 
30 October 2015 DN-3  Unknown 
BMD—Non-destructive test 
>30,000 kilometers 
Table 5.6.  Chinese ASAT and BMD Tests251      
Perceptions of Alliance Capabilities: 
Question 3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial 
alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, and 
military bases?  Supported.  Chinese analysts do note the presence of U.S. military 
bases in Japan that aid the U.S. military’s ability to project power in East Asia. 
Question 3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the 
adversarial alliances?  Supported.  Chinese analysts predominantly focus on 
strategic defensive weapons and Japan’s de facto nuclear capability. 
Question 3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the 
adversarial alliances?  Supported.  Chinese analysts do pay attention to conventional 
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capabilities.  In particular, highly advanced U.S. manufactured aircraft such as 45 F-
15Js fighter aircraft for air superiority missions, and 107 SH-60J anti-submarine 
helicopters and five P-3C anti-submarine pursuit aircraft.  The selected journals did 
not make mention of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force growth. 
Question 3d:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities and 
foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes?  Supported.  Concerning Japan’s 
nuclear fissile material stockpile, China has pursued a “naming and shaming” tactic.  
In response to alliance missile defense, China may have felt pressured to pursue its 
own ASAT and ballistic missile defense systems. 
5.8 US-JAPAN ALLIANCE SUMMARY 
All four alliance perception concepts shed light on Chinese perceptions of the 
US-Japan Alliance.  Three of them pointed towards Chinese foreign policy outcomes.  
The 1996 joint declaration and 1997 revised guidelines led to change in perceived 
intentions, and China responded with both attempts to avoid the security dilemma 
and to promote stronger relations with Russia.  Next, China’s assessment of a 
decline in US-Japan Alliance cohesion during the Hatoyama administration pushed it 
to seek greater cooperation with Japan.  Finally, Chinese estimates of US-Japan 
Alliance missile defense capabilities may have pushed China to develop its own 
ballistic missile systems and the deployment of nuclear missile submarines into the 
Pacific Ocean.   
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6.0  CHAPTER 6: US-ROK ALLIANCE 
6.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
After providing context to the post-Cold War alliance activities, this chapter 
will provide a chronological narrative of developments in the US-ROK Alliance, 
addressing the six alliance perception concepts at key points.  After providing the 
baseline intention of the alliance and the context to the post-Cold War alliance 
activities, the chapter will progress in a chronological fashion to bring attention to 
four alliance perception concepts.  First, the Roh administration will offer an 
examination of alliance cohesion.  Second, Chinese perceptions of increased US-ROK 
Alliance cohesion after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island crises will display over-
Machiavellianism.  Third, I will examine China’s perception of itself as a rising 
economic and military power in relation to the smaller alliance partner, South 
Korea.  Fourth, Chinese perception of the alliance’s current THAAD consultations 
will reveal thoughts on alliance capabilities and the alliance’s long-standing U.S. 
bases on the Korean Peninsula.  Fifth, I will quickly detail the absence of a shift in 
the way that Chinese analysts have perceived the intentions of the US-ROK Alliance.  
Each of these perception shaping categories will have varying degrees of influence 
on Chinese foreign policy outcomes. 
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6.2 BASELINE ALLIANCE INTENTIONS 
U.S. national strategy seeks to prevent the emergence of a regional power in 
Eurasia that would prevent the U.S. from having access to Eurasia’s economic 
activity and resources.1  Alliances play a large part of fulfilling this national security 
policy.  In 1995 the Nye Initiative stated, “America clearly has a stake in maintaining 
the alliance structure in Asia as a foundation of regional stability and a means of 
promoting American influence on key Asian issues.  Asian friends and allies are 
critical to the success of our global strategy in many respects.”2  Concerning 
alliances, the U.S. PACOM strategy states, U.S territories “coupled with our treaty 
alliances with Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand are the 
cornerstone of U.S. engagement in the region.”3  Therefore, from the Nye Initiative to 
the most up-to-date U.S. PACOM publications alliances affirm engagement in East 
Asian affairs as a central facet of U.S. national security strategy.  As Ashley Tellis 
wrote, “Other U.S. compacts, such as the ones with South Korea and Japan, have 
proved more durable because the absence of the Soviet Union has, unfortunately, 
been substituted by newer dangers in Asia: North Korea for starters, but 
increasingly China over the longer term.”4  
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6.3 POST-COLD WAR BACKGROUND 
At the conclusion of the Cold War, the US sought to reduce its personnel 
deployed to the Korean Peninsula and remove all tactical nuclear weapons.  The 
Nunn-Warner Amendment to the 1989 Defense Appropriation Bill mandated a 
reduction in U.S. troop strength in South Korea from 43,000 to 36,000 by the end of 
calendar year 1991.5  Similarly, President George H.W. Bush recommended further 
reductions of U.S. forces throughout the 1990s.6  The U.S. accomplished the latter 
policy decision on 27 September 1991 when President Bush called for the 
withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.7  Arms control 
experts estimate that the U.S. removed sixty B-61 nuclear bombs and forty W-33 
artillery shells.8  In December 1991, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo 
announced a nuclear free South Korea, and he would sign both the “North-South 
Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and the “Agreement 
on Reconciliation.”9  A further development towards a nuclear free peninsula 
materialized in May 1992 when North Korea allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the 
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Nyongbyon Nuclear Research Facility.  As part of the negotiations, the U.S. cancelled 
the TEAM SPIRIT 1992 joint exercise.10  TEAM SPIRIT was a massive joint military 
exercise that regularly involved 200,000 military personnel annually since the 
1980s.11   
In other political developments, at the end of August 1992, South Korea and 
China normalized relations.12  The next year, however, North Korean and South 
Korean bilateral relations deteriorated in light of IAEA findings that North Korea 
had engaged in three separate reprocessing campaigns.  Previously, in May 1992 the 
North Koreans admitted to a single reprocessing campaign.13  As a result, the U.S. 
military announced in January that the TEAM SPIRIT joint exercise would resume.14  
Despite South Korean President Kim Young-sam’s desire to promote a peaceful 
policy with his neighbor to the north, North Korea announced its withdrawal from 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on 12 March 1993, and successfully tested a 
mid-range missile by the end of May.15  Two months later, July 1993, Clinton visited 
Seoul and made a commitment that the U.S. would remain engaged in East Asia; and 
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by October, the Pentagon followed through with Clinton’s commitment by holding 
the U.S. troop presence in East Asia at 100,000 personnel.16  In the midst of these 
policy commitments, the U.S. and North Korea held high level negotiations from June 
1993 until October 1994.17  Yet the negotiations did not prevent North Korea from 
launching a Nodong-1 cruise missile with a range of 100 miles on 31 May 1994, nor 
prevent it from announcing its intention to withdraw from the IAEA.18  As a 
response to these enhanced threats, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea held its first 
Trilateral Defense Consultation in Hawaii to discuss the North Korean military 
threat and relations between the U.S. and China.19  U.S.-North Korean negotiations 
reached a compromise in October 1994, and the two sides signed the Agreed 
Framework.  The U.S. agreed to cancel the TEAM SPIRIT 1994 joint exercise as a part 
of the negotiations.20   
In terms of alliance relations, the U.S. and South Korea held negotiations 
concerning peacetime operational control.  Since the inception of the US-ROK 
Alliance, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) maintained peacetime operational 
control of South Korea’s military.  After the successful negotiations, South Korea 
gained peacetime operational control, but the USFK retained wartime operational 
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control.21  The following year, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea worked in concert to 
form the Korea Energy Development Organization to address North Korean energy 
issues.22  Moreover, the three states would continue to hold Trilateral Defense 
Consultations each year to discuss the North Korean situation and regional security 
issues.23   
The North Korean security issue remained an important issue into the late 
1990s.  For example, on 18 September 1996, South Korean forces encountered a 
North Korean submarine trying to infiltrate South Korea with heavily armed 
espionage agents.24  Furthermore, on 31 August 1998, North Korea launched a 
Taepodong-1 missile that flew over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.25  Nonetheless, 
despite North Korean missile tests and suspicious behavior, South Korean President 
Kim Dae-jung’s administration (25 February 1998 to 25 February 2003) put 
forward and maintained the “Sunshine Policy” as a non-confrontational policy to 
engage North Korea.  As a sign of improving North-South relations, two years later, 
North Korean and South Korean leaders held their first summit meeting.26  Yet, the 
same year North Korean and South Korean forces engaged in their first skirmish 
since the end of the Korean War on 15 June 1999 at Yeonpyeong Island.  Despite the 
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skirmish, the South Koreans displayed a remarkable degree of patience and 
persevered with the “Sunshine Policy.”27   
In March 2001, President Kim Dae-jung and President George W. Bush held 
discussions on the U.S. returning to the negotiating table with North Korea.28  
According to Morton Abramowitz, “Bush told Kim that his ‘Sunshine Policy’ of 
engagement, attempting gradual change of the North Korean system, was naive.”29  
Yet, the two sides still negotiated important agreements that greatly benefitted 
South Korea: the Land Partnership Plan that sought to move U.S. personnel from the 
De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) to Camp Humphreys.30  
6.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION 
In 2003, South Korea’s new president, Roh Moo-hyun (25 February 2003 to 
25 February 2008), ushered in a new chapter in alliance history.  The Roh 
administration advanced a “balancer diplomacy” strategy that encouraged greater 
independence from the U.S.  Li Zhijun described the conflict between the Roh Moo-
hyun administration and the George W. Bush administration as the most difficult 
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crisis in the alliance’s 50 year history.  President Roh not only continued Kim Dae-
Jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” but he issued many direct challenges to U.S. strategic 
direction that sought to expand the scope of contingencies that South Korea could 
participate.31   
In terms of context, in the summer of 2002, a U.S. Army M-60 tank variant, 
AVLM, crushed two middle school aged girls.  As a result, the USFK witnessed anti-
American demonstrations, attacks on U.S. military personnel, and fire bombings at 
Camp Page and Camp Grey.32  Subsequently, a U.S. military court martial acquitted 
both the tank driver and another driver in late November 2002.33  Due to the 
extraterritoriality clause in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and to the 
disdain of the South Koreans, the South Korean court system did not have the 
authority to prosecute the two U.S. Army sergeants.  The next month, the U.S. and 
South Korea agreed to alter the de facto extraterritoriality status of USFK soldiers in 
the SOFA.34  Additionally, anti-American sentiment helped candidate Roh Moo-
hyun’s Millennium Democratic Party secure the presidential election.35  In 2002, 
Victor Cha assessed that local South Korean politicians could take advantage of anti-
American grievances that stemmed from the SOFA agreement and other key issues 
such as “basing and land-use, live-fire exercises; host nation support; and the 
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combined forces command structures.”36  Table 6.1 below displays the Pew 
Research numbers on how unpopular the United States was in the summer of 2002.   
Question 9a: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 














4 48 37 7 3 
May, 
2003 
3 43 39 11 4 
Spring, 
2007 
3 55 33 5 5 
Spring, 
2008 
4 66 25 3 2 
Spring, 
2009 
4 74 17 2 3 
Spring, 
2010 
9 70 16 2 4 
Spring, 
2013 
8 70 18 2 2 
Table 6.1.   South Korean Public Opinion of the United States37 
When the Roh administration began in February 2003, the US-ROK Alliance 
leadership was already undergoing a strategic readjustment.  The U.S. and ROK 
sides reached agreement after holding two separate lengthy negotiations: 1) Future 
of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), and 2) The Security Policy Initiative (SPI).  
The FOTA negotiations started in November 2002 and stretched until the end of 
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2004.  The US-ROK Alliance partners held nine conferences to finalize four 
important changes in the alliance:38  
1) The U.S. agreed to consolidate over 30 U.S. military bases from their 
northern border positions in to two large bases in southern positions,   
2) Discussions on handing over the mission of containing North Korea to the 
South Korean partners, 
3) A reduction of U.S. forces by 12,500 personnel, and  
4) The Yongsan Relocation Plan moved the U.S. military headquarters out of 
Seoul’s prime real estate market and sent it to Pyeongtaek [平泽地区] roughly 20 
miles south of Seoul.39   
Even though the alliance partners complete FOTA agreement negotiations in 2004, 
the USFK at present is still in the lengthy process of moving from Seoul and U.S. 
Army camps north of Seoul close to the DMZ.  The Pyeongtaek military base covers 
more than five square miles and contains more than 500 buildings; construction 
crews should complete their work by 2017.  The USFK's 210th Field Artillery Brigade 
will remain just south of the DMZ until South Korean units can take over the task of 
countering North Korean artillery.40   
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Guo Xiangang notes how the USFK adopted policies that called for greater 
ownership of its own defenses.41  In part, these moves towards greater 
independence were due to the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which caused a 
drawdown of the USFK.  Most importantly, the FOTA negotiations worked to resolve 
long-held problems with U.S. basing in South Korea.  In 2006, testimony by Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless to the House Committee on 
International Relations revealed “legacy issues” as a source of anti-American 
sentiment that President Roh used to propel his election to presidency.  Mr. Lawless 
stated:42  
For example, we reached an agreement with the Republic of Korea in, I 
believe, 1990, and again, I believe, in 1992, to remove Yongsan from the 
center of Seoul, a very tangible irritant in the center of their country and in 
the center of their capital. We had not executed on that agreement over that 
intervening 12-, 13-, 14-year period. So one of the things we set ourselves to 
do was resolve that issue, get out of Seoul, and return Yongsan to the control 
of the Republic of Korea, where it belongs. 
There are other issues related to how our 2nd Infantry Division was 
organized and positioned north of the Han River. In many cases what we had 
were situations where just a growth of—economically had encroached upon 
those camps and created situations where we couldn’t even move our forces 
around. So we had no choice but to relocate.  
The SPI meetings were ongoing at the time of Yang Hongmei’s writing, but 
Yang surmised the FOTA and SPI meetings displayed both progress and divergence 
of the alliance relationship.  The U.S. was pushing South Korea to take on a greater 
burden of its own national security, and the South Koreans had to make some 
difficult strategic decisions to cooperate with or drift away from the American’s 
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regional focus.43  The U.S. military pressed its South Korean partners to expand the 
alliance from a Korean Peninsula focus to a “regional military” that would include 
Taiwan.  The U.S. planned to rename the US-ROK Forces a “Northeast Asia Reserve 
Force.”44  On this push for a new strategic direction, Li Zhijun’s interpretation is that 
the US-ROK Alliance was responding to two threats: 1) the North Korean military, 
and 2) the rising great power status of China.  To confront these two threats, the 
alliance partners engaged in high level negotiations in October 2003.  However, the 
suggested regional policy adjustments did not match up with the peace and stability 
goals set in motion by ROK President Kim Dae-jung and continued by Roh Moo-
hyun.   
On one hand, the FOTA and SPI negotiations actually aligned with the Roh 
administration’s desires to reduce South Korean dependence on the U.S. and make 
force adjustments that would lessen tensions with North Korea.  In a speech on 15 
August 2003, President Roh stated, “it’s not correct to be always dependent on U.S. 
military forces in ROK to safeguard our security.  Independent national defense is 
not contradictory to the ROK-U.S. alliance.  Their relations are mutually 
complemented.  It’s already 55 years since the first government of ROK was 
established.  It is in possession of strong economic strength that is 12th in the world.  
Now, it is the time for us to shoulder responsibilities of safeguarding our nation.”45  
This statement represented President Roh’s call for an independent national 
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defense policy that included weapon modernization, and upgrading of information 
technology resources to increase combat capabilities.46  Roh’s comments about 
independent national defense did not fall on deaf ears in Washington, as Morton 
Abramowitz noted, “The US national-security establishment often expresses 
impatience with South Korea, questioning why the US should station troops there if 
the Koreans do not want them.”47  Likewise, Roh’s advocacy of neutrality in South 
Korea’s military alliance with America earned him criticism from the South Korean 
establishment.48 
Yet, on the Taiwan issue, the Roh administration was adamant that the South 
Koreans would not expand their scope towards Taiwan.  On 8 March 2005, 
President Roh gave a speech at the South Korean Air and Land Officer School 
graduation that first diplomatically emphasized the importance of the U.S. military 
forces stationed in South Korea, but he also made a statement that went against the 
regional army direction desired by the U.S. military.  President Roh stated, “I am 
here stating with extreme clarity.  With exception to the circumstances we agreed 
to, the US military deployed to South Korea should not participate in any northeast 
Asian conflict.  This is a firm principle that cannot be changed under any 
circumstances.”49  President Roh reiterated his position on regional affairs, “I clearly 
say that the USFK should not be involved in disputes in Northeast Asia without 
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Korea’s agreement.”50  The above statements meant that the U.S. military’s 
intentions of making the U.S. military stationed in South Korea able to respond to 
regional contingencies was conflicting with President Roh’s strategic direction.   
However, in September 2006, U.S. House Representative Tancredo inquired 
about South Korean resistance to U.S. deployment plans stationed on the Korean 
Peninsula to intervene in the Taiwan Straits in the event of an attack.51  Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense Robert Lawless provided this answer: “Part of the 
process, and part of the discussions that we have had with the Republic of Korea in 
the past, has involved an issue called strategic flexibility.  We just say that we are 
satisfied currently with the understanding that we have with the Republic of Korea 
with regard to the United States forces that are currently stationed in the Republic 
of Korea.”52  Therefore, in rather vague terms, the Taiwan situation was resolved. 
Guo Xiangang also noted that under President Roh, the ROK was attempting 
to change the US-ROK Alliance from a “protector-protégé” relationship into an 
alliance of equals.53  In the 8 March graduation speech, President Roh asserted that 
in ten years South Korea would have complete military autonomy.54  This statement 
echoed a speech a month previous that emphasized South Korean independence and 
“balancer diplomacy.”  Roh told the ROK National Assembly that South Korea “will 
fully take on all rights and responsibilities of a sovereign state.  It will play the role 
of a balancer and promote peace and prosperity, not only on the Korean Peninsula, 
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but also throughout Northeast Asia.”55  President Roh repeatedly promoted South 
Korean “balancer diplomacy” as the ideal way of maintaining peace and stability 
between China and the U.S.56  In fact, Roh’s “balancer diplomacy” produced 
controversy in 2005 when the South Korean Defense Ministry removed all 
references to North Korea as South Korea’s “main enemy” from its official white 
paper.57  Yet, President Roh’s moves to soften tensions between the ROK and North 
Korea ran counter to Washington’s policy direction in the mid-2000s.   
Guo pointed to the external political environment as a source of cohesion.  He 
noted that during this period of decreased tensions between the two Korean states, 
the US-ROK relationship suffered because the George W. Bush administration took a 
hardline approach towards North Korea that included abandoning the 1994 Nuclear 
Framework Agreement.58  Guo summarized Roh’s softer policies that sought to 
maintain the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula naturally led to conflict 
within the alliance.59  Li Jun contends that the U.S. and the ROK view the North 
Korean threat differently.  Balbina Hwang, a senior policy analyst at the Heritage 
Foundation, testified to the House International Relations Committee in 2006, 
“Today, the majority of South Koreans no longer view North Korea as an invincible, 
evil enemy intent on conquering the South.  Rather, the greatest threat posed by the 
North is the instability of the regime which could lead to a collapse (whether 
through implosion or explosion), thereby devastating the South’s economic, political 
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and social systems.”60  For South Korea, an abrupt DPRK collapse and initiation of 
“involuntary military conflicts” is the worst case scenario, but for the U.S., it views 
the DPRK as a nuclear threat and a source of nuclear weapon proliferation.61  As T. J. 
Pempel stated, the U.S. and South Korea under President Roh were “clearly pursuing 
differently calibrated moves toward the DPRK.”62  This divide caused Kurt Campbell 
to write in 2004, “The Alliance between the United States and South Korea is in bad 
shape, and it is unclear how it might be repaired.  Indeed, the relationship may 
already have taken on less significance and become relegated to the ash heap of old 
alliance partnerships, given the difficulties in finding common ground for how to 
deal with North Korea.”63 
Another area of contention between the alliance partners pertains to the 
peacetime and wartime operational control of the alliance forces.  In both April and 
September 2005, the ROK government announced its refusal to participate in a 
specific operation plan (OPLAN5029-05).64  The plan mandated that in the event of 
an emergency in North Korea, the commander-in-chief of USFK would assume 
control over all of the US-ROK Alliance forces.65  Li Jun argues that the Roh 
administration was attempting to establish an equal relationship with the U.S.; thus, 
attempting to recover military sovereignty and operational command were 
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important goals for South Korea.66  At that time, The Economist reported that the 
alliance was under strain, stating President Roh “treats two current wrangles 
between the allies—the intended relocation of America's huge military base, 
Yongsan, out of downtown Seoul, and a debate about whether America should 
concede operational control of allied forces in wartime—as issues of national 
sovereignty, as if the United States were an occupier.”67  Subsequent negotiations on 
operational control did not produce a solution until June 2009 under the Obama 
administration when the U.S. promised to hand over full peacetime and wartime 
operational control in 2015.68   
Guo Xiangang from the China Institute of International Studies argued that 
the Bush administration pressured President Roh to concede that the U.S. was the 
ultimate balancer in Asia before his visit to the U.S. in June 2005.  Six months later, 
on 17 November 2005, Bush and Roh issued a joint declaration, “proposing to 
deepen and develop a comprehensive, dynamic and mutually beneficial 
partnership.”69  In January 2006, the alliance was continuing to show signs of 
recovery when the alliance partners marked an important first in holding the US-
ROK Strategic Dialogue.70  South Korea agreed to “respect the necessity for strategic 
flexibility of the U.S. Forces in the ROK” while the U.S. pledged, “not be involved in a 
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regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”71  
Subsequently, the U.S. agreed to handover maritime operational control to South 
Korea.72  Further movement towards mending the alliance relationship came on 28 
March 2006 when ROK President Roh said that he was not “anti-American,” re-
emphasized the strategic and economic importance that the U.S. plays in South 
Korea, and desired to maintain a close relationship with the U.S.73  President George 
W. Bush and President Roh again held a summit meeting in November 2006, and 
South Korea committed to build a “comprehensive and mutually beneficial 
partnership” with the United States.74  Therefore, the US-ROK Alliance experienced a 
difficult time from the summer of 2002 to March 2006. 
While some Chinese analysts point to President Roh’s time in office as a low 
point in alliance cohesion, Sun Xuefeng noted the immediate disappearance of the 
cohesion issues after Roh left office.  Jeffrey Bader’s account chronicles the quick 
turnaround in senior level interaction.  Roh’s successor Lee Myung-bak’s first 
meeting with Obama highlights the contrast between the two South Korean 
administrations.  President Lee was one of the administration’s first head-of-state 
visitors to the White House, and the two presidents’ “public and private messages 
indicated solidarity against North Korea’s nuclear program and other provocations 
and the firmness of the U.S. security guarantee to South Korea.”75  Sun’s stance is 
that the source of the problem was from within the ROK government and not related 
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to ROK’s dependence on the U.S.  Therefore, China had no way of disrupting the US-
ROK Alliance with a wedge strategy to break apart the alliance, because such a 
strategy would be counter-productive.  Sun argues that it was best for China to keep 
quiet and let the alliance run its course.  To explain, Sun provides the example of a 
married couple arguing over a small matter, and if a third-party observer says 
something about the argument the married couple will quickly make amends over 
the small matter.76  Under this logic, by China attempting to split the alliance, China 
would only make the alliance reconstitute itself in the face of an open challenge to 
divide it.  Sun specifically mentioned that China would not try a “wedge” strategy 
like that suggested by Timothy Crawford.77  However, President Roh’s “balancer 
diplomacy” might have offered an opportunity for China to pursue the Sino-South 
Korean free trade agreement.  In November of 2004, President Hu and President 
Roh agreed to launch an “unofficial feasibility study” that would move the two 
countries towards a final signed agreement on 2 June 2015.78 
On the institutional level, Yu Tiejun contends that while the leadership issues 
presented serious political disagreements at the senior level, the US-ROK Alliance 
remained secure and intact.  The respective militaries and defense departments of 
both states remained in close coordination despite the issues between senior 
political leadership.  As Yu Tiejun stated, “Most of the analysis concerning talk of US-
Japan Alliance and US-ROK Alliance changes in cohesion concern the political 
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dealings of the two governments and do not really account for the depth of the 
security cooperation that is still present and very difficult to see from outside.”79  
This judgement by Yu Tiejun aligns well with non-Chinese sources that both the 
South Korean and the American national security establishments were displeased 
with the Roh administration’s policies.80 
Adversarial Alliance Cohesion: 
Question 2a:  Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is a 
function of external political context?  Supported.  Chinese analysts viewed the 
reduced tensions between North and South Korea as a cause of Roh’s ambivalence 
towards the U.S., and the political crises in the next section will contrast this low 
point in adversarial alliance cohesion. 
Question 2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
institutional solidarity between the alliance partners?  Supported.  Chinese analysts 
noted that high level of security cooperation and successful negotiations were still 
evident throughout the low-point in adversarial alliance cohesion.  Yet, in the 
sample of journal articles I did not find reference to either the South Korean or U.S. 
defense establishments being displeased by the disagreements. 
Question 2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
interactions between the alliance partners’ senior leadership?  Supported.  Numerous 
Chinese analysts pointed to the senior leadership disagreements between President 
George W. Bush and the Roh administration. 
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Question 2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the 
domestic politics of the alliance partners?  Supported.  Two Chinese analysts detailed 
South Korean domestic concerns over the FOTA issues and the low view of the U.S. 
in the summer of 2002 after the roadway accident killed two middle school girls. 
Question 2e: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion 
influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?  No evidence points to Chinese foreign 
policy outcomes being influenced by the low-point in adversarial alliance cohesion.  
Potentially, President Roh’s openness towards China presented an opportunity to 
pursue the Sino-South Korean free trade agreement in November of 2004. 
6.5 PERCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY 
After the US-ROK Alliance experienced an episode of low cohesion in the 
early and mid-2000s, the US-ROK Alliance would rebound as tensions with North 
Korea increased.  The alliance partners responded by enhancing security 
cooperation to counter the North Korean threat.  This increase in cohesiveness of 
the alliance did not escape the attention of Chinese analysts, and it caused some to 
speculate that the U.S. was manipulating the crises for its own benefit.  This 
interpretation moved past overcentralization to over-Machiavellianism.  To 
demonstrate this point, I have divided the incidents into two phases: the 2006 and 
2009 North Korean nuclear tests and the 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island 
crises. 
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6.5.1 Phase 1: 2006 and 2009 North Korean Nuclear Tests 
The year 2006 saw an escalation in tensions between North Korea and the 
US-ROK Alliance.  On 5 July 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles over the Sea 
of Japan, and on 6 October 2006, it conducted its first nuclear test—a clear violation 
of the Agreed Framework.  Consequently, although the Six-Party Talks resumed on 
31 October 2006, they eventually collapsed in December 2008.  Five months later, 
on 25 and 26 May 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test and fired 
three missiles into the sea near Japan.81  The next month, President Obama and 
South Korean President Lee issued the “Joint Vision Statement” that pointed 
towards the year 2015 as the year South Korea would take full operational 
command, both in peacetime and wartime.82   
Li Jun’s interpretation of the 2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear tests 
points to the U.S. manipulating the North Korean security threat to its advantage.  
President Roh’s “balancer diplomacy” challenged U.S. strategic goals which were “to 
keep its troops deploying along the frontline in the Peninsula and maintain the ROK-
U.S. alliance so as to consolidate its hegemony in the region.”83  Li Jun argued that 
the U.S. conveniently uses the North Korean nuclear threat as a way to block the 
peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, because the existence of the US-ROK 
Alliance rests on the existence of the North Korean threat.  If the North Korean 
threat did not exist, the U.S. military forward deployed on the peninsula would need 
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to depart.  Likewise, Li Zhijun noted that South Korea’s trend towards “moving 
closer” to China and “being at odds with the leadership” has given the U.S. a deep 
sense of insecurity.  Li concluded, “In order to maintain and strengthen the US-ROK 
Alliance, the U.S. thinks the best method is to exaggerate the North Korean nuclear 
threat, plot how to use force against North Korea, and bind South Korea on to the 
war chariot.”84  This evaluation of the US-ROK Alliance represents Chinese 
perception of conspiracy because it emphasizes a U.S. conspiracy to promote U.S. 
hegemony in northeast Asia. 
Yet, the U.S. worked diligently to solve the North Korean nuclear issue by 
participating in the Six-Party Talks hosted by China, and it even offered North Korea 
a negative security assurance that the U.S. would not attack North Korea with 
nuclear weapons or conventional weapons.  Victor Cha, a U.S. negotiator at the Six 
Party Talks, recounted the details of when the U.S. offered a negative security 
assurance to North Korea, the Russians called a special bilateral meeting to 
communicate to the North Koreans the importance of this type of assurance.  In 
Victor Cha’s words, this is what the Russian negotiators told him after the special 
bilateral meeting with the North Koreans: 
We saw this language and we told the North Koreans that what this language 
basically constitutes is a negative security assurance: the United States will 
not attack North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons.  We consider 
this to be very significant language because we tried to get language like this 
from you during the Cold War and we could never get it.  So the fact that you 
are now offering this language to us is very significant, and we told the North 
Koreans that.85 
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This quote above shows how serious the U.S. side was about negotiating 
towards a solution to the North Korean nuclear threat.  Moreover, during the Six-
Party Talks the U.S. was willing to remove North Korea off the U.S. State 
Department’s international terrorism sponsor list.  When the U.S. did this action in 
hopes of furthering the negotiation process on the North Korean nuclear program it 
cost political capital with Japan.86  If the U.S. wanted to manipulate the North Korean 
threat to keep a strong US-ROK Alliance, the U.S. would not have taken an action that 
damaged alliance cohesion with the US-Japan Alliance at the negotiating table.  In 
consideration of the increase of forces in the Asian-Pacific region in 2006 he 
mentions naval and marine capabilities, Kurt Campbell wrote:   
The United States must maintain a forward deployed military 
presence in the region that is both reassuring to friends and a 
reminder to China that we remain the ultimate guarantor of regional 
peace and stability.  Capital ships, stealthy submarines, expeditionary 
Marine forces, and overwhelming air power will likely offer the most 
effective military instruments for managing a range of Asian scenarios 
involving core U.S. interests.87 
U.S. national security strategy leans on Geoffrey Blainey’s conclusion that “a clear 
preponderance of power tended to promote peace.”88  The U.S. displays a 
preponderance of power to convince states in the Asia-Pacific that a war would be 
very costly.  Additionally, Blainey wrote, “It is not the actual distribution or balance 
of power which is vital: it is rather the way in which national leaders think that 
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power is distributed [emphasis in original].”89  The U.S. Department of Defense 
works to maintain this preponderance of power and is evidenced by U.S. PACOM’s 
statement on its “Readiness to Fight”: “USPACOM is first and foremost a war fighting 
command, committed to maintaining superiority across the range of military 
operations in all domains.”90   
 However, this maintenance of a preponderance of power does not mean that 
the U.S. is seeking to contain China.  As Jeffrey Bader explains, “Containment in the 
style of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union after World War II was not a plausible 
option.  China was now completely integrated into the global economy and indeed 
had been explicitly encouraged by the United States to move in this direction...  U.S. 
policy toward a rising China could not rely solely on military muscle, economic 
blandishments and pressure...”91   
6.5.2 Phase 2: 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents 
The year 2010 held two tests for the US-ROK Alliance.  First, on 27 March, a 
North Korea torpedo sank the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan in a disputed 
maritime border area—46 sailors died.  Second, on 23 November, the North Korean 
military shelled Yeonpyeong Island—2 ROK Marines and 2 ROK civilians died as a 
result.  The US-ROK Alliance responded by holding large scale joint military 
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exercises in the Yellow Sea and more than 27 districts.  The U.S., Japan, and South 
Korea then met to coordinate their North Korean policies on 5 December 2010.92   
In stark contrast to the Roh administration, the security relationship 
between the U.S. and the ROK flourished under the presidency of Lee Myung-bak 
(25 February 2008 to 25 February 2013).  The US-ROK Alliance moved towards a 
“comprehensive strategic alliance” as the U.S. put in writing for the first time its 
policy of extending nuclear deterrence over South Korea on 14 June 2012.  This 
important deterrence distinction added South Korea into a special grouping of 
states (NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand).93  Moreover, the joint statement 
included the special term, “linchpin,” in describing the US-ROK Alliance as an 
integral part in securing the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.  
Ordinarily, U.S. official reserved the “linchpin” term specifically for the US-Japan 
Alliance.  Additionally, the ROK signaled greater involvement by resuming its 
deployment of troops to Afghanistan.94  When an alliance partner is putting their 
own soldiers into dangerous environments, they are signaling alliance commitment. 
 Numerous Chinese scholars noted the increase in US-ROK Alliance 
cooperation.  For example, Zhu Feng was quick to note how the US-ROK Alliance 
cohesion increased dramatically in the wake of the sinking of the Cheonan, and the 
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.95  He was also critical of what he termed a “trilateral 
alliance,” the combining of the US-ROK Alliance and the US-Japan Alliance on 5 
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December 2010.  Zhu Feng’s article begins by noting that in 2010 tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula were high and the two incidents “pushed the region almost to the 
brink of war.”96  Yet, later in the article Zhu Feng writes, “Those two incidents in 
2010 gave the U.S. a good excuse to consolidate the trilateral military alliance with 
South Korea and Japan, to build closer ties—both military and political—with South 
Korea at a time when South Korea seemed to be growing closer to China for 
economic reasons, to stop a rising China from replacing U.S. influence in the region 
and to keep hold of its other strategic resources in East Asia.”97  Zhu Feng interprets 
the “trilateral alliance” as a hedge against China’s rise instead of a move against 
North Korea.  Furthermore, Zhang and Wang cite the Cheonan sinking in 2010 as an 
excuse to bolster alliance ties.  They are in complete agreement with Zhu Feng in 
writing,  
The U.S. thinks, “The primary state in the midst of all the newly developing 
states, China possesses the largest possibility of developing a military 
competition with the U.S.”  As a result, after the Cheonan incident, the U.S. 
and the ROK used containment of North Korea as a pretext to continue to 
hold large-scale military exercises in the Yellow Sea, a serious threat to 
China’s national security.  The U.S. used all of its power to initiate the 
formation of a US-ROK-Japan security cooperation to contain China.98   
 
Qi Dapeng and Zhang Chi are in agreement with Zhu Feng’s earlier assertion 
from 2010, they wrote, “Washington has used the DPRK Threat as an excuse for 
building up its military presence in the region so as to solidify its military/security 
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alliance and therefore its preeminence in the region as a whole.”99  Similarly, Liu 
Jianping asserted that the U.S. deliberately confronted Prime Minister Hatoyama’s 
“East Asian Community” policies by manipulating North and South Korean tensions 
and China’s territorial tensions.  He writes, “The U.S. on one hand refused 
[Hatoyama’s policy direction], and on the other hand manipulated the ‘Cheonan 
Incident’ and Sino-Japanese and Sino-ASEAN maritime territorial disputes to 
engineer a joint military exercise.  The situation once more exaggerated the ‘North 
Korean threat’ and the ‘China threat’.”100 
 The conspiratorial nature of the Chinese interpretations rest on a faulty 
assumption: if an outcome benefitted the U.S., then the U.S. must have instigated the 
tensions.  This assumption disregards the agency exercised by North Korea to sink 
the Cheonan and shell Yeonpyeong Island.  Moreover, it presumes that the U.S. 
desires a conflict on the Korean Peninsula to aid its position in Northeast Asia.  In 
contrast to the perceptions of conspiracy, one Chinese analyst in the sample of 
journal articles offered an explanation that rests on cohesion being a function of the 
external environment.  Tang Yongsheng noted that alliance cohesion prospered 
when tension increased, “When inter-Korean relations were strained, the U.S. 
upgraded its South Korea-U.S. military alliance.”101   
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 In regards to Chinese foreign policy outcomes, there is no direct evidence 
that points to Chinese perceptions of conspiracy pushing China towards certain 
policies.  More likely, China recognized that the North Korean nuclear program was 
enhancing the US-ROK Alliance by heightening tension on the Korean Peninsula.  In 
February 2013, China took a tough stance towards North Korea’s nuclear bomb test 
preparations and issued “veiled threats” towards North Korea.102 
Perceptions of Conspiracy: 
Question 1Ba:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well 
organized and planned moves against them?  Supported.  Chinese analysts regularly 
view the US-ROK Alliance activities as promotion of “containment” policy.  These 
assessments do not align well with the baseline intentions of the alliance. 
Question 1Bb:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a 
conspiracy aimed against them?  Supported.  Chinese analysts offered perceptions of 
conspiracy.  Their logic was simple:  since the U.S. alliance system became more 
robust in response to the North Korean nuclear program and the Cheonan and 
Yeonpyeong Island crises, then the U.S. must have manipulated the crises.   
Question 1Bc:  Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy? 
Potentially.  One Chinese analyst offered a differing viewpoint that the alliance was 
responding to the external political environment.  The differing viewpoint aligns 
well with the baseline intentions of the alliance. 
Question 1Bd:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese 
foreign policy outcomes?  Potentially.  There is no evidence directly linking 
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perceptions of conspiracy to policy outcomes.  Yet, China’s recognition that North 
Korea’s nuclear program was heightening the US-ROK Alliance caused China to issue 
“veiled threats” towards North Korea to cease testing nuclear weapons in 2013.  
This also could indicate that rational thought processes are prevailing over 
perceptions of conspiracy. 
6.6 SELF-PERCEPTION OF RISING STATE IN RELATION TO 
ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE 
The rise of China’s economic and military power and China’s ever-expanding 
economic bilateral ties with South Korea represent two important and inter-related 
dynamics operating in the background of the US-ROK Alliance since the end of the 
Cold War.  There are two distinct debates among Chinese analysts concerning 
China’s rise and its relative position to the US-ROK Alliance.  The first debate is 
China’s prospering economic relationship holds lasting influence on the US-ROK 
Alliance.  The second debate is how China should manage its rise in military power. 
6.6.1 China’s Rise in Economic Power 
On the economic influence debate, it is undeniable that China’s bilateral trade 
relationship is a great success.  In 2011, the bilateral trade was valued at $220.6 
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billion, 35 times the amount of bilateral trade in 1992.103  In terms of bilateral trade 
between the two states, the numbers are staggering; bilateral trade has spiked from 
$31.5 billion in 2001 to $228.9 billion in 2013.  For the same period, the ROK’s 
percentage of total exports to China has risen from 12% to 26.1% while ROK 
percentage of total exports to the U.S. has dropped from 20.7% to 11.1%.104  As 
evidenced by Table 6.2, the amount of bilateral trade between China and the ROK 
has increased exponentially.   
Year ROK Exports to China 
(billions USD) 
Percent of Total 
Exports 




2000 18.45 10.71 11.29 4.53 
2001 18.19 12.09 12.52 4.70 
2002 23.75 14.62 15.53 4.77 
2003 35.11 18.11 20.09 4.59 
2004 49.76 19.60 27.81 4.69 
2005 61.91 21.77 35.11 4.61 
2006 69.46 21.34 44.52 4.60 
2007 81.99 22.07 56.43 4.63 
2008 91.39 21.66 73.93 5.17 
2009 86.70 23.85 53.58 4.47 
2010 116.84 25.05 68.77 4.36 
2011 134.19 24.17 82.92 4.37 
2012 134.32 24.52 87.67 4.28 
2013 145.87 26.07 91.16 4.13 
Table 6.2.   South Korea’s Import and Export Record with China105 
Moreover, South Korea has a sizable trade surplus with China and exports 
make up a sizeable portion of South Korea’s GDP.  For instance, in 2005, South 
Korea’s exports to China were worth $61.91 billion USD, and comprised 21.77% of 
total exports, which equated to 6.9% of South Korea’s GDP.  By comparison, in 2013 
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South Korean exports to China equaled 12.2% of the state’s GDP (in 2005 constant 
dollars).106    
One group of Chinese analysts argued that China’s economic relationship was 
pushing South Korea away from the U.S. axis.  Xin Qiang argued that rise of China’s 
economic power and the alliance commitment held by South Korea is a precarious 
balance to manage.107  China’s free trade agreement with South Korea bolsters 
bilateral trade, and China’s applications of serious pressure on North Korea are 
attempts to send benign signals to South Korea.  Xin Qiang sees this change as a 
natural process, “when South Korea has higher stakes with China-South Korea 
relations it will show more hesitance toward cooperating with the U.S. if it will make 
China angry.”108    Xin Qiang argues that the economic rise of China has placed South 
Korea squarely between the interests of China and the United States.  Xin Qiang 
argues that the economic rise of China has made it the largest trading partner of 
almost every neighboring state in East Asia and this naturally weakens the cohesion 
of the US-ROK Alliance.  Additionally, China invites foreign investment and is an 
attractive market for exports.  He stated, “If those countries want to fulfill their 
economic prosperity, they must have a good relationship with China.  This will cause 
these states to think twice when the U.S. is calling them to challenge China.”109  For 
example, South Korea’s current THAAD deployment issue “is a difficult decision for 
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President Park.  China’s economic boom provides a market for South Korean goods, 
so it is difficult for them to challenge China.”110   
Additionally, Li Zhijun, offered two reasons why South Korean leadership 
was not following the U.S. military’s lead in expanding the scope of the US-ROK 
Alliance: 1) South Korea’s economic dependence on exports to China, and 2) China’s 
ability to influence North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.111  In the area of economic 
dependence, Guo Xiangang saw bilateral trade as an important indicator of the ROK 
strategic departure from the U.S.  Guo reasons that ROK intervention or involvement 
in aiding U.S. military forces in the Taiwan Strait or in Northeast Asia would hold 
consequences for ROK’s bilateral trade relationship with China.112   
Finally, Sun Ru concluded that South Korea under President Park Geun-hye 
had already moved from “leaning” toward the U.S., to a new position of balance 
between the U.S. and China.113  Sun deduced that President Park’s disrupted the 
usual order of state visits to signal “the importance she attached to relations with 
China.”114  Normally, upon assumption of office, the ROK president would conduct 
state visits in the prescribed order: U.S., Japan, Russia, and China.  President Park 
visited the U.S. in May 2013, but her second state visit was to China in June 2013.115 
In contrast, other Chinese scholars  see the limits of economics to divide the 
US-ROK Alliance. Yu Tiejun disagrees that China’s rise is causing South Korea to lean 
towards China and contends that this viewpoint is superficial.  Yu explained, “South 
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Korean public opinion polls suggest that more than 70% of South Koreans say that 
the U.S. is the most important state for South Korea.  The two states are allies, and 
China is not an ally of South Korea.  So while the China and South Korea economic 
relationship has prospered, the political and military relationship with the U.S. will 
be very difficult to change.”116  Zhu Feng agrees, while he noted that the loosening of 
US-ROK Alliance cohesion in recent years has provided China with some strategic 
space.  Yet, Zhu Feng cautioned, “the U.S.-centric alliance system remains 
untouchable and unchangeable because the dynamics of economy and security are 
different.”117  Part of this unchangeable feature is South Korean elite consensus 
supports the U.S. axis.  Yu Tiejun argued that the elite South Korean figures were all 
educated in the U.S. and lean heavily towards the U.S.  They are not convinced that 
China represents the future and are not in favor of the China model.  Thus, the 
bedrock of South Korea’s future lies in the US-ROK Alliance.118   
Additionally, Wang Xiaoling of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences noted 
in 2012 pointed to ROK public opinion data that the consequences of China’s rise in 
economic power outweighed the positives because South Koreans feared that 
companies would move manufacturing jobs to China.119  Wang argues that this 
                                                        
116 Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University. 
117 Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University. 
118 Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University. 
119 Wang Xiaoling [王晓玲], “What Factors Influence the South Korean People’s Position on the China-
US Relations” [Shenme yinsu yingxiang hanguo minzhong zai Zhongmei zhijian de lichang], World 
Economics and Politics [Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi], 2012, No. 8, p. 29 
 216 
negative opinion towards China as an economic competitor increases favorable 
support towards the US-ROK Alliance.120 
6.6.2 China’s Rise in Military Power 
A substantial dichotomy exists between the level of security and economic 
relations between China and the ROK.  Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke assessed that 
South Korea has a dual strategy of containment and cooperation towards China.  On 
one hand, South Korea has a “comprehensive strategic alliance” with the United 
States that safeguards its security.  On the other hand, South Korea has a “strategic 
partnership” with China that bolsters its economic relationship.121   
China’s defense budget since the 2000s clearly displays China’s rise in 
military power.  For instance, examination of the Chinese defense budget in 2011 
constant dollars from 2004 at $63.5 billion to 2014 at $190.9 billion reveals 
tremendous growth over ten years—an increase of $127.4 billion.  By comparison, 
South Korea’s defense budget was $22.9 billion in 2004 and has grown to $33.1 
billion by 2014—an increase of $10.2 billion.122  Chinese investments of monetary 
resources have gone into modernization and equipping all four elements of Chinese 
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defense:  PLA Ground Forces, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA Rocket Force.123  As 
evidenced by Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, the Chinese military has grown in its power 
projection capabilities.  The most notable additions are the military assets that were 
in development or absent from 2005 and 2005 reports that appear in the 2015 
report.  For instance, the PLA Ground Force’s development of an air wing and the 
growth of marine (amphibious) divisions and brigades enhance its abilities to assert 
itself on the battlefield.   
PLA Ground Forces 2005 2010 2015 
Group Armies 18 18 18 
Infantry Divisions/Brigades (including airborne) 20/20 19/25 15/23 
Armor Divisions/Brigades 10/10 9/8 1/17 
Mechanized Infantry Divisions/Brigades 5/5 4/5 7/25 
Artillery Divisions/Brigades 5/15 2/17 0/22 
Army Aviation Brigades and Regiments - - 11 
Marine (Amphibious) Divisions/Brigades 0/2 2/3 2/3 
Tanks 6,500 7,000 6947 
Artillery Pieces 11,000 8,000 7,953 
PLA Navy 2005 2010 2015 
Aircraft Carriers - - 1 
Destroyers 21 25 21 
Frigates 43 49 52 
Corvettes - - 15 
Tank Landing Ships/Amphibious Transport Docks 20 27 29 
Medium Landing Ships 23 28 28 
Diesel Attack Submarines 51 54 53 
Nuclear Attack Submarines 6 6 5 
Nuclear Ballistic Submarines - - 4 
Table 6.3.    PLA Ground and Naval Forces Growth and Modernization124 
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For the PLA Navy, its lone aircraft carrier garnered a lot of attention, but the 
addition of four nuclear ballistic submarines and 15 corvettes enhance China’s naval 
power.   
PLA Air Force 2005 2010 2015 
Fighters 1,500 1,680 1,700 
Bombers 780 620 400 
Transport 500 450 475 
PLA Rocket Force 2005 2010 2015 
SRBMs   Launchers/Missiles 
DF-15 (CSS-6) 70-80/230-270 90-110/350-400 90-110/350-400 
DF-11 (CSS-7) 100-120/420-460 120-140/700-750 120-140/700-750 
DF-16 (CSS-11) - - Developmental 
IRBM & MRBMs  Launchers/Missiles 
DF-21 (CSS-5 mod 1) 19-23/34-38 75-85/85-95 75-85/85-95 
DF-21D (CSS-5 mod 5)  - Developmental Unknown 
JL-1 SLBM 10-14 10-14 10-14 
DF-26 (DF-21 Variant) - Developmental Unknown 
ICBMS Launchers/Missiles 
DF-3 (CSS-2) 6-10/14-18 5-10/15-20 Retired? 
DF-4 (CSS-3) 10-14/20-24 10-15/15-20 10/20 
DF-5A (CSS-4 mod 1) 10/10 10/10 10/10 
DF-5B (CSS-4 mod 2) MIRV 10/10 10/10 10/10 
DF-31 (CSS-10 mod 1) Developmental <10/<10 8/8 
DF-31A (CSS-10 mod 2) 
MIRV 
Developmental 10-15/10-15 25/25 
JL-2 SLBM (DF-31 Variant) - Developmental Unknown 
DF-41 (CSS-X-10) - - Developmental 
Table 6.4.  PLA Air and Missile Forces Growth and Modernization125 
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For the PLA Air Force, it is noticeable to see the overall increase in fighters as 
it develops the J-20 stealth fighter and the FC-31 multi-role fighter.126  In terms of 
the PLA Rocket Force, China continues to research and develop missile systems 
aimed at deterring or attacking U.S. carrier and island based capabilities in the 
western Pacific Ocean.  Most pointedly, the expansion of these military assets point 
to China’s increased capability to threaten South Korea.    
Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke noted in 2013 that China’s growth in regional 
power is affecting Chinese-South Korean relations.  They wrote, “China’s rise is 
causing a marked change in the relative power of the region, China and states on its 
periphery have entered a new era...  At present, in economic terms China is the 
world’s number two great power, and in terms of military and soft power it has 
nearly reached regional great power status.”127   
Tang Yongsheng of the National Defense University perceived that despite 
the enhanced cooperation and integration of the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK 
Alliance, the alliances would inevitably crumble in the face of China’s anticipated 
development and “effective deterrence capability.”128  Tang predicted that instead of 
China’s neighboring states balancing against China as a threat, China would draw in 
the surrounding states towards itself.  Included in this prediction were current U.S. 
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allies that would choose to side with China instead of the U.S.  Later in Tang’s article, 
he considered the policy implications of China’s rise and concluded that the U.S. 
alliance system “cannot stop China from rising.”129  Moreover, China cannot force 
the U.S. out of the Western Pacific and challenge U.S. hegemony.  Therefore, Tang 
prescribed patience instead of confrontation.   
Tang Yongsheng, in another piece of scholarship, suggested that economic 
investment could accomplish two goals: 1) China could ease the concerns of 
neighboring states that its rise in comprehensive power was not a threat; and 2) 
counteract the strategic pressure brought about by the U.S. pivot to Asia.130  Tang 
noted that as of 2013, “China is now the biggest trading partner of all of its 
neighbors and that gives it lasting economic and political clout.”131  Similarly, Tang 
prescribed that China should improve relations with its traditional allies, specifically 
Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos.  It is of interest that Tang does not mention 
North Korea as a “traditional ally”; but instead, argues that relations with other geo-
strategic important countries as South Korea, Kazakhstan and Indonesia should also 
be improved.  China did in fact improve its bilateral cooperation with Pakistan—a 
goal accomplished in April 2015 with an aid package worth $46 billion.132   
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Self-Perception of Rising State in Relation to Adversarial Alliance: 
Question 4a: Have Chinese analysts become increasingly dissatisfied with adversarial 
alliances on its periphery?  Not Supported.  Chinese analysts prescribe patience and 
further economic ties with South Korea and resist temptation to challenge U.S. 
hegemony. 
Question 4b: Do Chinese analysts tolerate the adversarial alliances and recognize the 
security benefits?  Supported.  Chinese analysts, Xin Qiang and Yu Tiejun recognize 
the alliance benefit that South Korea has not developed its own nuclear weapons.   
Question 4c: Has China’s self-perception of its rise in power influenced its foreign 
policy outcomes?  Possible.  China may have used its free trade agreement with 
South Korea to enhance South Korea’s economic dependence on China.  Moreover, 
China has shown increases in its military capabilities over the past 15 years that 
enhance China’s ability to project power on the Korean Peninsula. 
6.7 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES 
The next Chinese perception of the US-ROK Alliance is how Chinese analysts 
evaluate changes in alliance capabilities.  The analysis will continue with the rough 
chronology of alliance events before examination of the most recent key strategic 
issue—the proposed THAAD deployment on South Korean soil. 
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6.7.1 2014-2015  Exercises and Forward Deployment 
The US-ROK Alliance over the next two years, 2014 and 2015, conducted 
some of the largest joint military exercises to date, and North Korea responded to 
the military exercises with its own missile exercises.  For example, joint exercise 
SSANG YONG 2014 was the largest iteration of the exercise to date as U.S. Marine’s 
3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa, ROK Marines, and units from the 
Australian Army conducted amphibious landings in March 2014.133  Moreover, joint 
exercise MAX THUNDER in 2014 was also the largest iteration in its history as it 
practiced receiving and dispatching “follow on forces.”134  The next year, in protest 
to the KEY RESOLVE exercise and the FOAL EAGLE exercise, North Korea fired off 
seven surface to air missiles on 12 March 2015 and four missiles off its west coast 
on 3 April 2015.135  The following month on 8 and 9 May, North Korea test fired a 
Sub-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and three KN-01 missiles, respectively.136 
 Li Qingsi contended that the US-ROK Alliance has used North Korea’s nuclear 
and rocket programs as an excuse to conduct military exercises.  The result has 
pushed North Korea to pursue a “military first” policy and has dragged China into 
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the problem since the two states were alliance partners in the past.  Likewise, he 
argued that it is difficult for China to protect North Korea.137   
Concerning the forward deployment of U.S. forces, Vice Secretary Liu Xige [刘
惜戈], of the Chinese International Strategic Research Foundation, provided multiple 
reasons why the Korean Peninsula is important to American interests: “The Korean 
Peninsula holds important strategic value to the U.S., it not only served as an 
important strategic front to contain Soviet expansion, it also protects and 
suppresses Japan’s most advantageous flank; furthermore, because South Korea 
serves as a ‘forward position and assembly area’ for proceeding northward in land 
combat, and can also provide support for northwest Pacific maritime combat.”138  
Therefore, even if the Chinese consider the US-ROK Alliance a “relic” of the Cold 
War, it is promoting U.S. interests in East Asia.   
Servicea Installationb Major Units Personnelb 
Air Force Kunsan 8th FW 2,450 
Air Force Osan 51st FW, 731 AMS 5,350 
Army Camp Casey 1st BCT, 2nd Infantry Division, Fires 
Brigade 
5,200 
Army  Camp Humphreys Aviation Brigade, 210th Air Defense 
Artillery 
3,000 
Army Camp Red Cloud 2nd Infantry Division HQ 1,550 
Army  Yongsan 8th Army HQ 4,100 
Marine 
Corps 
Camp Mujuk Support Unit 
- 
Navy Chinhae Commander Fleet Activities 150 
Table 6.5.  U.S. Military Posts, Units, and Personnel in ROK in 2013139 
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Table 6.5 points to the forward deployment of an estimated 22,000 U.S. military 
personnel deployed to South Korea.  The forward presence of the troops not only 
aids power projection capabilities for the U.S., but also adds credibility to the U.S. 
commitment to defend South Korea. 
6.7.2 2014-2016 ROK THAAD Issue 
The cohesion test facing the US-ROK Alliance today is very different from the 
one the Roh administration caused.  The U.S. has sought to deploy a THAAD system 
to South Korea which includes the missile interceptors and a forward based X-band 
radar.  In October 2014, there was speculation that the U.S. subsequently delayed 
the hand-over of wartime operational control and tied it to the THAAD deployment 
as a negotiating point in late 2015.140  To answer this speculation, U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Hagel issued a statement that the ROK was not ready to assume wartime 
operational control and was working towards a 2020 handover date.141   
THAAD deployment incorporates China’s strategic relations with South 
Korea and North Korea as well.  Wang Dong summarized the current situation,  
The U.S. has successfully deployed the TMD system to Japan, and the U.S. has 
been discussing the deployment of the THAAD system to South Korea.  Of 
course, China cannot prevent the U.S. from deploying the system to Japan, 
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but China is attempting to pressure South Korea from accepting the 
deployment.  It is a sensitive topic as South Korea is torn between the two 
powers.  Sometimes you will hear Korean people complain about this, and 
one option they have discussed is the development of Korea’s own missile 
defense system that is separate from the U.S.  That will to a great extent 
alleviate Chinese anxieties because China is most concerned about the 
forward deployed X-band radar that is potentially damaging to Chinese 
strategic missile deterrence.142   
For background information, the U.S. has deployed two different anti-ballistic 
missile systems: National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defense 
(TMD).  The U.S. has directed the NMD system towards protecting the U.S. mainland 
and directed the TMD system towards protecting Japan.  A key contention raised by 
Wu Riqiang is that the two missile defense system’s purposes can be linked together 
to enhance NMD performance.  For example, the TMD system includes the Aegis 
missile system and the PAC-3 Patriot missile system are focused on protecting 
Japan, but Chinese analysts argue that the forward deployed X-band radar stations 
can be used for both TMD and NMD purposes.143  Therefore, the Chinese argue that 
that the TMD assets are promoting the NMD system’s protection of the U.S. 
mainland and breaking the strategic stability between the two states.144  As noted in 
the US-Japan Alliance chapter above, X-band radar is a “fire-control” radar that is 
very different from L-band and UHF radar systems that have search and surveillance 
functions.145 
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  The U.S. government asserts that a THAAD system deployed to South Korea 
will counter the North Korean nuclear threat, but Chinese analysts reject this 
argument because at present North Korea does not possess any nuclear ballistic 
missiles.  For instance, Wu Riqiang acknowledges that North Korea does possess 
nuclear weapons, but he adds that North Korea does not possess any ICBMs or the 
capability to arm a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead.  In 1998, U.S. experts 
were arguing that within five years North Korea would possess a nuclear ballistic 
missile, but as of early 2016, North Korea has still not developed a nuclear tipped 
ballistic missile.  Even North Korea’s most recent rocket launches in 2014 and 2016 
have not fully demonstrated a weapon delivery capability.  The U.S. reaction to the 
rocket launch in 2014 was to increase the number of Ground Based Interceptors 
(GBI), but what missiles are they going to intercept?  Thus, at present, a THAAD 
system does not enhance South Korea’s security because it has nothing to intercept 
from North Korea.  Wu Riqiang posits that this policy represents a disconnection on 
the part of the U.S. in consideration of the non-existent North Korean nuclear missile 
threat.146  Wang Dong agrees with Wu Riqiang’s assessment, “The X-band radar’s 
capabilities are much greater than what is necessary to confront the North Korean 
so-called ‘nuclear threat.’  If the U.S. goes forward with the THAAD deployment it 
serves as a prominent example of the U.S. trying to pursue absolute security at the 
expense of deepening the security dilemma with China.”147  Consequently, the U.S. 
argument that South Korea needs THAAD to protect South Korea and Japan from a 
North Korean nuclear attack is at present hard to justify.  Wu Riqiang does not know 
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the intentions of the U.S., but the current reality causes him to speculate that the U.S. 
is pointing its TMD policy towards China’s nuclear capabilities.148  In response to 
Chinese fears that a THAAD deployment in South Korea is aimed at countering 
China’s nuclear arsenal, Lt. Gen. David Mann recently stated, “It’s very, very 
important that we clarify that the radar, that system, is not looking at China.  That 
system is oriented, if the decision is made to deploy it, that system would be 
oriented on North Korea.”149  Yet, this response does not fully answer Chinese 
criticisms that the THAAD system’s X-band radar could potentially enhance the 
precision of NMD defending the continental U.S.   
U.S. extended deterrence over South Korea provides a different view of the 
problem.  The US-ROK joint statement made on 14 June 2012 stated for the first 
time in writing that the U.S. has extended its nuclear umbrella over South Korea.150  
The ROK is already very secure without the addition of THAAD because North Korea 
would face nuclear devastation for launching a nuclear attack on South Korea.  If the 
deployment of the THAAD system to South Korea truly enhanced the security of 
South Korea, it would be easy for the ROK leadership to go along with the U.S. as a 
trusted alliance partner.  However, the Park administration has not been able to 
agree to the deployment.   
The choice is not a simple one, because the bilateral relations between China 
and South Korea complicate the THAAD deployment decision.  Since the summer of 
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2014, China’s senior leadership has repeatedly voiced their disapproval of the 
proposed deployment of the THAAD system’s capabilities being in such close 
proximity to China.151  For example, recently Xi Jinping told President Obama that 
China is “resolutely opposed” to the THAAD deployment.152  These veiled threats 
indicate the seriousness of the issue to China and attempts to test the cohesion of 
the US-ROK Alliance. 
China has also focused attention on North Korea after its “hydrogen bomb” 
test on 6 January 2016 and the 7 February 2016 rocket launch.  The day of the 
rocket launch, the Park administration signaled its intentions to hold “consultations” 
with the U.S. on the THAAD deployment, much to China’s chagrin.153  Subsequently, 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry summoned both the South Korean Ambassador to 
                                                        
151 Kim Oi-hyun, “Washington and Beijing’s Conflict Growing over Missile Defense,” The Hankyoreh, 9 
June 2014, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/641453.html (Accessed 13 
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News, 26 August 2014, 
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Summit,” The Hankyoreh, 27 August 2014, 
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4 February 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-
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13 May 2016); Chang Se-jeong and Ser Myo-ja, “Xi Pressed Park on Thaad System,” Korea JoongAng 
Daily, 6 February 2015, 
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3000595 (Accessed 13 May 
2016); and “Seoul Must Stand Up to Chinese Pressure over THAAD,” The Chosun Ilbo, 17 March 2015, 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/03/17/2015031701802.html (Accessed 13 
May 2016).  
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http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/Xi-warns-Obama-over-THAAD-missile-
system?page=1 (Accessed 13 May 2016). 
153 “China protests S. Korea’s Decision on U.S. missile shield,” Yonhap News, 8 February 2016, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/02/08/52/0301000000AEN20160208000400315
F.html (Accessed 24 February 2016). 
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China, Kim Jang-soo, and the North Korean Ambassador to China, Ji Jae-ryong.154  
The Korean media outlet did not provide details on the message the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry delivered to the respective ambassadors.  These recent developments 
highlight Chinese fears that a successful nuclear program in North Korea will create 
adverse effects for China such as South Korea and Japan requiring “more robust 
missile defense systems in Northeast Asia,” and provide incentives for independent 
nuclear weapons programs.155 
In late May 2016, Chinese military leaders were pointing to the potential 
THAAD deployment in South Korea and development of hypersonic glide missiles as 
rationale for China’s future deployment of its nuclear ballistic Jin-class (Type 094) 
submarines into the Pacific Ocean.156  In late December 2013, China’s Ministry of 
Defense informed foreign military attaches that the missile-sub fleet would make its 
first voyage into the Indian Ocean.  At the time, Chinese Admiral Wu Shengli stated 
in a Communist Party magazine, “This is a trump card that makes our motherland 
proud and our adversaries terrified...  It is a strategic force symbolizing great-power 
status and supporting national security.”157  However, Wu Riqiang argues against 
the effectiveness of the Jin-class submarines for deterrent purposes; he stated, “My 
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May 2016). 
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argument is that because of the high noise level of the Type 094 and China’s lack of 
experience of running a SSBN fleet, China cannot and should not put 094 in 
deterrent patrol in the near future.”158  Wu Riqiang argued that China’s current 
ICBM forces are the most trustworthy way to deliver nuclear weapons since China is 
not technologically ready to develop strategic bombers or nuclear submarines.159 
Additionally, North Korea’s provocative actions have pressed China to adopt 
tougher measures on North Korea as evidenced by its vote in favor of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 to apply pressure on North Korea for its 
most recent provocative behavior.160  China also carried out its own sanctions to 
pressure North Korea such as the recent suspension of coal shipments from 
Dandong in Liaoning Province to North Korea that began in March.161   
Adversarial Alliance Capabilities Concept: 
Question 3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial 
alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, and 
military bases?  Supported.  Chinese analysts have commented on the proximity of 
U.S. military forces on the Korean peninsula in close proximity to the Chinese 
mainland. 
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Question 3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the 
adversarial alliances?  Supported.  Chinese analysts pay a lot of attention to the 
recent THAAD consultations between the US-ROK Alliance partners. 
Question 3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the 
adversarial alliances?  Supported.  Chinese analysts have paid attention to the yearly 
joint US-ROK Alliance military exercises. 
Question 3d:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities and 
foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes?  Supported.  Since the summer of 
2014, Chinese leaders have used diplomatic channels to signal their disapproval of a 
potential THAAD deployment and veiled threats.  Additionally, Chinese military 
leaders point to their future nuclear missile submarine deployment as a response to 
the THAAD system.  Most recently, China has adopted a harder line on North Korea 
since the most recent North Korean nuclear and missile tests by agreeing to UN 
Security Council Resolution 2270. 
6.8 PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGED INTENTIONS 
An important result from the US-ROK Alliance case study is that scholars 
represented in the sample of Chinese journal articles and interview subjects did not 
talk about any notable shifts in how China perceives the US-ROK Alliance.  Though 
there was mention in the alliance cohesion section and the perceptions of 
conspiracy section about the U.S. attempting towards confrontation with China, the 
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perceptions never fully took hold permanently.  On the former point, the alliance 
partners agreed on the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative and the Security 
Policy Initiative agreement and did not garner a large amount of attention.  On the 
latter point, North Korea’s provocative behavior in 2006, 2009, and 2010 served as 
a more viable explanation for why the alliance’s cohesion rebounded from a historic 
low point.  Chinese analysts are in general agreement that the US-ROK Alliance 
remains pointed towards North Korea.  As Sun Ru summarized, “The influence of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance is confined predominantly to Northeast Asia, with its tensions with 
China both modest and local.”162  The assessment aligns well with Yu Tiejun’s ideas; 
he stated that despite the US-ROK Alliance, China has continued to develop stronger 
relations with South Korea as it does not consider the US-ROK Alliance as a major 
threat.  Since China and South Korea’s diplomatic normalization in August 1992, the 
Sino-South Korean relationship has prospered ever since as an important trading 
partner.163   
Perceptions of Changed Intentions: 
Question 1Aa:  Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, reports, 
speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions?  Not Supported.  
Even though the alliance has signed and issued various alliance documents and joint 
declarations reaffirming the alliance, Chinese analysts did not perceive a change in 
alliance intentions.   
Question 1Ab:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the 
adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of benign intentions?  No Evidence.  I did 
                                                        
162 Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, “Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle,” p. 117. 
163 Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University. 
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not find any articles in my sample that mentioned the removal of U.S. tactical 
nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. 
Question 1Ac:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the 
adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of malign intentions?  No Evidence.  The 
Adversarial Alliance Capabilities concept above focused on enhanced alliance 
capabilities, but Chinese analysts did not describe a change in the intentions of the 
alliance. 
Question 1Ad: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of changes in alliance intentions 
influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?  No Evidence. 
6.9 US-ROK ALLIANCE SUMMARY 
In conclusion, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have greatly 
influenced the US-ROK Alliance since the end of the Cold War.  This strategic 
interaction has heavily affected the way Chinese analysts have assessed and 
characterized the adversarial alliance.  From their vantage point, the presence of the 
US-ROK alliance legitimizes the North Korean regime’s fears.  Li Qingsi provides the 
metaphor of a person trying to cool a boiling pot of water by blowing on it, instead 
of removing the heat source.  If the US-ROK Alliance is acting as a heat source, any 
policy to reassure the North Koreans is useless as long as the US-ROK Alliance 
remains a serious threat to the North Korean regime.  Li Qingsi admits that this 
dilemma has caused China to be perplexed because it has no method to dismantle 
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the US-ROK Alliance, and may have no other choice but to bring North Korea closer.  
Moreover, China’s increasingly close economic relationship with South Korea 
further complicates the issue.164  Notably, the North Korean threat heavily affected 
the state of US-ROK Alliance cohesion.  This corollary made some Chinese analysts 
speculate that the U.S. was manipulating the tensions for its own benefit.  Moreover, 
the rise of China’s economic influence has directly influenced South Korea’s ability 
to cooperate with the U.S. military, because activities that could potentially harm 
Chinese interests could create economic consequences for South Korea’s economy.   
 
                                                        
164 Li Qingsi [李庆四], Personal Interview, Renmin University, 14 October 2015. 
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7.0  CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The findings from the three case studies reflect a structured and focused 
comparison.  I have examined the same alliance perception concepts across all three 
cases.  Although the three adversarial alliances vary in quality and experience, the 
method of inquiry has revealed some interesting observations.  The comparisons 
below will focus on how Chinese scholars have viewed key developments within the 
cases.  Each concept section will include a chart to compare the questions across the 
three cases; I have included an article count to the show the relative amount of 
attention per question where applicable.  Lastly, I will conclude with policy 
implications, and notes on areas for further research. 
7.2 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE INTENTIONS 
7.2.1 Perceptions of Changed Intentions 
Chinese analysts shifted their perceptions of alliance intentions in two 
cases—the USSR-Vietnam Alliance and the US-Japan Alliance.  By contrast, Chinese 
analysts’ perceptions of the intentions of the US-ROK Alliance did not markedly 
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change.  First, we will address the changes perceived in USSR-Vietnam Alliance and 
the US-Japan Alliance, before turning to compare those two cases with the US-ROK 
Alliance. 
The USSR-Vietnam Alliance took a dramatic turn in its short history.  The role 
of the Soviet Union as the great power in the alliance relationship largely 
determined Chinese threat perceptions.  The Soviet Union went from being a sizable 
threat in the 1970s and early 1980s to a non-threat by 1989 when China and the 
Soviet Union normalized relations.  China called upon the Soviet Union to remove its 
support of Vietnam in Cambodia as a key requirement for normalization.  
Subsequently, the removal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia was quickly 
followed by the exit of Soviet naval and air assets from Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang.  
The tangible costly action of removing military assets pointed to a substantial 
decrease in alliance capabilities as well as Vietnamese interest in hosting Soviet 
forces.   
From the Chinese standpoint, the US-Japan Alliance’s intentions changed 
dramatically with the 1996 joint declaration and 1997 revised defense guidelines.  
Chinese analysts saw the alliance shift from a “restraining” alliance to a military 
alliance that allowed Japan to be more active in East Asian security matters.  A key 
component of this activity is Japan’s active role in Taiwan, and the US-Japan Alliance 
has been regarded a growing security challenge as the Sino-Japanese relationship 
has worsened since 2010.  Likewise, the development of strategic defensive 
weapons signaled malign intentions towards China. 
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By contrast, Chinese perceptions of the US-ROK Alliance intentions have held 
constant.  First, in comparison to the USSR-Vietnam Alliance, the US-ROK Alliance 
since the end of the Korean War to present has remained focused on North Korea 
and did not pose a large threat to the Chinese mainland since its tensions with China 
are “both modest and local.”1  Second, in comparison to the US-Japan Alliance, the 
US-ROK Alliance did not present a large joint declaration or revised defense 
guidelines that signaled a shift or expansion in the scope of the alliance focus.  The 
ROK military is operationally coordinated with U.S. military forces to contend with 
North Korea.  While the Roh administration was adamant that South Korean forces 
were not going to support contingencies in Taiwan, U.S. Congressional testimony 
from Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Robert Lawless vaguely pointed to 
“strategic flexibility” of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea as an issue that had been 
resolved concerning a Taiwan contingency.2  These two findings show that Chinese 
perceptions of intentions are rationally connected to observable behavior. 
In conclusion, concerning changes in perceived intentions, Chinese analysts 
paid attention to a number of sources to determine intentions.  Table 7.1 points to 
adversarial alliances signing agreements that expand their scope of activity and 
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Republic of Korea Alliance: An Alliance at Risk?, p. 32 [pdf p. 36]. 
 238 
Change in Perceived Intentions Predictions 




1Aa:  Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial 
alliance agreements, reports, speeches, 






1Ab:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible 
costly actions that diminish the adversarial 
alliance’s capabilities as a signal of benign 
intentions? 
Supported No Evidence 
No 
Evidence 
1Ac:  Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible 
costly actions that enhance the adversarial 
alliance’s capabilities as a signal of malign 
intentions? 






1Ad: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of 
changes in alliance intentions influence 






Table 7.1.  Structured Comparison of Change in Perceived Intentions 
7.2.2 Perceptions of Conspiracy 
This section will explore the evidence of Chinese analysts perceiving 
conspiracy against Chinese interests.  With the USSR-Vietnam Alliance, I argue that 
Chinese interpreters over-read the significance of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of 
Friendship and Co-operation.  The Vietnamese aimed the treaty at China to gain 
diplomatic cover for Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, but I argue that the 
Vietnamese would have invaded Cambodia without the treaty with the Soviets.  The 
Vietnamese had exhausted previous attempts to end its border dispute with 
Cambodia via bilateral negotiations with Cambodia, the offer of Chinese mediation, 
and at least four coup attempts.  Pre-existing levels of Soviet-Vietnamese security 
cooperation were present long before the Cambodian invasion.   
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Moreover, I argue that the Chinese over-read the treaty’s significance.  The 
language used in the treaty was very different from the military assistance promised 
to East Germany or North Korea in their respective agreements.  The treaty between 
the USSR and Vietnam only promised “mutual consultation” not military force.3  The 
treaty served as a diplomatic signal that the Soviet Union was on Vietnam’s side in 
the conflict and served to advance the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship.  However, 
the Soviet leadership at the time of the signing must have been well aware of the 
tensions between China and Vietnam, and they were not going to allow Vietnam to 
entrap them in a war with China.  The treaty may have forced the Chinese to plan 
response to a Vietnamese invasion at the Chinese Central Work Conference in 
November and December of 1978 that would not incite a Soviet response before the 
signing of the treaty.4  Potentially, the treaty agreement influenced China’s 
diplomatic signaling that the upcoming attack on Vietnam would be limited and 
would not seek regime change.5  After the month long punitive strike on Vietnam in 
1979, it is very possible that China re-evaluated its previous view of the USSR-
Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation as the Soviets did not respond 
forcefully to the month long invasion of Vietnam’s northern border.  Into the mid-
1980s, the Chinese repeatedly bombarded Vietnam as a signal of their disapproval 
of Vietnam’s continued occupation of Cambodia and “dry-season” offensives against 
the Khmer Rouge.  While the treaty was against China’s interests in Cambodia, there 
                                                        
3 Douglas M. Gibler, “Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam,” International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II 
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), pp. 465-467. 
4 Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications, p. 88. 
5 Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979, p. 229 
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is no evidence that the treaty was part of a Soviet conspiracy against China.  In 
summary, Chinese analysts were able to discern the intentions of the Soviets by 
reading the observable actions of the alliance. 
In contrast to the USSR-Vietnam Alliance case, Chinese misperceptions of the 
US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance moved beyond overcentralization and 
exhibiting over-Machiavellianism.  In both the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK 
Alliance, the alliances entered respective crises that forced the U.S. to respond.  
Chinese analysts noticed as the alliances showed a dramatic reversal in alliance 
cohesion.   
The first example of a perception of conspiracy comes from the US-Japan 
Alliance; numerous Chinese academics accused the U.S. of manipulating the 2010 
and 2012 Diaoyu Island issues for its benefit.  The conspiracy theories pointed to the 
U.S. as the instigator of the conflict as a means of improving its hegemonic position 
in East Asia.  In the US-Japan Alliance case, moderate voices challenged the 
conspiracy theories to emphasize the positive balancing role that the U.S. plays 
between China and Japan.  The second example comes from the US-ROK Alliance 
when it strengthened in the wake of the 2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear tests 
and the Cheonan sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.  A number of 
Chinese academics speculated that the U.S. instigated the events without detailing 
how the U.S. accomplished the task.  The logic of the conspiracy was simple: the U.S. 
benefitted the most from the crises; therefore, it is responsible for creating and 
stoking the crises.  In contrast to the US-Japan Alliance, I did not find other Chinese 
analyses in the sample that refuted the US-ROK Alliance conspiracy theories.   
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In conclusion, it is natural for the target state or third-party state in an 
anarchic international system to be wary of security cooperation on its periphery, 
and this natural inclination to see connections and correlation can quickly lead to 
imagined planning and conspiracy.  Table 7.2 details how perceptions of 
“overcentralization” and perceptions of conspiracy were present, but subsequent 
events corrected the misperception or other commentators offered differing 
viewpoints.  Overall, Chinese analyst were able to rationally discern the baseline 
intentions of the alliances and offer differing viewpoints to counter perceptions of 
conspiracy. 
Perceptions of Conspiracy Questions 




1Ba:  Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial 
alliance activities as well organized and planned 
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7.3 ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION 
All three case studies revealed junctures of low cohesion.  The Soviet Union 
displayed a lack of practical support for Vietnam while it faced China’s 1979 
punitive invasion and regular incursions.  The US-Japan Alliance and US-ROK 
Alliance both suffered from senior-level disagreements over alliance direction and 
defense policy.  In the former, Chinese leaders were wary of a strong reaction from 
the Soviets for attacking Vietnam, but the Soviet Union offered minimal “airlift” 
support of ten flights to Vietnam and held a naval exercise in the South China Sea on 
17 March 1979 a full month after China’s attack on Vietnam.6   
In the latter cases, Chinese analysts focused on senior level speeches that 
pivoted away from the U.S. axis.  For example, South Korean President Roh made 
some rather controversial speeches that promoted his ideas of “balancer diplomacy” 
and notions of independent security; Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama also made 
speeches promoting an “East Asian Community.”  In both cases, both President 
George W. Bush and President Obama brought significant political pressure on their 
senior counterparts to bring realignment.  In hindsight, scholars such as Sun 
Xuefeng and Zhu Feng noted how quickly the senior-level disagreements faded after 
the respective officials left office.  This complete turnaround in cohesion made them 
look to the institutional solidarity of the U.S. alliance system as deep-rooted 
systemic variables. 
                                                        
6 Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the 
Cold War, p. 122; and Sally W. Stoecker, Clients and Commitments: Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 
1978-1988 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989), p. 9 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2737.pdf (Accessed 10 June 2016). 
 243 
Concerning perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion affecting Chinese 
foreign policy outcomes we can draw some conclusions via correlation of events.  
For example, the Soviets inattention to Vietnam displayed a lack of cohesion 
between the alliance, and China felt more freedom to launch further incursions 
against Vietnam.  Additionally, Sino-Soviet high-level negotiations on normalization 
throughout the 1980s were completely unaffected by Sino-Vietnamese tensions 
such as the March 1988 clash over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands,7 the 
Soviets “maintained near total silence.”8  For the US-Japan Alliance, even though the 
Hatoyama government was a short-lived departure from the American axis, senior 
Chinese leaders were very welcoming of Hatoyama’s calls for the creation of an 
“East Asian Community.”  On six separate occasions, senior Chinese leaders such as 
Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Xi Jinping echoed calls for Japan to pivot towards the 
Asian mainland and away from the “Asia-Pacific.”9  In comparison, there is a 
possibility that Hu Jintao found the dip in cohesion of the US-ROK Alliance as a good 
point to pursue a free trade agreement with South Korea.10   
In conclusion, cohesion is a quality often judged after the event.  Moreover, 
there are multiple levels of analysis to consider within an alliance such as senior-
level interaction, institutional level, degrees of dependence, threat environment, and 
shared versus individual national interests.  Table 7.3 reveals that Chinese analysts 
                                                        
7 Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 154. 
8 Robert Ross, “China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 31, No. 12 (Dec. 1991), pp. 1174-1175. 
9 Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism” 
[Dongya de Zhongguo: diqu zhengzhi jingyan yu diqu zhuyi sixiang], World Economics and Politics 
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10 “China FTA Network,” Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Last updated March 2016, 
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paid particular attention to the senior level interactions between adversarial 
alliance partners, but they were also aware of the deeper military-to-military nature 
of alliances. 
Adversarial Alliance Cohesion Questions 




2a:  Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance 
cohesion presume that it is a function of 
external political context? 
Supported Supported Supported 
2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance 
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Table 7.3.  Structured Comparison of Adversarial Alliance Cohesion 
7.4 ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES 
From the cases, it is possible to distinguish between what the Chinese 
perceived to be extremely versus moderately threatening capabilities.  For Chinese 
analysts, the most worrisome part of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance was the USSR’s 
large numbers of capabilities in close proximity to China.  From 1969 until 
normalization in 1989, the Soviet Union presented SS-20 nuclear ballistic missile 
capabilities that could destroy China with a “surgical strike,” and more than a 100 
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nuclear capable Backfire bombers.11  Additionally, the Soviet’s Southeastern Theater 
of Military Operations contained 25 Soviet Army divisions that could be ready for 
combat within four days, and an additional complement of 31 Soviet Army divisions 
with eleven days of full alert—representing a million Soviet troops on China’s 
border.12  Vietnam for its part of the alliance represented air and naval basing 
options for Soviet aircraft and naval vessels at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang as 
“fraternal facilities.”13 
In comparison, the U.S. as the great power partner in both the US-Japan 
Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance does not represent the same threat to China as the 
Soviet Union.  Since the post-Cold War troop decreases, the U.S. has held steady at 
100,000 forward deployed personnel in the Asia-Pacific as mandated by the Nye 
Initiative.14  Even though the troop presence is much smaller than Soviet 
deployments, Zhang Jingquan and Liu Xige have recognized that U.S. military bases 
and ports in Japan and South Korea enhance U.S. power projection capabilities.15  
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Moreover, the US-ROK Alliance for its small size has exhibited advanced joint 
operational capabilities.16   
All three cases represent adversarial alliances where the small power is 
reliant on a great power with strategic nuclear weapons.  The ability of the great 
power to extend nuclear deterrence holds important weight for an alliance 
relationship.  The U.S. has repeatedly provided statements to confirm the fact that 
Japan is under the nuclear protective umbrella since President Johnson’s January 
1965 reassurance.17  For the South Koreans, the first time the U.S. stated in writing 
that South Korea is under the nuclear deterrence umbrella came in a US-ROK joint 
statement in 2012.18  The nuclear issue is of great concern to Chinese International 
Relations scholars since Japan possesses an extremely large stockpile of nuclear 
fissile materials that Japan could use to produce a large nuclear arsenal.  Japan’s 
fissile material is of great importance as China considers the strategic capabilities of 
the US-Japan Alliance and Japan’s dependence on U.S. nuclear assets.19  The “Study 
on Japan’s Nuclear Materials” cites a calculation from a nuclear security expert, 
                                                        
16 Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University. 
17 Liu Xing [刘星], “Discussion on the Vitality of the US-Japan Alliance” [Shilun Rimei tongnmeng de 
shengmingli], World Economics and Politics [Shejie jingji yu zhengzhi], 2007, No. 6, p. 42, note 1. 
18 Sun Ru [孙茹], “Network and Outlook for the US Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific,” [Meiguo yatai 
tongmeng tixi de wangluohua ji qianjing], China International Studies [Guoji wenti yanjiu], No. 4, 2 July 
2012, p. 45; and Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, “Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle,” 
Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 24, No. 4 (July/August 2014), p. 106.   
19 Liu Weidong [刘卫东], “The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its 
Rebalancing Strategy,” p. 89; Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US - Japan alliance,” pp. 88-
92; “Study on Japan’s Nuclear Materials,” China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and 
China Institute of Nuclear Information and Economics, September 2015, pp. 27-28 [pdf pp. 33-34], 
available at: http://fissilematerials.org/library/cacda15.pdf (Accessed 28 April 2015).   
 247 
Frank von Hippel, that Japan could use its domestically based 10.8 tons of separated 
plutonium to construct nearly 1350 nuclear warheads.20 
Finally, in consideration of missile defense as a strategic defensive weapon, 
the US and Japan have cooperated extensively on research and development of TMD 
capabilities.  Chinese analysts have long taken note of this cooperation and judge 
that the missile defense capabilities upset the strategic stability between China and 
the U.S.  Even though the U.S. repeatedly claims that missile defense is for 
countering “limited” nuclear attacks, the Chinese argue that missile defense 
endangers its secure second strike capability.21  Similarly, in recent months, moves 
to deploy THAAD in South Korea have garnered greater attention from Chinese 
leaders and analysts as the THAAD interceptor battery has X-band radar that could 
aid National Missile Defense with warhead discrimination and tracking.22  This 
discrimination capability would potentially hinder Chinese missile decoys and 
counter-measures.  Table 7.4 below illustrates Chinese commentators are very 
much concerned with strategic capabilities in close proximity to the Chinese 
mainland.  
 
                                                        
20 “Study on Japan’s Nuclear Materials,” p. 2 [pdf p. 8], The warhead calculation references Frank von 
Hippel, “The large costs and small benefits of reprocessing,” International Workshop on Spent Nuclear 
Fuel Management, Beijing, 23 October 2014.   
21 “Statement by the United States of America Concerning Missile Defense,” U.S. Department of State,  
Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Washington, DC, 7 April 2010, document 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140406.pdf (Accessed 22 April 2016); 
and Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” from chapter 8 in 
Christopher P. Twomey, ed., Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 120.   
22 Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University; and Ryan 
McGinley, Commander, “Sea-Based X-Band Radar Arrives in Pearl Harbor,” U.S. Navy, 10 January 
2006, Story Number: NNS060110-11,  http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=21914 
(Accessed 27 April 2016). 
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Adversarial Alliance Capabilities Questions 




3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the 
geostrategic factors of the adversarial alliance 
capabilities; for example, forward 







3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic 








3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the 







3d:  Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of 
adversarial alliance capabilities and foreign 
basing influence its foreign policy outcomes? 
Supported Supported Supported 
Table 7.4.   Structured Comparison of Adversarial Alliance Capabilities 
7.5 SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF RISING STATE IN RELATION TO 
ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE 
China’s self-perception as a rising power in relation to the US-Japan Alliance 
and the US-ROK Alliance elicits a variety of viewpoints: hedging, playing both sides, 
and a systemic viewpoint.  First, there are perceptions that China’s rise has 
enhanced the U.S. Alliance system as the U.S., Japan, and South Korea hedge against a 
potentially dangerous China.  For instance, Yuan Jingdong noted that China’s rise 
created an “implicit competition for a regional leadership role if not hegemony or 
dominance.”23  Another scholar, Zhang Jingquan, argued that China’s rise shifted the 
United States’ containment strategy.  Instead of the US-Japan Alliance containing 
                                                        
23 Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 87. 
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both China and Japan, the alliance has now shifted to the single purpose of 
containing China.24  China is cognizant of the fact that its rise can cause other states 
to worry about China’s future intentions and has learned to avoid inciting a security 
dilemma.  As Xin Qiang pointed out, China has not sought to maximize its power by 
increasing its nuclear weapons arsenal, but has consistently maintained its minimal 
deterrence doctrine.  He concluded that arms racing the U.S. would not be in the best 
interest of China.25   
Second, there is speculation from many analysts that China’s economic rise is 
causing South Korea to lean towards China, but others contend that this is a 
superficial understanding.  Yu Tiejun pointed to more than 70% of South Koreans 
stating that the U.S. is the most important state for South Korea.  The bilateral 
economic relationship between China and South Korea has prospered, but the 
political and military relationship with the U.S. will be very difficult to change.  
Additionally, Yu Tiejun thinks that the U.S. educated South Korean elite lean heavily 
towards the U.S. and they are not in favor of the China model.26  In summary, Zhang 
Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke assessed that South Korea has a dual strategy of 
containment and cooperation towards China.  On one hand, South Korea has a 
“comprehensive strategic alliance” with the United States that safeguards its 
security.  On the other hand, South Korea has a “strategic partnership” with China 
                                                        
24 Zhang Jingquan [张景全], “The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy,” [Rimei 
tongmeng yu Meiguo chongfan yazhou zhanlue], China International Studies [Guoji wenti yanjiu], No. 5, 
4 August 2012, p. 51. 
25 Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies 
Center. 
26 Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University. 
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that bolsters its economic relationship.  Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke conclude 
that South Korea is using US-ROK relations to balance Sino-ROK relations.27 
Third, Zhu Feng offers a systemic vantage point.  While he agrees that China’s 
rise has decreased the cohesion of the alliance and this provides China with a little 
more strategic space to maneuver, Zhu Feng also argues that the dynamics of 
economy and security are different and the U.S.-centric alliance system remains 
untouchable and unchangeable.  He stated, “Don’t have illusions that China’s rise 
could undermine the U.S. strategic anchor in the region.”28   
Self-Perception of Rising State in Relation to 
Adversarial Alliance Questions 




4a: Have Chinese analysts become increasingly 







4b: Do Chinese analysts tolerate the adversarial 
alliances and recognize the security benefits? 
N/A Supported Supported 
4c: Has China’s self-perception of its rise in 
power influenced its foreign policy outcomes? 
N/A Supported Potentially 







                                                        
27 Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke [张慧智与王箫轲], “Twenty Years of China-ROK Relations: 
Achievements and Problems” [Zhonghan guanxi ershi nian: Chengjiu yu wenti], Contemporary 
International Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], 2013, No. 1, p. 24. 
28 Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University. 
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7.6 LESSONS LEARNED FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
This dissertation research provides important lessons for International 
Relations, and this section will synthesize the case findings on four topics: the 
security dilemma, rational actor, rising power capabilities, and alliance politics.  
While the cases focus on Chinese perceptions of adversarial alliances, it is possible 
to draw greater analytical understanding of these International Relations issues. 
First, this research points to the security dilemma as a political science 
concept that has real-world implications.  International Relations is an anarchic 
environment where states compete and cooperate for security.  It is only natural for 
states to prepare for worst-case scenarios by internally and externally balancing 
against other states.  The cases illustrate how Chinese senior leaders saw first-hand 
how their actions could spur and initiate adverse reactions from the US-Japan 
Alliance.  In turn, the US-Japan Alliance’s 1996 joint declaration and 1997 revised 
guidelines continued to heightened security dilemma.  In response, China enhanced 
its bilateral relations with Russia.  While senior Chinese leaders publicly stated their 
desires to avoid arms racing and alliance politics, the empirical record shows quite 
the opposite.  China has continued to enhance its offensive and defensive strategic 
arms; and without a doubt, the U.S. continues to advance its defensive strategic arms. 
This continuous strategic competition between China and the U.S. illustrates 
the security dilemma at work.  Both states are compelled to react to the other states 
added capabilities.  Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has retained its strategic 
alliances with Japan and South Korea to aid its power projection to hedge against 
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the rise of China.  China’s advancements in military capabilities cause other states to 
balance against its rise in power.   
However, the USSR-Vietnam Alliance case shows how two states can 
circumvent the security dilemma by each state undertaking tangible costly actions.  
The Soviets achieved normalization with the Chinese by steadily removing the 
“three obstacles” that were threatening to the Chinese.  First, physically removing 
Soviet troops from Mongolia and Afghanistan, and reducing troop numbers on the 
Sino-Soviet borders was a signal of benign intent.  Second, removing support for the 
Vietnamese in Cambodia necessarily ended Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay and Da 
Nang.  These concrete policies helped to reduce the security dilemma. 
Second, in relation to the security dilemma is the idea of the state behaving 
as a rational actor.  As a state operating in an anarchic environment, it is natural to 
be cautious and wary of other powerful actors.  For the three adversarial alliance 
cases, China was cognizant of great powers in security cooperation with lesser 
powers on its periphery.  In each case the lesser power shared territory with the 
greater power; thus, aiding the greater power’s ability to project power in East Asia.  
China, as a rational actor, is able to discern the benefits and drawbacks of the 
respective alliance relationships.   
In the benefits column, numerous Chinese scholars have remarked that 
adversarial alliance partnerships have helped reduce the number of nuclear armed 
states on its periphery.  The U.S. through its extended deterrence policy and alliance 
management practices kept Japan and South Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons.  
Second, the relationship with the large alliance partner can act potentially as an 
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institutional brake.  In theory, if a great power manages its alliance relationship well, 
the small power and the large power will hold policy deliberations that can slow a 
small actor from behaving impetuously.  The large power alliance partner can 
always inform the smaller alliance partner that certain under certain circumstances 
the large power alliance partner will abandon it.  For instance, the distant large 
power alliance partner could have much smaller interest in advancing or protecting 
an issue or asset that is not a vital interest.  Third, an adversarial alliance can 
potentially act as a restraint on the capabilities of the smaller power by causing the 
smaller power to be dependent on the great power.  For example, Japan is heavily 
dependent on U.S. intelligence capabilities (a necessity in modern warfare), and the 
U.S. has limited the capabilities of Japan by not allowing it to have cruise missiles, 
ballistic missiles, nor aircraft carriers.  For example, the U.S. decision to not to sell F-
22 to Japan keeps the Japan Self-Defense Force from possessing the most advanced 
5th generation fighter in the world.  The F-22s that are in Okinawa are under the 
control of the U.S. Air Force’s 94th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron.   
In contrast, it is natural for China to see many of the drawbacks of security 
cooperation in close proximity to its borders.  First, in the drawback column, an 
adversarial alliance decreases the distance between a great power and China’s 
border.  Quite simply, U.S. basing privileges on foreign soil make a North American 
great power an East Asian power.   Second, the aggregated power of the adversarial 
alliance makes smaller neighbors much more powerful and potentially more 
dangerous if the small power is emboldened to challenge the resident power.  This 
is the opposite situation of the benefit above; instead of alliance abandonment, this 
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type of situation could entrap the large power alliance partner in a conflict that it 
does not want to pursue.  Third, a small power on China’s periphery can greatly 
enhance its internal balancing capabilities by linking with a large power.  In terms of 
internal balancing, a small power can gain technology transfers to its own domestic 
defense industries by way of production licenses, special equipment, and training.   
China, additionally, as a rational actor in an anarchic environment is cautious 
of other states’ intentions.  While Chinese analysts are continually evaluating the 
intentions of the U.S. and its Asian allies, these intentions are apt to change and 
deemed undependable.  Chinese analysts in this study evaluated the intentions of 
the alliances by looking for changes in intentions and at times saw conspiratorial 
intentions.  It is perfectly natural for rational actors to doubt the intentions of other 
actors and be suspicious of their activities that pertain to its national interests.  
Other scholars offered differing perceptions that interpreted the same events 
without attributing conspiratorial intentions.   
Third, Chinese analysts keep an eye to the future with an eye to potential 
threats and opportunities.  As they anticipate a continued rise in comprehensive 
national power that will rival the U.S.  In strategic terms, Chinese analysts recognize 
the potential dangers of a hegemonic war and the amount of resources that both 
states would dedicate towards an arms race.  In economic terms, China’s GDP has in 
constant 2011 US Dollars has grown dramatically in this new millennium; in 2000, 
China’s GDP was $1.3 trillion and by 2014, it was $5.3 trillion.  As an economic 
power, China benefits other countries as an export market.  For example, South 
Korea’s exports in 2005 comprised roughly 7% of South Korea’s GDP, and it would 
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grow by 2014 to roughly 12% of its GDP (constant 2005 US Dollars).  Additionally, 
China has demonstrated its rise in power by not only its yearly growth in GDP and 
trade surplus statistics, but also its yearly defense budget increases.  In constant 
2011 US Dollars, China defense budget surpassed Japan in 2004.  Ten years later, 
China’s defense budget would more than triple and Japan’s defense budget would 
actually decrease by $2 billion.  China’s military modernization has greatly benefited 
from the steadily growing defense budgets to pay for enhanced capabilities.  For 
instance, China’s research and development of ballistic missiles includes the full 
spectrum of ranges from intermediate to inter-continental.  Additionally, the 
Chinese military has been active in researching ballistic missile defense systems.   
In naval terms, China’s rise in power capabilities has grown tremendously in 
the past 16 years.  Chinese analysts are continually pointing to the fact that China is 
developing a blue water navy that will not be hemmed in by the first island chain, 
but will have greater abilities to operate in the Pacific Ocean.  The most recent 
announcement came in May 2016 during the deliberations over the US-ROK 
Alliance’s deployment of the THAAD system.  Chinese military leaders point to the 
deployment of the Jin-class (Type 094) submarines as a way to insure retaliation 
with nuclear weapons, referring to the submarines as a strategic trump card.  The 
addition of four Jin-class nuclear ballistic submarines enhances China’s ability to 
project power.  Each submarined is fitted with twelve JL-2 MIRV capable ballistic 
missiles that can carry two to three warheads.  Likewise, while the Liaoning aircraft 
carrier has received a lot of media attention, the addition of 15 corvettes in the past 
five years merits attention.   
 256 
With respect to the US-Japan Alliance, China’s rise in power has allowed it to 
use government vessels since 2012 to sail the contiguous and territorial waters of 
the Diaoyu Islands on a regular, almost daily basis.  In the summer of 2013, the 
Chinese government consolidated the activities of the Fisheries Administration, the 
Maritime Surveillance, the, Customs Enforcement, and the Border Control under the 
China Coast Guard.  The repeated use of Chinese government vessels in the Diaoyu 
Island waters forces Japan to use its maritime assets to monitor the Chinese 
government vessels.  In April 1978, China resorted to sending a flotilla of fishing 
boats to the Diaoyu Island waters before Japan and China agreed to “shelve the issue” 
as part of the peace treaty negotiations.29   Now in 2016, the Chinese government 
has much greater resources at its disposal to demonstrate its disapproval of 
Japanese policies over the disputed territory.   
Fourth, this dissertation research points us to greater understanding of 
alliance politics from the vantage point of the target state or third-party state.  From 
the perspective of a state outside the membership of an alliance, it is difficult to 
judge the actual intentions, capabilities, and cohesion of the alliance.  The alliance 
can display joint declarations, agreements, treaties, revised guidelines, and 
proclamations in an effort to signal its intentions.  The alliance can announce 
deployments, weapons sales and transfers, joint military exercises, and establish 
bases and ports to signal its capabilities.  When alliance members undertake the 
                                                        
29 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertiveness in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” MIT Political 
Science Department Research Paper No. 016-19, May 2016, p. 2, fn. 2, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2788165.  For more details on this event, see Daniel Tretiak, “The Sino-
Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku incident prelude,” Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 12, 1978, pp. 
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actions above they are pointing to the alliance’s cohesion, because all of these events 
require a degree of negotiations between the two alliance partners.  These are the 
events that the target state or third-party state can perceive, but it is cognizant that 
so much more is going on behind closed doors.   
Chinese analysts paid a lot of attention to the visible manifestations of low 
cohesion between the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance.  The relationship 
between the respective senior leaders was strained by suspended agreements, 
revelation of secret agreements, independent and exclusionary rhetoric, and refusal 
to comply with operational planning.  Chinese observations were validated by non-
Chinese sources that indeed the alliances were in difficult shape.  These analysts, 
Chinese and non-Chinese, were evaluating alliance cohesion by looking at the 
individual level of analysis.  ROK President Roh and President George W. Bush had 
serious disagreements on North Korean policy; Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama 
and President Obama had serious disagreements on the Futenma issue.  These 
disagreements were public and evident for all to see.  Strong and enduring alliances 
cannot be divided by a disagreement between senior actors alone.  During this time, 
the inter-alliance workings behind the scenes represented by military to military 
dealings and the bureaucratic dealings between the respective defense departments 
were not public.  It is thus, difficult to determine the level of alliance cohesion when 
a large part of the inter-alliance workings are behind closed doors.         
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7.7 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Finding #1: Chinese analysts focus on the personal relationship between senior leaders 
when evaluating adversarial alliance cohesion. 
 First, the relationship between Indian Prime Minister Modi and President 
Obama has long garnered attention.30  We should expect to see Chinese analysts on 
the lookout for strategic enhancements of the US-India relationship.  For instance, in 
April 2016, Ash Carter made a logistics agreement with his Indian counterpart, 
Manohar Parrikar, that “will allow the Indian and American militaries to use each 
other’s bases to refuel and as staging areas during emergencies or natural 
disasters.”31   
 Second, President Obama’s presidency is quickly ending.  Thus, looking 
forward to the 2016 presidential nominees, Hillary Clinton’s previous role as 
Secretary of State began during the Hatoyama low-point, but she was instrumental 
in pushing the U.S. “pivot” to Asia.  In terms of the alliance, Hillary Clinton 
repeatedly voiced support for Japan’s administration over the Diaoyu Islands during 
the 2010 and 2012 crises, and she has a record of interacting positively with Prime 
Minister Abe.  If Hillary Clinton is elected in November, Chinese analysts would 
expect the U.S. alliances in East Asia to remain cohesive.  If the U.S. alliances in East 
                                                        
30 Jeffrey Marcus, “After a Promise to Keep in Touch, Obama and Modi Get a Hotline,” The New York 
Times, 21 August 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/22/world/asia/after-a-promise-to-
keep-in-touch-obama-and-modi-get-a-hotline.html?_r=0 (Accessed 16 June 2016); and Gardiner 
Harris, “President Obama and India’s Modi Forge an Unlikely Friendship,” The New York Times, 5 June 
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/world/asia/india-narendra-modi-obama.html 
(Accessed 16 June 2016);  
31 Michael S. Schmidt, “U.S. and India Agree to Strengthen Military Ties,” The New York Times, 12 April 
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/world/asia/us-and-india-with-eye-on-china-agree-to-
strengthen-military-ties.html? (Accessed 28 June 2016). 
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Asia remain cohesive, South Korea and Japan have less incentive to pursue nuclear 
weapons to confront the nuclear threat from North Korea.  However, Chinese 
analysts would not favor further moves by Clinton to check the rise of China or 
attempts to embolden Japan. 
In contrast, Donald Trump has disparaged the U.S. alliances as a “bad deal” 
for the U.S., and he is opposed to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.  If Donald Trump is 
elected in November, Chinese analysts would expect poor relations between Trump 
and Prime Minister Abe and President Park.  Chinese analysts would expect the US-
Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance to enter a time of low cohesion.  If the U.S. 
vacates the region or abrogates its extended deterrence policies with Japan and 
South Korea, it would be highly likely that the South Korea and Japan would 
independently develop nuclear weapons to match the present-day nuclear threat.  
This contingency is most-likely why Japan has retained domestically at least 10 tons 
of nuclear fissile material.   
Finding #2: Chinese analysts focus on tangible costly actions in the realm of strategic 
capabilities. 
First, we should expect to see China continue its attempts to dissuade South 
Korea from accepting a THAAD deployment while the alliance partners are holding 
consultations on the issue.  South Korean media outlets have reported Chinese 
leaders issuing “veiled threats” toward the U.S. and South Korea if the alliance 
partners move forward with the THAAD deployment.  In addition, China has shown 
greater willingness to punish North Korea for its provocative behavior that provides 
justification for a THAAD deployment.   
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 Second, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) 
have potentially compromised China’s secure second strike capabilities.  Assurances 
that the strategic defensive weapons are aimed at “rogue states” have not convinced 
the Chinese.  Additionally, in response to further U.S. advances in Global Strike and 
the proposed Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) we should expect to see China 
pursue development of a modern nuclear triad that would include hypersonic 
ballistic missiles, advanced ballistic missile submarines, and a strategic stealth 
bomber.   
Finding #3:  Chinese analysts are aware of the role South Korean and Japanese 
domestic politics plays in the cohesion of the alliance. 
Chinese analysts pay attention to large protest events and polling numbers 
that gauge the respective domestic population’s lack of support for U.S. bases.  For 
example, the recent murder by a Marine veteran on Okinawa holds potential 
repercussions for the alliance relationship.32  This potentially affects U.S. basing 
options since Prime Minister Abe and the Governor of Okinawa, Takeshi Onaga, can 
discern the electorate’s pressure.33  We should expect China to welcome Japanese or 
South Korean leaders that lean away from the U.S. axis because they jeopardize the 
ability of the U.S. to retain basing privileges. 
 
                                                        
32 Jonathan Soble, “At Okinawa Protest, Thousands Call for Removal of U.S. Bases,” The New York 
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Finding #4:  Chinese analysts view the U.S. as a great power that has a moderating 
effect on the smaller alliance partner’s behavior. 
As China has carried out its “salami slicing” tactics in the South China Sea, the 
U.S. has undertaken a significant amount of security dealings with Vietnam and the 
Philippines.34  We should also expect Chinese analysts to view the enhancement of 
U.S. security ties with the Philippines and Vietnam as a not entirely negative 
development.35  Chinese leaders would be very reluctant to praise the development; 
yet, they can see the U.S. as a restraint on the smaller power’s foreign policy.  The 
U.S. can seek to maintain open sea lines of communication and act as an “honest 
broker” in the South China Sea territorial dispute.   
Finding #5:  Chinese analysts view the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea as a 
nuclear proliferation inhibitor.   
U.S. extended nuclear deterrence over its alliance partners has, in this sense, 
had a positive effect on China’s security.  We should expect to see Chinese analysts 
encourage U.S. policies that will restrain Japanese remilitarization.  For example, the 
27 April 2015 defense guideline revisions have not elicited the large amount of 
attention as the 1997 guideline revisions.36  In contrast to the 1997 revised 
guidelines that contained the phrasing “areas surrounding Japan” twenty times, the 
                                                        
34 Ronald O'Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
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[pdf p. 9], https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (Accessed 10 June 2016). 
35 Jane Perlez, “Why Might Vietnam Let U.S. Military Return? China,” The New York Times, 19 May 
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2015). 
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2015 revised guidelines only used the phrase “waters surrounding Japan” two times 
and two other mentions about defending airspace and maritime approaches.  This 
emphasis on wording helps avoid the Taiwan issue and puts Japan’s focus on its own 
territory.   
Finding #6: Chinese analysts’ perceptions are rationally connected to observable 
behavior.   
 Target states face a steep deficit of information on inter-alliance politics and 
bureaucratic policies.  We should expect China to attach greater significance to 
observable behavior instead of statements and declarations.  This finding should be 
particularly important for developments in the South China Sea as Freedom of 
Navigation Operations around the seven Chinese reclamation projects.  Additionally, 
the ability to bolster Filipino naval and coast guard assets should indicate in an 
observable way that the U.S. serious about enhancing its relationship with the 
Philippines. 
Finding #7: China’s rise in power relative to the U.S. alliances in East Asia is 
contradictory and suggests China has its own “integrate but hedge” strategy. 
 On one-hand Chinese diplomats and senior leaders have put forward the idea 
of a peaceful rise and avoidance of arms-racing and alliances, but at the same time 
China has developed a “quasi-alliance” with Russia as a way to purchase advanced 
weapon systems.  We should expect to see China’s large and growing defense 
budgets to continue the development of blue water navy capabilities and advanced 
ballistic missiles that potentially threaten U.S. aircraft carriers ability to operate in 
close proximity to the Chinese mainland. 
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Finding #8: Chinese analysts understand that China’s rise in economic and military 
power tests the economic and military resources of the U.S. to maintain its alliance 
network. 
The U.S. does not possess the fiscal strength that it possessed in the Cold War 
and has fewer economic incentives to offer its allies.  We should expect to see China 
test the cohesion of the U.S. alliances in East Asia by attempting to link economic 
policies with security issues.  The U.S., South Korea, and Japan all seek economic 
gains by engaging in commerce with Chinese companies and would prefer not to cut 
economic ties with China.   
Finding #9:  The US-Japan Alliance has been unable to reverse China’s announcement 
of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and repeated sailings of government 
vessels in the contiguous and territorial waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands.  
We should expect to see China to continue its use of “salami tactics” to coerce 
smaller powers.  Figure 7.1 displays China’s use of government vessels in the 
contiguous and territorial waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands from January 
2012 to May 2016.  China will use these assets to assert its territorial claims, and 
protect Chinese fishermen from arrest in disputed foreign Exclusive Economic 
Zones. 
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Figure 7.1.  Chinese Government Vessels in Japanese Waters37 
7.8 NOTES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Concerning the USSR-Vietnam Alliance case, I would like to track down 
archival data on two critical cohesion events.  First, I want to locate primary source 
evidence that would provide details on the November 1978 treaty negotiations 
between the USSR and Vietnam.  Minutes or a memorandum from the meeting 
would confirm the testimony from the anonymous Vietnamese officer that said 
Vietnam did not expect the Soviets to come to the aid if the Chinese attacked as a 
                                                        
37 “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, 
and Japan's Response- Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other Vessels into Japan's 
Territorial Sea,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 16 June 2016, 
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reprisal for invading Cambodia.38  Second, after Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech in 
July 1986, the newly appointed Vietnamese Party Chief, Truong Chinh, was waiting 
for Gorbachev in Moscow.  The two leaders met on 12 August 1986, and it would be 
highly instructive in the areas of alliance cohesion and power asymmetry to read the 
minutes of the meetings or memorandum between Gorbachev and Truong Chinh.   
Concerning the US-ROK Alliance, I will conduct further research to trace the 
on-going THAAD deployment issues.  This cohesion test places South Korea between 
the competing interests of its historic alliance partner, the U.S., and a rising 
economic power in the region, China.  The THAAD issue continues to evolve as South 
Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo recently stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 
Singapore on 5 June 2016, “If the THAAD is deployed to U.S. forces in Korea, our 
capability will be dramatically enhanced.”39 
Concerning the US-Japan Alliance, I will need to keep an eye on the Abe 
administration’s defense policies.  Japan under the second Abe administration has 
displayed intentions of becoming a “normal country” and throwing off the 
restrictions imposed on it after World War II.40  Furthermore, the Japanese Diet has 
                                                        
38 Henry J. Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” from Chapter 10 in Mark A. 
Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience 
Since 1949 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 222, the interview was conducted in 1999. 
39 “THAAD to ‘dramatically’ enhance capacity to counter NK threat: defense chief,” Yonhap News 
Agency, 6 June 2016, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/06/06/0200000000AEN20160606006100315.html 
(Accessed 6 June 2016). 
40 Wang Shan, trans. Wang Xiangyan, “An Analysis of Japan’s ‘Active Pacifism’,” Contemporary 
International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 24, No. 6 (November/December 2014), p. 105. 
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also displayed a legislative willingness to support Abe’s moves by passing legislation 
that provides the JSDF with greater legal latitude to act.41   
Concerning the inter-connectedness of alliance cohesion and alliance 
capabilities, I would like to develop a typology of events where cohesion enhancing 
or degrading decisions interact with capability enhancing or degrading events.  
Table 7.6 below illustrates the four possible outcomes that I would like to populate 
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the Cost of Cohesion Event 
 
Table 7.6.  The Interaction of Alliance Cohesion and Capability Events 2x2 
To fully address the question of how Chinese analysts perceive alliance 
capabilities, I will need to find Chinese military journals that delve into doctrinal and 
warfighting analysis.  Five potential journals to explore include: Contemporary 
Military [现代军事] from the PLA Press; Contemporary Military Digest [当代军事文
摘] from the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center; Military 
Operations Research and Systems Engineering [军事运筹与系统工程] from the 
Academy of Military Science’s Military Operation Research and Analysis Institute; 
                                                        
41 Jonathan Soble, “Japan’s Lower House Passes Bills to Give Military Freer Hand to Fight,” The New 
York Times, 16 July 2015. 
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and World Military Review  [外国军事学术] and National Defense [国防] from the 
Academy of Military Science of the Chinese PLA.   
Concerning the future of the U.S. Alliance system in East Asia, Zhu Feng 
contends, “East Asia security is a great laboratory for testing all of the assumptions.  
We need new theorizing of the security dynamics in East Asia.  The alliance system 
will always come underneath the crux of economics and security.  Otherwise, you 
will never know what is going on in the alliance system.”42  It will be worthwhile to 
keep tracing how China’s rise in economic and military power affects the respective 
alliances.  Will China be able to use its growing economic influence to weaken 
alliance commitments that would hold economic repercussions, or will China’s 
growing military power continue to cause the alliance partners to hedge against 
China? 
                                                        
42 Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University. 
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